<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
		>
<channel>
	<title>Comments on: Hitler&#039;s Dark December, 1941</title>
	<atom:link href="http://www.historynet.com/hitlers-dark-december-1941.htm/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://www.historynet.com/hitlers-dark-december-1941.htm?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=hitlers-dark-december-1941</link>
	<description>From the World&#039;s Largest History Magazine Publisher</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Tue, 14 Feb 2012 22:24:31 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3</generator>
	<item>
		<title>By: Henry Oster, Capt. USNR, Ret.</title>
		<link>http://www.historynet.com/hitlers-dark-december-1941.htm#comment-647423</link>
		<dc:creator>Henry Oster, Capt. USNR, Ret.</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 17 Jul 2011 02:51:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.historynet.com/?p=13681595#comment-647423</guid>
		<description>Re: #10: German intelligence was better than often portrayed, as  exampled by Guderian&#039;s assertion that the Red Army fielded at least &quot;10,000 tanks&quot; prior to Operation Barbossa. However, Hitler&#039;s governance permitted a culture wherein logical evaluation of such facts was suppressed or ignored. My analysis, done as part of a project on historical research during my years in ROTC and as an Active Reservist, leads me to conclude that the German General Staff failed early on to effectively deal with the developing crisis of leadership in their ranks. Fritsch, for example, an early critic of Nazi policy, was scandalously discredited and effectively eliminated. At that time the rest of the General Staff, missed an opportunity to stand up to Hitler at a point when he was still in the process of usurping their responsibilities.

By the beginning of the war, the General Staff had been largely emasculated, and could no longer obstruct or delay Hitler based upon considerations such as logistics, supply and manpower, which were known by many experts to be inadequate to carry out lengthy and extensive operations in the USSR. A &quot;preliminary study&quot; for Barbarossa in July 1940 nonetheless elicited a positive response from the remaining Army leadership in the context of a limited war for territorial gains.

I recognize that it is controversial to tackle the issue of dissent on the part of military leadership against political leadership; however, I can think of instances in recent US history where this has been both necessary and expedient.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Re: #10: German intelligence was better than often portrayed, as  exampled by Guderian&#039;s assertion that the Red Army fielded at least &#034;10,000 tanks&#034; prior to Operation Barbossa. However, Hitler&#039;s governance permitted a culture wherein logical evaluation of such facts was suppressed or ignored. My analysis, done as part of a project on historical research during my years in ROTC and as an Active Reservist, leads me to conclude that the German General Staff failed early on to effectively deal with the developing crisis of leadership in their ranks. Fritsch, for example, an early critic of Nazi policy, was scandalously discredited and effectively eliminated. At that time the rest of the General Staff, missed an opportunity to stand up to Hitler at a point when he was still in the process of usurping their responsibilities.</p>
<p>By the beginning of the war, the General Staff had been largely emasculated, and could no longer obstruct or delay Hitler based upon considerations such as logistics, supply and manpower, which were known by many experts to be inadequate to carry out lengthy and extensive operations in the USSR. A &#034;preliminary study&#034; for Barbarossa in July 1940 nonetheless elicited a positive response from the remaining Army leadership in the context of a limited war for territorial gains.</p>
<p>I recognize that it is controversial to tackle the issue of dissent on the part of military leadership against political leadership; however, I can think of instances in recent US history where this has been both necessary and expedient.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: pepe villarán</title>
		<link>http://www.historynet.com/hitlers-dark-december-1941.htm#comment-168306</link>
		<dc:creator>pepe villarán</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 02 Jan 2010 00:56:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.historynet.com/?p=13681595#comment-168306</guid>
		<description>On December 7th, the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. Hitler declared war on the United States.

Why??

Very Simple: to save face and cover up the retreat and defeat from Moscow; and he achived it to a certaint extent.

He did it again with Kursk; he called it off to &quot;help&quot; the italians against the sicily invasion. Actually Germany was defeated.

