Greco-Persian Wars: Xerxes’ Invasion

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After clearing Thermopylae, the Persians made haste for Athens, which was now almost abandoned. Themistocles had convinced most of his countrymen that their best chance for survival lay in moving to Salamis. All of northern Greece was defenseless against the Persian onslaught, which culminated with the burning of Athens and the Acropolis and the slaughter of the few Athenians who had refused to evacuate.

Xerxes was not satisfied simply with the burning of Athens. His army was already on the march toward the isthmus that connected the Peleponnese with northern Greece. The Spartans and other Peleponnesians had built a wall across the isthmus and placed troops there to defend their homes, but their naval contingents were with Themistocles at Salamis preparing to fight for Athenian territory.

The true military genius of Themistocles now proved critical. Herodotus says that Xerxes acted upon false information that Themistocles deliberately sent to him by way of a slave. ‘I am the bearer of a secret communication from the Athenian commander, who is a well-wisher to your king and hopes for a Persian victory, said the slave Sicinnus. ‘He had told me to report to you that the Greeks have no confidence in themselves and are planning the save their skins by a hasty withdrawal. Only prevent them from slip[ping through your fingers and you have at this moment and opportunity for unparalleled success. They are at daggers drawn with each other, and will offer no opposition-on the contrary, you will se the pro-Persians amongst them fighting the rest.’

Xerxes took the bait and weakened his force by sending an Egyptian squadron west to block a possible escape route; the squadron would not be available during the coming battle. He also ordered that ships cover the channel near Cape Cynosura. Once those movements were completed, he intended to annihilate the Greeks in the narrow waters off Salamis. On the morning of September 20, 480 BC, the main body of the Persian armada, about 400 triremes, moved toward the showdown. Xerxes sat on his golden throne high atop the contested area and watched the battle develop.

The Greek fleet was arranged from the Athenians on the left of the line to the Corinthians to the north, covering the Bay of Eleusis, the Pelopponesians on the right and the ships of Megara and Aegina in nearby Ambelaki Bay. The majority of the Greeks’ 300 triremes were hidden from the approaching Persians’ view by St. George’s Island. To draw the enemy well into the shallow water and narrow confined around Salamis, Themistocles ordered the 50-ship Corinthian contingent to hoist its square sails and feign retreat. Once the Persians were drawn in, the Greeks, in ordered line, would surround them. The Persians’ greater numbers would be no advantage in the narrows. Even worse, they would have no room to maneuver.The Greeks began to sing a hymn to the god Apollo as they struck the Persian vanguard in its exposed left flank. When the commanders of the leading Persian ships realized that they were trapped and began to backwater, the caused a tremendous crush of confusion, because those ships coming behind them had nowhere to go. Aeschylus, remembered as the father of literary tragedy, fought both at Marathon and Salamis. He later described the scene as similar to the mass netting and killing of fish on the shores of the Mediterranean: ‘At first the torrent of the Persians’ fleet bore up: but then the press of shipping hammed there in the narrows, none could help another.’

The Greeks kept outside of the tangled Persian mass and struck virtually at will. The Persian ships seemed more suited for action in the open sea-they were larger, sat higher in the water and were loaded with approximately 30 marine infantry or archers, as opposed to 14 aboard each Greek ship. Therefore, the top-heavy vessels fell easy prey to the bronze rams of the Greek triremes in those confining waters.

The Phoenicians in Xerxes’ fleet broke under the relentless Greek pressure and many of them ran their ships aground. Several of those Phoenicians hurried to the great king and said that the Ionians were the cause of their defeat. Xerxes had watched the Ionians perform well and ordered the Phoenicians beheaded for lying about their allies.

Aeschylus chose to tell the story from the Persian viewpoint and said: ‘The hulls of our vessels rolled over and the sea was hidden from our sight, choked with wrecks and slaughtered men. The shores and reefs were strewn with corpses. In wild disorder every ship remaining in our fleet turned tail and fled. But the Greeks pursued us, and with oars or broken fragments of wreckage struck the survivors’ heads as though they were tunneys and a haul of fish. Shrieks and groans rang across the water until nightfall hid us from them.’ The Persians lost 200 triremes on that momentous day, the Greeks 40.

With the crushing defeat at Salamis, Xerxes had little choice but to consider withdrawal. The Greeks might sail northward and destroy the bridges across the Hellespont, severing communication and supply lines. The weather might also worsen and take an even greater toll of what was left of his once-proud navy. Above all, the king of Persia belonged in his capital of Susa, where he could continue to rule.

The Greeks did not realize the full extent of their victory immediately, and they did have one more battle to fight. When Xerxes returned to Susa he left a hand-picked force of 300,000 soldiers in Thassaly under the command of Mardonius, the highest-ranking Persian general. The following spring, Mardonius led his army south and captured Athens once more. In the summer of 479 BC the combined armies of Athens and Sparta forced him northward toward Thebes and decisively defeated the Persian army at Plataea in September. In that same month, the Greek fleet, led by Xanthippus, scored one more victory over the Persian navy at Mycale, off the coast of Asia Minor.

Greece was at last free from the threat of eastern domination. Over the next half-century Athens remained the strongest naval power in the world, while Sparta maintained the finest army. The differences between them, however, increased the rivalry and distrust that for a time had simmered just below the surface. The next great threat to the future of Greece was to come from within.

This article was originally published in Great Battles, May 1994. For more great articles be sure to subscribe to Military History magazine today!

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Tags: Ancient-Medieval, Historical Conflicts

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