Initial blame for the disaster at Gettysburg was directed, naturally enough, at Lee. Texas Senator Louis T. Wigfall spoke openly of Lee's "blunder at Gettysburg" and "his utter want of generalship." For his part, Lee offered to resign, a pro forma offer that he knew Confederate President Jefferson Davis would refuse. Soon, however, critics zeroed in on another high-ranking general: Jeb Stuart. A well-connected Mobile newspaper correspondent based in the Confederate capital of Richmond reported that "for some time back many serious charges have been made against Stuart, reflecting severely upon him. His vanity seems to have controlled all his actions, and the cavalry was used frequently to gratify his personal pride and to the detriment of the service." The reporter continued, "At the Battle of Gettysburg, he was not to be found, and Gen. Lee could not get enough cavalry together to carry out his plans."

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Lee himself, in his mild way, complained that "the movements of the army preceding the battle of Gettysburg had been much embarrassed by the absence of cavalry." To this, Stuart's adjutant, Henry McClellan, responded: "It was not the want of cavalry that General Lee bewailed, for he had enough of it had it been properly used. It was the absence of Stuart himself that he felt so keenly."

John S. Mosby, whose initial scouting report had contributed much to Stuart's decision to go ahead with the raid, criticized Robertson for his failure to join Lee's army quickly enough after the Union army had begun its pursuit. "Stuart had ridden around General Hooker while Robertson had ridden around General Lee," Mosby said. "The only thing I blame Stuart for was not having him [Robertson] shot."

The frustration of not having Stuart's counsel, and the meager results of his raid, might have been overshadowed by a great victory at Gettysburg. The shock of defeat, however, led the South to look for scapegoats. Stuart has been criticized through the years for misinterpreting Lee's orders, and this has caused him to receive more widespread unfavorable comments than any other commander involved in the campaign.

The raid, its failure and its impact on the operations of the Army of Northern Virginia at Gettysburg should be evaluated in three respects. First, the raid's accomplishments must be evaluated against what was expected. Did the raid accomplish what Lee and Stuart had hoped for? Second, the raid must be appraised against the larger strategic picture. What influence, if any, did the raid have on the operations of the army? Third, was the raid a sound military movement, and if not, who should be held accountable for the consequences?

Stuart was tasked by Lee to gain information on the enemy's movements and to damage and delay the enemy before joining Ewell in Pennsylvania. By evaluating the validity of Stuart's claims of success in his battle report, it becomes clear that the raid was a failure in this respect. First, Stuart claimed that he "caused serious loss to the enemy in men and material and spread terror and consternation to the very gates of the capital." He captured a large wagon train of supplies, but the loss only inconvenienced Hooker. By no means did it affect Union army operations. Many of the 1,000 prisoners were teamsters, garrison troops or detached cavalry, and their loss therefore had no impact on the Union Army. And although Stuart damaged telegraph lines and the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, the damage was quickly repaired and the railroad between Baltimore and Washington remained intact. The panic Stuart claimed he instigated in Washington and Baltimore in no way affected Maj. Gen. George C. Meade and the Union army's movement toward Lee.

Second, Stuart asserted that a large part of Union cavalry and the entire Union VI Corps was sent to intercept him, "which prevented its participation in the first two days' fight at Gettysburg." There is little truth to this claim. Most of the Union cavalry was already placed on the army's flanks, and only two brigades of Brig. Gen. Irvin Gregg's division were sent in pursuit of Stuart. The VI Corps was sent through Westminster as part of Meade's strategy to guard his right flank against Lee, but not in response to Stuart. At any rate, the VI Corps arrived at Gettysburg late on July 2 and helped to stop the Confederate attack.

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