pepe</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On December 7th, the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. Hitler declared war on the United States.</p>
<p>Why??</p>
<p>Very Simple: to save face and cover up the retreat and defeat from Moscow; and he achived it to a certaint extent.</p>
<p>He did it again with Kursk; he called it off to &#034;help&#034; the italians against the sicily invasion. Actually Germany was defeated.</p>
<p>pepe</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Matt-The-Sixteen-Year-Old-Pretentious-Bigot</title>
		<link>http://www.historynet.com/hitlers-dark-december-1941.htm#comment-148458</link>
		<dc:creator>Matt-The-Sixteen-Year-Old-Pretentious-Bigot</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2009 16:02:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.historynet.com/?p=13681595#comment-148458</guid>
		<description>My, now. That is open for debate.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>My, now. That is open for debate.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: WWII Man</title>
		<link>http://www.historynet.com/hitlers-dark-december-1941.htm#comment-148457</link>
		<dc:creator>WWII Man</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2009 16:01:51 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.historynet.com/?p=13681595#comment-148457</guid>
		<description>I agree with matt but also think his mother didn&#039;t love him</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I agree with matt but also think his mother didn&#039;t love him</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Matt-The-Sixteen-Year-Old-Pretentious-Bigot</title>
		<link>http://www.historynet.com/hitlers-dark-december-1941.htm#comment-148454</link>
		<dc:creator>Matt-The-Sixteen-Year-Old-Pretentious-Bigot</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 19 Nov 2009 15:56:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.historynet.com/?p=13681595#comment-148454</guid>
		<description>Did you know? Just some food for thought. If Adolf Hitler was never rejected -twice- by the Vienna school for Architecture, he probably would have never done everything he&#039;s done. (Not to say that I&#039;m not aware of everything he&#039;s done, but rather, I don&#039;t want to spend a lot of time getting into it, because I&#039;m in the library.)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Did you know? Just some food for thought. If Adolf Hitler was never rejected -twice- by the Vienna school for Architecture, he probably would have never done everything he&#039;s done. (Not to say that I&#039;m not aware of everything he&#039;s done, but rather, I don&#039;t want to spend a lot of time getting into it, because I&#039;m in the library.)</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Lee</title>
		<link>http://www.historynet.com/hitlers-dark-december-1941.htm#comment-148105</link>
		<dc:creator>Lee</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 17 Nov 2009 20:45:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.historynet.com/?p=13681595#comment-148105</guid>
		<description>As a reader of this scholarly blog, I have been tempted to respond over the past week from comment #1, because I have been reading Adam Tooze and I have some serious concerns regarding some of the data presented.  For the past week I have witnessed what was obviously intended to be a thought provoking catalyst for discussion by one of Military History’s highly respected and preeminent scholars quickly de-evolve into this offensive comment by John Karr. My question is why would any serious scholar of WWII history squander such a rare opportunity to engage in scholarly debate with the vanguard in the field?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As a reader of this scholarly blog, I have been tempted to respond over the past week from comment #1, because I have been reading Adam Tooze and I have some serious concerns regarding some of the data presented.  For the past week I have witnessed what was obviously intended to be a thought provoking catalyst for discussion by one of Military History’s highly respected and preeminent scholars quickly de-evolve into this offensive comment by John Karr. My question is why would any serious scholar of WWII history squander such a rare opportunity to engage in scholarly debate with the vanguard in the field?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Rob Citino</title>
		<link>http://www.historynet.com/hitlers-dark-december-1941.htm#comment-145758</link>
		<dc:creator>Rob Citino</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2009 21:20:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.historynet.com/?p=13681595#comment-145758</guid>
		<description>Thanks, Steve.  Good reminders about the &quot;pre-war&quot; war in the Atlantic. Woody Guthrie wrote a great song about the sinking of DD-245:

&quot;Tell me what were their names, 
tell me what were their names?
Did you have a friend 
on the good Ruben James?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks, Steve.  Good reminders about the &#034;pre-war&#034; war in the Atlantic. Woody Guthrie wrote a great song about the sinking of DD-245:</p>
<p>&#034;Tell me what were their names,<br />
tell me what were their names?<br />
Did you have a friend<br />
on the good Ruben James?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Steven Ramold</title>
		<link>http://www.historynet.com/hitlers-dark-december-1941.htm#comment-145654</link>
		<dc:creator>Steven Ramold</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2009 15:53:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.historynet.com/?p=13681595#comment-145654</guid>
		<description>No, I do not believe that Roosevelt would have asked Congress for a declaration of war on December 8, when Congress issued the declaration of war on Japan, but he might not have needed to.

Germany was doing a damned good job of pressing the issue on their own.  Thirty-seven days before Pearl Harbor, the U-522 sank the destroyer Reuben James, killing 119 men of her crew.  Fourteen days before that, U-568 put a torpedo into USS Kearny.  The ship did not sink, but 11 men lost their lives.  Neither of these incident equat to a Luisitania type sinking, but after the Greer Incident, the U.S. Navy received permission to fire at German submarines in self-defense.  A few more torpedo attacks or the sinking of a U-boat or two, and war might have happened anyway.

