Yes, obviously there were enlightened southerners but they unfortunately let their dumber neighbors run the show …

Stuart was an excellent cavalryman, but he did not have a realistic chance of executing this plan. The East Cavalry Field was fewl ridgelines away. The ground did not support a large Cavalry strike to the rear of Meade's lines. To compound the problem, the US VIth Corps extended the lines to the east of Cemetary Hill. Once Stuart hit Gregg's forces, his tow Brigades and Custer, Staurt lost any momentum his tired troopers might have had. Even if Stuart prevails, and that was a tall order for troopers in the condition described by all accounts, there was Sedgewick and the Provost Brigade. I took time once to walk their monumnets in the vicinity of Meade's HQ. So Stuart had no real chance to break Gregg with McIntosh, Gregg and Custer and break Sedgewick and break Partick's Provost Brigade armed with Sharpes repeaters in the defense.

That is bravado on the part of those that believe General Stonewall Jackson was correct in his assertion for an agressive war carried out against the Union.

Strategic Offensives are difficult by even the most professional armies. It took the Allies 11 six months in 1944 to move the same distance the Germans did in six weeks in 1940. Logistics alnog with politics were limiting factors. Napoleon was crushed by the Russian winter as was Hitler 125 years later. Iraq in 1991 and 2003, the US led forces stopped near the same distance from Baghdad, due to supply problems. (I am a Historian and retired US Army Supply Officer so I have intimate knowledge on some of these examples)

The victorious Confederate Army at Bull Run did not have any capability to project itself to DC. It won the battle due primarily to a defensive nature with which it fought. The Confederate Commanders reacted to McDowell's movements and the Union Army itself was not really capable of pulling off the advanced movements at this early stage in the war.

Why did the Union lose Bull Run, but win Shiloh, it has to do more with their opponents any the opponent's ability to carry out offensives that early in the war.

Many Southerners were also very opposed to invasion. Dorsey Pender's wife was so opposed, she believed it to be the will of God that her husband lost his life at Gettysburg.

Finally, Jackson's first offensive at Kernstown was a defeat, even though it began his most impressive and greatest achievement – The Valley Campaign

The problem was he did not have any other fresh troops "to bear".

Most Civil War armies did not have the capabiltiy to mount several offensive actions in consecutive days. Especially in Lee'sANV where a directive was given to not list "slightly" wounded on the rolls as casualties due to the fact that casualties are posted in newspapers and readily available to the enemy.

Now for the other organizations:
Hood's Division-suffered 1/3 casualties(2372) from 7375 effectives, to include Hood himself and two of four BDE CDRs wounded in action starting by a march early on the 2nd and concluding after dark with consolidation
McLaws- suffered 1/3 casualites(2307) from 7153 effectives two of his BDE CDRs Mortally Wounded same conditions as Hood

2nd Corps:
Johnson's Division 2000 casualties on July 2nd and morning of July 3rd of 6433 effectives and in action on Culp's Hill Morning of July 3rd, two BDE CDR wounded or killed
Early's Division 1500 casualties of 5500 on July 1st, 2nd and moring of 3rd, engaged on morning of July 3rd one BDE CDR wounded
Rodes Division 3100 of 7900 39% casualties primarily on July1st. Three largest Brigades suffer 50% casualties, two of the Birgades are combat ineffective (ONeal and Iverson)

3rd Corps
Hill and Pender Divisions formed the left half of the Offensive. Brockenbrough's Brigade was not heavily engaged, but it broke during the offensive
Anderson's Division was the only unit capable of being included, but curiously Lee did not assign Anderson to Longstreet's offensive.

Also "readily dispatched" is very dismissive of a very good unit 2nd US Corps, which absorbed and dispatched the offensive. More troops would have just equaled more casualties. Had Cousre and Jenkins been in the offensive the breach might have been a bit bigger, but there was no force ready to exploit the gains. The Army of the Potomac was not going to evaporate on that ground on that day. This was not the 11th Corps at Chancellorsville, nor Bragg's Army on the heights above Chatanooga.

Hancock, the best Corps Commander in the history of the Army of the Potomac, with Gibbon and Hays very able Division Commanders Webb, Harrow, Hall
also very able Brigade Commanders.

The assault was folly. Lee had come this far and did not want to admit that he had been out-Generalled. Not that Meade was great, he was a competent commender, but Meade did not make mistakes like previous commanders and he got all his available troops into the fight, something that no other AoP commander had been able to do.

sorry if spilling is bad im deslexic