Interview With World War II Luftwaffe Eagle Johannes Steinhoff

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WWII: You had many meetings with Göring. What was your per-sonal opinion of his leadership of the Luftwaffe?

Steinhoff: Göring was a good, brilliant leader before the war started. He was a great ace from the first war, and he was very en-ergetic and important in the buildup of the Luftwaffe in the 1930s, but during the Battle of Britain he became lazy. Göring started collecting his artwork, diamonds and precious stones and was no longer interested in the operation of the Luftwaffe. Toward the end of the war he was a nuisance, and I personally hated him. Many pilots died needlessly because of him, killed before they were able to lead. I went with Galland, Latzow, Trautloft and others to Berlin to see General Robert Ritter von Greim to have Göring removed and replaced, but this did not happen. Greim told us in January 1945 that it was too late, and that Adolf Hitler would never remove one of his oldest and most loyal friends from his post. This was what eventually led to the fighters’ revolt against Göring, and he threatened to court-martial me and told Lützow that he would be shot for treason. Hitler ordered me, or rather banished me, to Italy for my own safety along with Lützow, and Trautloft was sent packing back to the East. Galland was replaced as General der Jagdflieger [general of fighters] by Colonel Gordon Gollob, who was a competent fighter and leader, but was a fervent supporter of Hitler and a nasty little man who was hated by almost everyone, including me. Needless to say, none of us Kommodores were very enthusiastic about it, and we refused to accept it. All of the leaders remained loyal to Galland and stayed in contact with him, which infuriated Gollob and Göring, since it showed that the highest ranking and most decorated men in the fighter force were still going to do things their way.

WWII: I have been informed by all of the alte Karneraden [old comrades] that Gollob was an egomaniac who was marginally capable as a leader but did not gain the trust of his men. Is that true?

Steinhoff: Well, I will say this, then I will say nothing else about Gollob. Losses soared under his leadership everywhere he went, much like Göring in the first war. He placed leaders in command of units not because of their competence, but due to their loyalty to the Nazi Party, which were very few in the Jagdwaffe [fighter arm].

WWII: Do you feel that Galland’s appointment as general of the fighters was good for the service, and if so, why?

Steinhoff: Definitely. Galland was a very energetic man, a strong leader and great fighter, successful, loyal to his men and a most honorable and honest gentleman. He was never awed by Hitler or swayed by Göring, and he always answered truthfully when they questioned him on any subject, regardless of how unpopular the truth might have been. Galland was a visionary who knew how to turn the tide in the air war and how to rebuild the fighter force, but his standing beside his pilots against Göring and Hitler, as well as many others, gave Hitler cause to replace him, which was a bad mistake. Honesty in Berlin was not always fashionable.

WWII: Tell about the occasions on which you met Hitler-what was your impression of him?

Steinhoff: I first met Hitler around September 3, 1942, when he awarded me the Oak Leaves [to the Knight's Cross]. He asked those of us present about the war, which we were supposed to be winning, and what we thought about the new territory being incorporated into the Reich in the east.

I mentioned something to the effect that ‘I hope the Führer will not become too attached to it, because I don’t think we will be taking up long-term residence.’ He looked at me as if he was going to suffer a stroke. When he asked me to clarify my statement, I simply told him that since the United States had entered the war, and they, along with Britain, were supplying Russia, and we had no method of attacking their industry beyond the Urals, I did not think we would keep making great gains. He sat silent for a moment, then said something like, ‘We will finish Russia soon, and turn our attentions to the West once again. They will see that supporting Bolshevism is not to their benefit.’ And then we were dismissed. I met with him again outside Stalingrad a few weeks later when he toured the front. He told me: ‘Now I have Russia, now I have the Caucasus. I am going to penetrate the River Volga; then after that the rest of Russia will be mine.’ I remember looking at the others around us and thinking that this guy was nuts! I met Hitler the next time on July 28, 1944, when I received the Swords to the Knight’s Cross. That was a week after the bomb plot to kill him, and he was not the same man, perhaps more withdrawn and living in a fantasy where the war was concerned. All I wanted was to get my medals and get the hell out of there. I could not stand him. Well, the next time I was summoned to Hitler we Kommodores were in Berlin to meet with him and Göring just prior to the revolt. He was pacing back and forth, mumbling about the weapons we had, how we would show the Allies a thing or two, and so on. It was very depressing to know that our country was in the hands of this madman and the lu-natics around him. You know, after the July 20 plot to kill him, we were never allowed in his presence with our sidearms, which was a part of our service uniform. He trusted no one.

WWII: Do you feel that Hitler was indifferent to the plight of his people, the soldiers and the situation he created for himself?

Steinhoff: Yes, as you said, the situation he created for himself. He could have cared less about anyone else. But it was our fate to pay for his crimes, and Germany will never live that down.

WWII: It is my understanding that despite the abuses hurled at the Luftwaffe by Göring and Hitler, the fighter force did have sup-porters among the Wehrmacht. For instance, General Hasso von Manteuffel stated many times that his panzer troops could have gained nothing if not for the Luftwaffe and that, without the industry to produce aircraft and the schools and leaders to train new pilots, the war was lost. Albert Speer also agreed. What is your opinion?

Steinhoff: They were absolutely correct, but we were receiving the blame, and most of it came from Göring, hence the revolt. He made all of the grand promises, and he boasted to Hitler that his men could accomplish anything at any time. Unfortunately, he did not consult us before he made these grand overtures.

WWII: What, if any, changes did you see after the United States entered the war, and what was your opinion about it?

Steinhoff: When this happened we were in the middle of the first Russian winter, and we were too busy to think about it. I was just south of Moscow when I heard the news. However, it later penetrated my mind that this was a decisive step. The Americans had tremendous willpower and an unmatched industrial capacity for building big bombers, fighters, ships and so on. It was more or less the end of the war–only time determined how long we would survive.

WWII: You transferred to the Western Front after a couple of years in Russia and the Mediterranean. How was fighting in the West then different from your experiences in 1940?

Steinhoff: Well, I can tell you, as soon as I took over command of JG.77 I was shot down on my first mission while attacking B-24 Liberators, and I knew right then that it was a totally different war from 1940. I also realized, as my plane tumbled out of control and I took to my parachute for the first and last time, just how much I had forgotten. It was different fighting the Soviets as opposed to the combined British and American forces, even though the Soviets outnumbered us even more. The Western Allies had improved their already first-rate equipment. I had also forgotten how flexible they were and how they could alter their tactics to fit the situation and orchestrate brilliant attacks.

WWII: Why did the high command not consult the Kommodores and fighter leadership, who had the knowledge and experience, before implementing these absurd orders and recommendations?

Steinhoff: That is a question you historians will continue to ask long after we are all dead. I think that the mentality in Berlin was one of pride and ego. But at that time it was too late anyway.

WWII: From your wide experience, which aircraft was the most difficult to attack?

Steinhoff: The B-17 Flying Fortress without a doubt. They flew in defensive boxes, a heavy defensive formation, and with all of their heavy .50-caliber machine guns they were dangerous to approach. We finally adopted the head-on attack pioneered by Egon Mayer and Georg Peter Eder, but only a few experts could do this successfully, and it took nerves of steel. Then you also had the long-range fighter escorts, which made life difficult, until we flew the Me-262 jets armed with four 30mm cannon and 24 R4M rockets. Then we could blast huge holes in even the tightest formation from outside the range of their defensive fire, inflict damage, then come around and finish off the cripples with cannon fire.

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Tags: 20th - 21st Century, Aces, Aerial Combat, Historical Conflicts, Historical Figures, World War II

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