Longstreet vs. Jackson
Jeffry Wert’s cover story “Lee’s Best Subordinate” in the August 2006 issue is in my opinion wrong. James Longstreet was not Lee’s best general.

Longstreet was a failure when given independent command. His conduct at the Battle of Seven Pines, in which he was in charge of 30,000 troops and provided the primary attack force, was less than exemplary. His orders were vague and misunderstood, causing the columns under Maj. Gens. D.H. Hill and Benjamin Huger to take the wrong road and march south instead of toward the isolated Union position to the east. These delays caused confusion, and the subsequent attack on Brig. Gen. Samuel Heintzelman’s III Corps was slow and piecemeal. Longstreet blamed General Huger for the failed assaults. Later in the Knoxville campaign in late 1863, he led a failed attack, then blamed Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws for it this time. It was always someone else’s fault.

The victory at Second Manassas was due to Lee’s bold strategy and Lt. Gen. Thomas Jackson’s excellent decision to attack Union Maj. Gen. John Pope and then pull him into counterattacking his corps, which was in a great defensive position with artillery placed to sweep the entire field to the front. If Longstreet had attacked on the afternoon of August 29 when Lee urged him to, he could have captured or destroyed Pope’s entire army. But Longstreet said, “The time was just not right.” Again he was too slow to act, and it cost the South a huge victory.

At Gettysburg Longstreet’s behavior and lack of first-rate generalship hurt the Confederates dearly. He disagreed with Lee on strategy, as a result delaying the movements of his divisions. He failed to attack in the early morning of day two like Lee planned. He failed to have Pickett’s Division brought forward for an early attack on day three. And quite possibly the worst mistake Long­street made was in not properly planning the tactical details of the battles on days two and three. Lieutenant General James Longstreet was one of the major contributors to the South’s loss. His conduct bordered on dereliction of duty and insubordination.

No, Stonewall Jackson was head and shoulders above Longstreet. His Valley victories of 1862 at McDowell, Front Royal, Winchester, Cross Keys and Port Republic are legendary and still studied to this day at West Point. His resolve and fearless conduct greatly perpetuated the Confederates’ victory at the First Battle of Manassas. He chose a great defensive position at the unfinished railroad cut and drew Pope to him at Second Manassas. His performances at Harpers Ferry, Antietam, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville were superb. Jackson understood that if you act swiftly at the crucial moment, you can achieve great victories. Longstreet did not.

Lee summed it up with these words on Jackson: “Such an Executive Officer the sun never shone on! I have but to show him my design, and I know that if it can be done, it will be done. No need for me to send or watch him. Straight as the needle to the pole he advanced to the execution of my purpose. Oh the daring, skill, and energy of this great and good soldier.”

C. Michael Black
Arlington, Texas

Jeffry Wert responds: Most of the criticisms that Mr. Black notes of Longstreet’s generalship are contained in my article. Like all men, Longstreet had failings. He also performed skillfully, if not brilliantly, on some battlefields of the war. Mr. Black is in error when he blames Longstreet for not attacking on August 29 at Second Manassas. Lee wanted to attack until reports came in of a Union force on the army’s right flank, finally concurring with Longstreet to delay an assault. What Mr. Black does not note is Stonewall Jackson’s failure, as instructed, to support Longstreet’s counterattack the next day. Jackson may have had good reasons not to advance, but he never explained why he had not done so.

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