Julius Caesar’s Triumph in Gaul

By Adrian Goldsworthy | MHQ  | one comment  |  Print This Post  |  Email This Post

At the start of 52 b.c., a rebellion that spread rapidly throughout much of Gaul surprised and wrong-footed Gaius Julius Caesar. Even though it was his seventh year in the region, he had completely misread the situation. His army was dispersed and vulnerable, and he himself was far away—south of the Alps—keeping an eye on the disturbed politics of Rome.

When Caesar had first intervened in Gaul in 58 b.c., many of the tribes had welcomed him as a friend and liberator. Now all but a handful turned against him. Leading the revolt were chieftains he had promoted and rewarded, showing them both favor and friendship.

Gaul had never been a unified country. Many fiercely independent and mutually hostile tribes inhabited it, often riddled with bitter and sometimes violent rivalries between individual noblemen.

Yet during the winter of 52, almost all of those leaders and tribes joined to expel the Romans from their lands. It was a serious political failure that resulted in the greatest military problem Caesar had ever faced. The result was a savage war on a massive scale, war that would test the limits both of the Roman general and his army.

It is often said that Caesar was as much—or even more—a politician as he was a general. Sometimes the comment seems almost dismissive, as if his military skill deserves less recognition because his ultimate ambitions lay elsewhere. The Romans would not have understood the distinction, for the same men led the republic in peace and in war. In Rome political success brought opportunities for military command. Success in war gave a man glory and wealth, which allowed him to rise farther up the political ladder and, in turn, provided the chance for more senior army commands.

Caesar was no different in his basic ambitions from his contemporaries, save that he had both the talent and the determination to rise to the very top. The intimate connection between war and politics at Rome had another very important consequence. Roman governors had supreme civil and military power within their provinces. They also had virtually complete freedom of action, since the slow pace of communications ensured that the Senate could not hope to control events from Rome.

Some received specific instructions before they set out from Rome, and there were some legal restrictions on behavior, but there was no one to enforce those rules. A governor might have to answer for his actions after his post expired, but during his term of office he controlled military and civilian decision-making within his province.

Caesar was granted an especially large command when the three normally separate provinces of Illyria, Cisalpine Gaul, and Transalpine Gaul were combined. He also enjoyed the security of an unusually long term in the post—initially five years, later extended to ten. The scale of this appointment reflected the strength of his political alliances, which also ensured that he had even greater freedom of action than was normal. He raised new legions on his own initiative, doubling and later trebling the forces at his disposal, and only subsequently did he secure senatorial approval and funding for them.

Massively in debt after spending lavishly to climb the political ladder, Caesar arrived in his province in need of a successful and profitable war. It seems probable that his original plan was for a Balkan campaign, striking against the strong and wealthy Dacian King Burebista. In 58 b.c., however, the Helvetii, a tribe from what is now Switzerland, tried to migrate across part of Transalpine Gaul. When Caesar repulsed them, the migrants took another route, crossing the territory of peoples allied to Rome, including the Aedui. Those Gauls complained of depredations, and Caesar as the proconsul of Rome felt it his duty to intervene and defend the republic’s friends.

Shifting his forces, he ruthlessly hunted down the Helvetii, defeated them and forced the survivors to return to their original territory. After that, he received pleas from the same allies along with other tribes for protection from the Germanic warlord Ariovistus. Another tribe had originally invited Ariovistus into Gaul to assist it in its struggle with the Aedui. He had not made any hostile act toward the Romans. Indeed, little more than a year earlier, Caesar himself had been instrumental in the Senate’s awarding Ariovistus the status of “king and friend of the Roman People.” That did nothing to protect Ariovistus now, for Caesar routed his army and drove him back east of the Rhine.

Help HistoryNet by bookmarking to

Tags: Ancient-Medieval, Historical Conflicts, Historical Figures

You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a comment, or trackback from your own site.