To make up for these losses, Markos resorted to a brutal conscription in which young village boys and girls were forced to serve in the guerrilla battalions. The differences, meanwhile, between Markos and Zakhariadis widened and, in January 1949, Zakhariadis replaced Markos as commander of the Democratic army. Markos fled to Albania just ahead of Zakhariadis’ assassins.

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The national army cleared 4,000 rebels from the Peloponnesus in January, and the following month it was given a new commander-in-chief, the able General Alexander Papagos–hero of the 1940 triumph over the Italians, who accepted the post with the condition that the National Defense Council not interfere in military operations.

The final campaign in the summer of 1949 was code-named Operation TORCH. Papagos attacked in six-division strength, more than 50,000 men, driving the rebels across the border into Albania and Bulgaria.

It was the deathblow to the insurgents. Already conditions in the crucial countryside were becoming more settled with each passing month. By July 1949, 100,000 refugees had returned to their homes.

Stalin had long since realized that, with American aid pouring into Greece, the rebellion had no chance. Even as Greek commando units began coordinated sweeps of the country from north to south, wiping out small bands of insurgents who had been left behind in the general retreat across the border, the Russian leader ordered the Democratic army to declare a cease-fire. The civil war was over. In October 1949, the EAM and ELAS announced a ‘temporary cessation’ of hostilities.

The cost of the Greek Civil War was enormous. Perhaps as many as 158,000 Greeks lost their lives and hundreds of thousands lost their homes and all they owned. Greek army losses were almost 11,000 killed, while perhaps 38,000 Communist guerrillas were killed.

And what did the West learn from the conflict? According to insurgency expert Robert Asprey, the results of the victory were, unfortunately, not accurately interpreted. Military commanders came to think that insurgency conflicts could be won by conventional methods: regular armies with increased firepower. Insufficient credit was give to such tactics as temporarily removing the civil population from areas of guerrilla control.

Such lessons would have to be learned again–in later wars. Markos, in fact, may have been beaten before he started. The Communists, say Asprey, failed to establish an identity with the religious and conservative Greek people–especially in the rural areas.

Moreover, their cavalier treatment of civilians, their brutal treatment of hostages and their unthinkable, barbarous act of forcibly removing children were major and, in the end, irretrievable mistakes.

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