In the main attack plan for Apache Snow, the commanding general of the 101st Division, Maj. Gen. Melvin Zais, ordered Colonel Joseph B. Conmy Jr. and his 3rd Brigade into the A Shau to seek out and destroy the 29th NVA Regiment, known as the “Pride of Ho Chi Minh,” which was known to be operating in the area. Conmy’s brigade consisted of the 2nd Battalion, 501st Airborne (2-501); 1st Battalion, 506th Airborne (1-506); and the 3rd Battalion, 187th Airborne (3-187). For this operation, 3rd Brigade was to also have operational control of two ARVN battalions.

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The operation was conceived as a reconnaissance in force; Conmy’s intent was to find the enemy and pile on. When one of his units made significant contact with the NVA, Conmy would reinforce it with one of the other units and maneuver his remaining forces to cut off the enemy’s retreat and destroy them. The 2-501 and 1-506 were to look for the enemy in their assigned operating areas and block enemy escape routes into Laos. The 3-187 drew the most difficult mission, which was to air assault into a landing zone 2,000 meters northwest of Hill 937 and move cross country to clear and occupy the mountain.

Conmy had little good intelligence on actual enemy strength or where they were specifically located in the A Shau. The U.S. forces had learned some from captured documents and equipment and the occasional prisoner, but the enemy was heavily camouflaged and conducted most major movements at night under radio silence and thus had not been detected. Still, Conmy knew that the North Vietnamese were in the area in force and spoiling for a fight; he was eager to oblige them.

The operation began on May 10 with a 74-minute prep of 30 potential landing zones in the A Shau by artillery, Cobra attack helicopters and close air support. At 0710 hours, after the prep fires were concluded, 64 Huey helicopters inserted the lead elements of the 1-506 and 3-187 into their assigned landing zones at the northern end of the valley.

There was only light contact throughout the first day. Alpha and Charlie companies of 3-187 had moved only a few hundred meters from their landing zones, however, when they discovered enemy huts and bunkers all along their lines of advance. Lieutenant Colonel Weldon F. Honeycutt, commander of the 3-187 “Rakkasans,” still was not sure what his battalion was facing, but it was clear that it had landed in an active NVA base area and that the enemy was in the area in significant numbers. Honeycutt, whose Bravo Company was being held in 3rd Brigade reserve at Firebase Blaze, called Colonel Conmy and requested release of his company. Conmy agreed and Honeycutt had it inserted into a landing zone east of Dong Ap Bia. Bravo arrived at about 1600 and moved out toward the mountain. The lead element of the company had a short but sharp fight at sunset, but Honeycutt ordered its commander to form a night defensive position and continue the attack in the morning.

The Rakkasans resumed their attack the next day, with Bravo and Alpha companies moving out toward the mountain’s summit by two different routes while Charlie Company conducted movement to the east toward the northern edge of Dong Ap Bia. Late in the day, Bravo Company came under intense machine gun and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fire from NVA troops dug into heavily fortified bunker positions on the hill. Cobra gunships and aerial rocket artillery were called in. As they attacked, they mistook the 3-187 command post for enemy and opened fire, killing two Americans and wounding 35, including the battalion commander. This was the first of five friendly fire incidents during the battle, caused by the thick jungle that rendered target identification very difficult. With the battalion CP in disarray, command and control in 3-187 broke down. Bravo Company, unable to move forward, withdrew into defensive positions for the night about 1,000 meters from the summit.

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