Julius Caesar’s Triumph in Gaul

By Adrian Goldsworthy | MHQ  | one comment  |  Print This Post  |  Email This Post

The rebellion in the previous year had failed, but the initial annihilation of Legion XIV had shown that Gauls could beat the legions. The disturbances back in Rome seemed to make the time all the more opportune. At best Caesar might be unable to return, and at the very least he might not receive much support from Italy.

The outbreak began among the Carnutes when two chieftains led their retinues into the town of Cenabum (modern-day Orléans) and massacred the Roman traders living and working there. Vercingetorix, a young Arvernian nobleman who had been favored by Caesar in the past, followed their example. At first other leaders from his own tribe opposed him, but after gathering more warriors he was able to seize the tribe’s main center at Gergovia (near modern-day Clermont).

Vercingetorix proclaimed himself king, and many of the neighboring tribes swiftly answered his call to rise against the Romans. Soon he had formed a substantial army, on which he imposed a level of discipline previously unknown in Gallic warrior bands. It is quite possible that he had fought as an ally alongside Caesar’s legions. Certainly he had studied the recent campaigns and believed that he had discovered the Romans’ fatal weakness. Throughout the campaign, he would seek to avoid facing the legions in open battle, but would instead try to cut off their supplies and starve them into submission.

Vercingetorix began by attacking the Remi, staunch allies of Rome. Reports of this soon reached Caesar’s subordinate officers, or legates, but they took no direct action. They did ask the Aedui to send help, but that tribe had already turned lukewarm in its allegiance. The nearest Roman forces achieved nothing before swiftly returning home. Seeing that Rome had failed to crush the rebellion, more tribes openly joined Vercingetorix. He launched further attacks on Roman allies, as the revolt gained momentum, making the Romans appear weak.

By this time the news had reached Caesar, and he seems to have realized quickly that something major was underway. He rushed back north of the Alps in time to meet a raid into the Transalpine province itself. All his legions were farther north, but he raised local troops, managed to defend the province, and even launched a counterraid against the Arverni.

His men labored to clear a path through the snowdrifts in the Pass of Cevennes, and once they were through, the cavalry dispersed into small patrols that ranged widely, killing and burning where they could. They did minimal damage, but the nervous tribal leaders summoned Ver­cingetorix to their aid.

While the enemy was distracted, Caesar spread a false rumor that he was returning to Transalpine Gaul to raise troops. Instead he hurried northward to join his army as the ten legions came out of their winter quarters. It was a bold move, for he was traveling through potentially hostile territory with only some four hundred German horsemen for an escort. Even so, he thought it better to run the risk than wait for the army to join him.

Even reunited with his main force, Caesar’s situation was still extremely grim. It was before the normal campaigning season, and he had very little food available. Vercingetorix had recovered quickly, and now attacked the Boii. Caesar left two legions to guard his baggage and led the remainder against the main Gallic army, for he did not want the Gauls to believe he would not protect his allies.

The Romans captured one town, which contained some food stores and, just as important, sufficient pack animals to transport it. Moving on, the army reached Cenabum, which it sacked in punishment for the massacre of the Roman traders. Caesar moved on, satisfied that he had drawn Vercingetorix away from the Boii to defend his own allies. Yet although the Gallic army stayed a short distance away, its commander refused to be drawn into a battle, sticking to his strategy of starving the Romans into submission. The Gallic warriors were told that “private possessions must be disregarded, villages and houses put to the torch in all areas as far afield as the enemy foragers were likely to range from their main route of march.” Rather than offer shelter or food to the legions, inhabitants of twenty towns burned their own dwellings.

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Tags: Ancient-Medieval, Historical Conflicts, Historical Figures

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