On December 8, in his speech to Congress requesting a declaration of war on Japan, Roosevelt stated that since the attack the day before &quot;a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire.&quot;  If Roosevelt believed that a war already existed with Japan, then why did he need Congress to declare war?  There are obvious political and public reasons for doing so.  But could Roosevelt have used the same logic against Germany?  Considering the heightened tensions and the loss of American lives by German hands, Roosevelt might have simply stated that, for all practical purposes, a state of war existed between the U.S. and Germany.  Roosevelt could then have escalated military operations against Germany without a formal declaration.

This would be, of course, a potentially dangerous political action to take.  From a historical standpoint, in our era of debate over the war-making powers of the President, it is also Constitutionally problematic.  For a politician like Roosevelt, however, that would certainly free his hands.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>No, I do not believe that Roosevelt would have asked Congress for a declaration of war on December 8, when Congress issued the declaration of war on Japan, but he might not have needed to.</p>
<p>Germany was doing a damned good job of pressing the issue on their own.  Thirty-seven days before Pearl Harbor, the U-522 sank the destroyer Reuben James, killing 119 men of her crew.  Fourteen days before that, U-568 put a torpedo into USS Kearny.  The ship did not sink, but 11 men lost their lives.  Neither of these incident equat to a Luisitania type sinking, but after the Greer Incident, the U.S. Navy received permission to fire at German submarines in self-defense.  A few more torpedo attacks or the sinking of a U-boat or two, and war might have happened anyway.</p>
<p>On December 8, in his speech to Congress requesting a declaration of war on Japan, Roosevelt stated that since the attack the day before &#034;a state of war has existed between the United States and the Japanese Empire.&#034;  If Roosevelt believed that a war already existed with Japan, then why did he need Congress to declare war?  There are obvious political and public reasons for doing so.  But could Roosevelt have used the same logic against Germany?  Considering the heightened tensions and the loss of American lives by German hands, Roosevelt might have simply stated that, for all practical purposes, a state of war existed between the U.S. and Germany.  Roosevelt could then have escalated military operations against Germany without a formal declaration.</p>
<p>This would be, of course, a potentially dangerous political action to take.  From a historical standpoint, in our era of debate over the war-making powers of the President, it is also Constitutionally problematic.  For a politician like Roosevelt, however, that would certainly free his hands.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Rob Citino</title>
		<link>http://www.historynet.com/hitlers-dark-december-1941.htm#comment-145619</link>
		<dc:creator>Rob Citino</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2009 14:14:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.historynet.com/?p=13681595#comment-145619</guid>
		<description>Steven--

Do you think Roosevelt would have even asked for a declaration of war on Germany, if Hitler hadn&#039;t declared war first?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Steven&#8211;</p>
<p>Do you think Roosevelt would have even asked for a declaration of war on Germany, if Hitler hadn&#039;t declared war first?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Cap'n Dave</title>
		<link>http://www.historynet.com/hitlers-dark-december-1941.htm#comment-145309</link>
		<dc:creator>Cap'n Dave</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 12 Nov 2009 01:32:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.historynet.com/?p=13681595#comment-145309</guid>
		<description>Luke, in order for intelligence to fail, it has to be extant and functioning. It has been well established that German Intelligence (so to speak) couldn&#039;t identify the number of planes available to England during the Battle of Britain, I hardly think they would have a much better view into America.

Having said that, there is quite a difference between Military Intelligence and Political estimates that should have been done by the German Foreign Ministry. The real question here should be what was Ribbentrop telling Hitler? As Ribbentrop is usually depicted as a Hitler lackey, I would think he was saying what he thought Hitler wanted to hear. 
Which takes us back to the original question of What was Hitler thinking? I think you can find a good discussion of that at: 

http://www.historynet.com/hitlers-dark-december-1941.htm 

or in the book &quot;The Wages of Destruction&quot; which many consider to be the definitive book on World War II.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Luke, in order for intelligence to fail, it has to be extant and functioning. It has been well established that German Intelligence (so to speak) couldn&#039;t identify the number of planes available to England during the Battle of Britain, I hardly think they would have a much better view into America.</p>
<p>Having said that, there is quite a difference between Military Intelligence and Political estimates that should have been done by the German Foreign Ministry. The real question here should be what was Ribbentrop telling Hitler? As Ribbentrop is usually depicted as a Hitler lackey, I would think he was saying what he thought Hitler wanted to hear.<br />
Which takes us back to the original question of What was Hitler thinking? I think you can find a good discussion of that at: </p>
<p><a href="http://www.historynet.com/hitlers-dark-december-1941.htm" rel="nofollow">http://www.historynet.com/hitlers-dark-december-1941.htm</a> </p>
<p>or in the book &#034;The Wages of Destruction&#034; which many consider to be the definitive book on World War II.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
</channel>
</rss>

