Vietnam: But it never happened because of the Phoenix Program?

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Walsh: That’s what Phoenix was designed to do: stop the VCI. And, again, I was after their leaders.

Vietnam: You must have had success getting some VCI leaders or else the Hanoi government would not have admitted after the war that Phoenix really hurt them.

Walsh: One SEAL officer, who’s now dead, actually killed a COSVN (Central Office of South Vietnam) member. COSVN was the big staff that ran the VCI. Their office was in a remote region of III Corps. They moved to Cambodia when things got too hot.That was the biggest priority of the war, finding that staff.

Vietnam: So you did manage to get one of the COSVN members. Tell us about some of your other successes in Phoenix.

Walsh: We killed three regional-level officers in the teams. That happened in my third or fourth tour. Two of them would be equivalent to two-star generals. The documents we captured were so sensitive we weren’t even allowed to know what they contained. The stuff was flown out of the country that evening, and it went right to the Pentagon. We received a top-secret message back that simply said, ‘Thanks.’

Vietnam: The Communists kept meticulous records during the war, isn’t that so?

Walsh: Yes, and all handwritten. But what I liked were their maps. We would stop turning them in because we started using them. Their maps were exact in every detail; every little tributary and stream was noted. These people actually walked the grounds where their commo-liaison routes were. So we actually found out where their commo-liaison routes were by using their own maps.

Vietnam: Did you booby trap those routes?

Walsh: We would set booby traps, lay ambushes, all kinds of stuff. But, getting back to the Phoenix Program, the SEAL platoons would use the resources of the PRUs to find somebody in the VCI who was willing to spy for us. And eventually, if you spent the money and you were patient, it could happen. But then, in a six-month tour, you didn’t have much time. You see, the Navy wouldn’t let SEALs stay in-country for more than 180 days.

Vietnam: Why was that?

Walsh: For anything over six months we would have had to be temporarily assigned. In the Navy it’s called TAD: Temporary Assigned Duty. It was strictly bureaucratic. The Navy did not want to let their SEALs go on loan to MACV – SOG for anything longer than that. They wanted us under their control at all times. When Special Forces started going up north and into Laos, we had guys that wanted to be a part of that. However, the Navy refused, saying we were better prepared for riverine and coastal operations. That was our bread and butter. We had two guys actually get out of the SEALs and join the CIA paramilitary program. Both went back as civilians into Laos. They both got shot; one made it.

Vietnam: Was it on your first tour that you grappled with an NVA general?

Walsh: Yes, that was on my first tour, my pointman tour. I didn’t know he was a general. His job, we discovered later on, was to organize the next big Tet offensive. We put the kibosh on that by just taking out this one general. He had everything on a 100-piastre note: who he was, his mission and his safe-conduct passes all the way from North Vietnam down into the delta. This 100-piastre note was covered with all these little stamps that allowed him safe passage.

Vietnam: Interesting. So he was sent down there to organize the 1969 Tet offensive?

Walsh: For that whole region, and we actually stumbled into his command post.

Vietnam: You actually got into hand-to-hand combat with him?

Walsh: He hit me so hard my lights went out. That was intended as a lethal blow on his part.

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