By early 1947, the Democratic army was controlling perhaps 100 Greek villages. It was in the villages that the real battle was taking place. Here, the Communist insurgents conscripted the able-bodied, commandeered supplies and levied taxes. Thousands of real and imagined government sympathizers were shot after parodies of trials that entire villages were compelled to attend–the synkendrosi, compulsory gatherings. Nicholas Gage’s book Eleni vividly describes what life was like in the Greek villages during this period.

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By March 1947, Markos commanded 13,000 insurgents in organized units, with the active support of perhaps as many as 50,000 others int he villages and towns and what some observers have estimated to be another 250,000 sympathizers throughout Greece.

There were also several secret Communist units carrying gout assassinations and terrorism in the cities. By mid-1947, Communist rebel forces had grown to 23,000 active in the field–about 65 to 70 ‘battalions,’ each composed of about 250 men and women. According to Greek government figures, in October 1947 alone, the Democratic army had attacked and pillaged 83 villages, destroyed 218 buildings, blown up 34 bridges and wrecked 11 trains. More than 250,000 civilians had now been made homeless by the war, and four-fifths of Greece was insecure to government forces.

Yugoslavia and the other Communist nations–except Russia–continued to supply the insurgents with everything from antiaircraft artillery to food. A Yugoslav general was posted to ELAS’s field headquarters.The Greek government was now in a desperate position. The Communist guerrillas were in complete control of the Mourgna massif, the range of highlands that stretched for 20 miles along the border between Greece and Albania. They also controlled the Grammos Mountains at the northern end of the Pindos range. From these bases, they threatened the entire northwestern region of Greece.

And then the Communists made a mistake. Perhaps overconfident with success, Markos began to deploy his units throughout Greece instead of keeping them concentrated in the mountains. This was a major error providing easier targets for the government. On the international scene, pressure was mounting against the Communist governments supporting the rebels. A U.N. Special Commission on the Balkans arrived in Salnika in January 1947, but was refused entry into the Communist countries–a move that was widely criticized. In March, president Harry S Truman of the United States announced a major economic and military aid program for Greece with his famous ‘Truman Doctrine.’ Surprised at the international pressure and suddenly seeing government forces fighting with new determination, Markos in frustration reverted once again to guerrilla tactics. He had lost the initiative.

Searching for a site where he could establish a government ‘capital,’ Markos now attacked the town of Konitsa, about eight miles from Albania’s border, aided by 105mm guns sited in Albania. In some ways this became a showdown battle, vital to the Greek Communists. If they could establish a capital at Konitsa, perhaps recognition from the socialist countries would follow. They threw in a force of 10,000 guerrillas to take the town.

The first objective was the bridge at Bourazani, which spanned the Aoos River. Along this route would come the government reinforcements from the provincial capital Yannina. But the townspeople of Konitsa wanted no part of a Communist country. They fought the guerrillas desperately, turning their homes into forts and fighting alongside the government troops. More Greek army troops were flown in by DC-3s commandeered from civil airlines. From Christmas Day 1947 to New Year’s Eve, the battle raged on.

Finally, it was too much for the insurgents Leaving behind some 1,200 casualties, they simply melted away across the frontier.

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