The landing at Inchon by U.S. and ROK forces on September 15 finally compelled the North Koreans to withdraw from the Pusan perimeter. The 24th Infantry was divided into Task Forces Blair and Corley (named for their commanders), and they, along with several from other commands, began pursuing the enemy on September 27. By October 1, 1950, the NKPA troops were fleeing back across the 38th parallel.

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The 25th Division remained in South Korea until ordered north in late November to participate in the Chongchon operation. Later in November, overwhelming assaults by Chinese troops forced the U.S. Eighth Army to withdraw. On November 29, the Chinese 40th Army flanked the 24th Infantry’s line north of the Chongchon River in North Korea, forcing the neighboring 9th Regiment of the 2nd Division to withdraw.

On November 30, the 3/24th was at Kunu-ri, on the division’s open right flank, with Chinese troops behind it. With the help of air support, the battalion extricated itself, losing one soldier killed, 30 wounded and 109 missing. Overall, the 24th Infantry lost one-fifth of its officers and one-third of its enlisted men in the withdrawal across the Chongchon. Colonel Corley blamed the disarray of the 3rd Battalion on its commander, Lt. Col. Melvin E. Blair, whom he summarily relieved.

The Eighth Army’s withdrawal did not cease until the force was well below the 39th parallel. But by early March 1951, the American and ROK troops were again ready for a full-scale offensive.

On March 6, the 25th Division advanced across the Han River. The 1/24th did well, moving over difficult terrain against an entrenched enemy. The 3rd Battalion initially also performed well, executing a hastily devised river crossing and advancing through rough country against well dug-in Chinese troops, far from the 1st Battalion. While climbing up steep terrain, however, the 1/24th reportedly collapsed under Chinese fire and withdrew in disorder. When the division commander learned of that action, his confidence in the 24th plummeted.

Although the 24th performed well in the attack north of the Han and the subsequent general withdrawal of the Eighth Army after the Chinese spring offensive of 1951, its reputation was somewhat tarnished. But it again performed well in the Army’s drive back north in May and June 1951.

In August, the regiment’s new commander, Colonel William D. Gillis, prodded by the division commander, closely examined the 24th’s record in Korea. Determining that leadership had been the problem, he relieved a number of officers.

After the change in command, Company F conducted a valiant bayonet and grenade charge on September 15. However, the positive performance of Company F was ignored by higher commands and the news media. By October 1, 1951, the 24th had passed into history.

The 24th and its black members were tagged with every stereotypical racial slur possible–blacks were afraid of the dark, wouldn’t fight, were undependable, hated whites, resented white leadership, were disloyal, etc. Racial prejudice and stereotypical notions also affected how some white officers in the regiment handled their charges. The 24th had an inordinately high turnover of senior NCO and officer leadership at the company level, and had seven regimental commanders in 14 months, when other regiments in Korea had two to four. Three changes were made in the first two months. The 1st Battalion saw three different commanders in the first three months, while the 2nd and 3rd battalions had five each in the same period. Continuity of leadership, purpose and command cannot be attained when commanders change so rapidly.

The 34th had also suffered from a rapid turnover of senior leadership–four different regimental commanders within two weeks. Its 1st Battalion also had three commanders in the same period. The long withdrawals from Pyongtaek and Ansong, the confusion at Chonan, the disaster on the Kum River and the debacle at Taejon–all were blamed in varying degrees on the 34th Infantry and its leadership. Colonel Beauchamp of the 34th was in overall command at Taejon, yet he and his executive officer, Colonel Wadlington–along with General Dean, who was also there and not in command–were all out of Beauchamp’s CP at the same time, but none of them told anyone there where they were going, how long they expected to be absent or how to handle an emergency.

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