Bill, Carl Spaatz thought that Allied bombers could bomb Germany into submission and that a land invasion was not necessary. He believed that a concentrated air offensive against the German oil industry could bring Germany to its knees. That's a totally different discussion which we can continue at 10 am tomorrow.

I'm not trying to say that Hitler wasn't a threat, or that nothing should have been done about him, but I really don't think the major lesson of the 20th Century is about the dangers of appeasement. Quite simply, Hitler wasn't created by appeasement. Even if Britain and France had decided in 1933 to spend a fortune on what would have then seemed like an irrational war against Germany, during which they could have marched on Berlin and executed Hitler… what good would that have done? Would it have solved anything, or would it just have embittered Germany further whilst plunging the world into a deeper economic crisis? Is anybody so naive as to think that executing Hitler would have magically stopped the fascist movement?

Meanwhile, the fact of the matter is that the Treaty of Versailles was simply unreasonable. It doesn't matter whether Germany started WWI, or whether 'new research' demonstrates that Germany could have successfully paid the reparations. What matters is that millions of Germans were appalled and outraged at how they were treated during the 1920s. That resentment is what created Hitler, and any invasion of Germany in 1933 would have only served to foster additional resentment. It is simply naive to think that Germans would have been intimidated by an occupation in 1933, any more than they were intimidated by the French occupation of 1923.

I hate to be a preacher, but many historical truths are only discernible to those who understand basic moral truths. For example, those who seek justice by punishing the guilty, will only create further resentment and hostility, and that is simply the way the world works. Psychologists have repeatedly demonstrated that negative reinforcement is counter-productive and ineffective. Thus, although I hate to be cliched, but there is a lot of truth in moralistic sayings about the karmic cycle of violence, and how an eye for an eye makes the whole world blind.

This is the real lesson of the 20th century, that punishing a nation for the crimes of its leaders, will only serve to encourage sentiments of revenge. There is an obvious lesson here for both criminal-justice and foreign-policy, although it is one which is tragically ignored. When we advocate sanctions and armed force against dictators, we may deter them in the short-term, but over the long 'duree' such actions will only foster resentment amongst the general populace. Yes, in 1933 the Allies could have stopped Hitler, but they would not have stopped fascism, and they actually would have encouraged it! I can't imagine anything which would have more inspired the fascist belief in violence as a tool of the state, than witnessing a foreign occupying force exercising such violence! Indeed, the French occupation of 1923-1925 did just that!

Subsequently, in 1939, the Allies were clearly unprepared for war, and those bellicose politicians who declared war on Germany were foolish, because their nations were nearly destroyed in 1940. Therefore, in 1939 the Allies should have gladly and desperately offered to trade Danzig for Warsaw. Germany should have been freely allowed to occupy the Polish Corridor, although it should have perhaps been informed in no uncertain terms that further annexations would not be allowed. This may or may not have stopped Hitler, but that is not the point. If it had somehow prevented World War II, then that would have been just fabulous. Meanwhile, if it had not prevented a German invasion of Poland, it would have at least allowed the Allies a few more months to prepare their armies for war.

Of course, I truly wonder whether Poland was worth a world war. This may offend those who celebrate Polish independence, but in the grand scheme of things I don't think anyone benefits from having major world powers fight six-year conflicts for the trivial sake of preserving the independence of a decidedly minor nation. I will happily make a similar statement about China… was Chinese independence really worth that war with Japan? I rather doubt that Japan could have ever maintained control of China, and so I also doubt that anything was gained from fighting to prevent Japan from doing something it wasn't capable of doing anyways. If the Allies had not gone to war with Germany and Japan, it is probable that those nations would have exhausted themselves in wars against Russia and China, and horrid as those conflicts would have been, they would not have been as disastrous as what actually occurred.

This was the wisdom that Chamberlain understood. He saw that there was a flood of German (and Japanese) anger, some of it was justified, and some of it was not, but he correctly sought to appease that anger by making relatively minor concessions, in order to buy time for ongoing military reforms. Admittedly, none of this was sufficient, but at least Chamberlain saw the correct strategy. His mistake was that he did not appease Germany enough! Clearly, if he had 'known' the German people, he would have foreseen that Germany would inevitably demand control of the Polish Corridor. And if your military is unprepared for war, where is the wisdom in drawing a line which you cannot defend, and which your enemy is sure to cross?

Ultimately, foreign-policy is like a game of chess, and sometimes you have to admit when you have been defeated. After World War I, the allies tried to play a game of harsh punishment, in order to break the German spirit and prevent Germany from ever becoming a powerful nation. They utterly failed in that impossible task, and they thus ensured that when Germany rose again, it would be a hostile power. This was all anticipated in 1919 by such economists as John Keynes, and there is therefore no excuse for why the Treaty was not more moderate. Subsequently, with the inevitable rise of a demagogue such as Hitler, the balance of power firmly shifted in Europe, such that the strategic retreat of appeasement was the only rational choice, no matter how unpalatable it may have been to the pride of those who sought British and French hegemony.

In conclusion: In 1919, there was definitely something which could have been done to prevent Hitler, because there was no need for the Treaty of Versailles to be so harsh. In 1933, there may have been something which could have been done to stop Hitler, but there was simply no way that invading Germany would undo a decade of cruel neglect, and it would have been utterly impossible to justify such actions without the benefit of hindsight. The allied powers simply didn't have the force to invade every bellicose nation in 1933! The populace would have wondered why they should invade Germany, and not Italy, or Russia, or Japan, or Rumania? Finally, in 1939, the Allies declared war against a power which would overwhelm them in a matter of months. It was a decision based upon plenty of emotional rhetoric, but it was clearly not the correct decision.

Quite simply, when you've enraged a monster which you created and which you are now unable to control, appeasement makes a lot of sense. Perhaps I'm a coward, but I would never voluntarily charge a German machine-gun, in order to preserve Poland's access to the sea. In 1939, when German troops moved east, Britain and France should have breathed a sigh of relief that the Germans weren't coming west. I hesitate to post this at all, because I know what manner of hyper-emotional opinion there is on this topic, but I would hate to see Americans let themselves make a similar mistake in the future. For some strange reason, Taiwan comes to mind. In 1945, the Americans could have ensured Taiwan's independence. In 1995, we probably could have had at great cost to ourselves. And in 2015? Will it be worth it?

Also, if you look carefully at what Hitler was thinking overall, you could definitely make the argument that the SU was his overall objective, and that W. Europe was simply a necessary pre-cursor to that.

As to why he went into Russia without taking out England first. Well, take a look at it from his perspective. What was England going to do? Cross the channel? With what army? Bomb his industry? OK, during the day – good way to commit suicide, at night – too innaccurate to be effective.

For a reading list – Mein Kampf by good old Adolph himself
A War to be Won – Murray and Millett
A world at Arms – Weinberg

As for mobilization just read that the US was estimating in Jan 42 that they would need 334 divisions. Considering that the US at the time had 36 divisions, that's quite a goal. Don't ever say that planners aim low.