Comments on: Judge Not: Colonel Andrew's 'Mistake' at Maleme

By: Peter

Peter — Mon, 12 Sep 2011 09:46:44 +0000

A lot of problems on Crete. Hargest requested the areas west of Maleme, be occupied/defended. This was denied. The runway itself be cratered, this was denied, obstructed by drums of gravel, again denied. How critical was the aerodrome deemed before the battle? The Germans were easily killed, but only until they got to their weapon cannisters. A key factor was the preliminary German bombardment. 1940/s version of the coordinated air/land battle. This meant that once the para attack began, the infrastructure collapsed. Communications were problematic. Landlines were cut by roving bands of Germans, runners never turned up. The late war artist Peter McIntyre commented that on arriving at HQ one day, before the battle, all senior officers emerged from conference concerned mostly about the sea invasion. The "sea invasion" I'm sure loomed large in the background throughout all the battles 20 + May. I think the Maleme sector was expecting to receive 10,000 troops supported by armour from the sea.

By: Dave

Dave — Thu, 19 May 2011 16:38:39 +0000

The guys in the rear all ways know what is best for the ones on the front line. Always. Do it and no back talk I know best.

By: Brett Curtis

Brett Curtis — Sat, 12 Jun 2010 23:23:16 +0000

I agree, Andrew was no coward having been awarded the VC in WWI – but like most Kiwis he was a citizen-soldier, having stayed on as a Territorial between the wars. NZ Historian Glynn Harper has written a very good book on NZ commanders. Like most NZ senior officers, Andrew was getting on in age and also his superior Brigadier Hargest, was also deficient, a man promoted far beyond his abilities because of his connections (he was a Member of Parliament). Col (later Maj-Gen) Howard Kippenberger wrote the NZ official history of the Cretan Campaign and apportioned blamed squarely on Hargest – later captured in Nth Africa, escaped Italian POW camp and appointed NZ official observer to D-Day then killed on June 12 1944. Having said that, most early NZ senior commanders were found wanting – either too old or inexperienced. Fortunately a good crop of younger men rose to the challenge!

By: Tom

Tom — Mon, 15 Mar 2010 21:01:46 +0000

Point over looked:

1.You do not know what he observed at this point which provoked his movement
2. You do not know what his intelligence report said to him at this point
3. You do not know what his search teams saw and reported.

REMEMBER SATALITE COMMUNICTION DID NOT EXIST THEN

These item are critical in making decision. Unless you are there it is hard to criticize any decision by any commander under fire. .

By: Brian Jacobi

Brian Jacobi — Wed, 09 Dec 2009 12:55:51 +0000

I think that it is mostly the loss of contact with higher command that precipitated the retreat, as it is much easier for a remote higher leader to order a fight to the last man, than for a commander who has to look into the faces of the men he is condeming.

During the 'Channel Dash' of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau the Manston station commander, seeing that to send Swordfish aircraft in a daylight attack (they had initially planned a night attack) was suicidal, called the Admiralty to have the attack cancelled. The remote commander was able to insist, where as the man on the spot might not. With tears in his eyes he passsed on the order to Lt. Cmr. Esmonde to proceed with the attack, with the inevitable result.

British and Commonwealth forces in general may have known the inportance of holding airfields, but at this early stage of the war each individual commander was probably finding himself in this position for the first time. Later in the war there may well have been a harder edge.

By: Rob Citino

Rob Citino — Sat, 07 Nov 2009 14:05:58 +0000

Randall–

The New Zealand official history is a bit more protective of Andrew, and argues claims that Brigadier Hargest "misread the situation." But your point is well taken.

May I ask: as you the Randall C. Reed who designed my favorite wargame of all time: Avalon Hill's Air Assault on Crete? If so, welcome!

By: Randall C. Reed

Randall C. Reed — Wed, 04 Nov 2009 20:28:56 +0000

The official Australian history is fairly clear about the cammender's appreciation of the importance of the airfields. With Eban Emael and the Corinth Canal behind them, the British Commonwealth forces understood the importance –nay, the absolute necessity– of resupplying airborne troops via an airhead as soon as possible after the initial drop. The airfield was key: That's why the Brits defended each one of them. British defense of Suda Bay was an afterthought left to the MNBDO because of the preoccupation with defending against airborne assault. No, I think it is clear that some people are made of sterner stuff and some aren't (sorta like 2 of the 3 regiments of the US 106th Division in the Bulge). Andrews "put up the good fight" and saw his chance to live a comfortable existence in a German POW camp and he took it. Walking away was the easier course of action for a gentleman soldier. Funny how quickly and consistently it was recognized as the critical action of the battle. I don't think he counted on that.

By: Miguel Ondina

Miguel Ondina — Tue, 27 Oct 2009 16:09:23 +0000

Sorry I come late to this discussion. There is another angle to look at why Andrews decided to "bug out". Perhaps this was another manifestation of the British "way of war" after the devastation they suffered during the Great War. France 1940, Singapore, Tobruk and Greece are more examples that demonstrate the British state of mind in the 1940's.
This state of mind explains Montgomery's greatness and success (except for Market Garden of course). He recognized this tendency and planned and executed battles in which the British soldier could win.

By: Christopher Tarboton

Christopher Tarboton — Mon, 26 Oct 2009 09:17:40 +0000

I recall reading a book by a NZ survivor of the Crete campaign and admiring greatly their courage in extremely difficult circumstances, but also the apparent complete breakdown of communication between their fighting units, with the result that whilst they seemed to understand the importance of holding out, it was assumed that resistance had crumbled around them and thus the withdrawal. Unlike today, communication was a different story entirely. The next question that needs answering is whether Andrews had stayed fast, would it have defeated the invaders?

By: Bill Nance

Bill Nance — Sun, 25 Oct 2009 21:24:47 +0000

Although the LTC Andrew may not have had orders, he also had to have basic understanding of the situation. He was defending the main airfield on the Western side of the island against an airborne force whose only hope for reinforcement was through an airfield – more precisely his airfield. This situation is what commanders are paid for.