Greatest Aircraft Carrier Duel - March ‘99 World War II Feature

Spruance’s first order of business was to take out Ozawa’s land-based air strength to gain local air supremacy and to remove the possibility of Ozawa’s using Marianas airfields to shuttle-bomb his forces. American admirals dreaded shuttle-bombing, in which planes took off from carriers, hit their targets and landed on nearby shore bases rather than return to their carriers, because it enabled the Japanese to launch while still outside the attack range of American fighters. In two days of heavy air raids on June 11-12, American fighters and bombers tore into airfields on Guam, Rota, Saipan and Tinian, while seven carriers swerved north to blast airfields on Iwo Jima and Chichi Jima. Japanese Mitsubishi A6M Zeroes rose to do battle, but the inexperienced pilots proved no match for the better-trained American fliers darting about in superior Hellcats. When the smoke had settled, Ozawa had been shorn of his much needed land-based air strength. But in an amazing display of ineptness, the commander of the decimated land squadrons, Vice Adm. Kakuji Kakuta, failed to relay that vital information to Ozawa. The Japanese admiral sailed on to meet Task Force 58, blissfully ignorant that one of his offensive arms had been hacked off.

On June 13, the same day that American battleships moved into bombardment positions to unleash a largely ineffective pre-invasion shelling of Saipan’s beaches, Ozawa guided his fleet out of Tawi Tawi in the Sulu Archipelago and headed toward the Marianas. American submarines quickly reported the departure to Spruance, who later ordered the transports to continue unloading supplies on Saipan until June 17, when they were to withdraw and head east, away from the coming battle. The submarine Cavalla picked up Ozawa 800 miles west-southwest of Saipan on the night of June 17-18 and tracked the Japanese fleet as it churned closer to the Americans.

Both Ozawa and Spruance knew one force would sooner or later locate the other. Throughout much of June 18, both combatants cautiously moved about the Philippine Sea like boxers gingerly testing each other–Ozawa wary because of Spruance’s superior power, Spruance concerned about his foe’s longer range and habit of slipping in an end run. Before showing his hand, Spruance intended to get a precise fix on Ozawa’s location. “Until we know exactly where the enemy is,” he told subordinates, “we must be positive that we are between his possible locations and those landing ships.”

Ozawa split his force as he moved farther east. Admiral Takeo Kurita commanded the advance group, built around the carriers Chitose, Chiyoda and Zuiho and 88 planes protected by a lethal concentration of battleship and cruiser anti-aircraft guns. One hundred miles behind Kurita followed Ozawa’s main force of two groups. Group A, commanded by Ozawa, centered on the carriers Taiho, Shokaku and Zuikakau, with 207 planes; in Group B, Rear Adm. Takaji Joshima led the carriers Junyo, Hiyo and Ryuho, with 135 planes. Ozawa hoped that Spruance’s planes and ships would be lured west by Kurita’s van, giving Ozawa a chance to crush him with his two lurking carrier groups. To prepare his men for the important battle, Ozawa signaled Japanese hero Admiral Togo’s famous message, flashed before the Battle of Tsushima during the Russo-Japanese War early in the century: “The fate of the Empire rests on this one battle. Every man is expected to do his utmost.”

Ozawa first spotted Spruance in late afternoon but refrained from sending his planes since little daylight remained. He also could not determine if Japanese airfields on Guam, where his planes would have landed after attacking Spruance, were intact or pockmarked with craters from recent American attacks.

Spruance’s turn came next. Mitscher’s Task Force 58 steamed west for much of the day, its search planes reaching out even farther to the west, like tentacles hunting for prey. As darkness neared, Spruance ordered Mitscher to turn eastward so the carriers would hover closer to Saipan when daylight broke on June 19 and thus guard against an end run. However, a signal intercepted when Ozawa foolishly radioed a land-based commander, placed the Japanese 335 miles west-southwest of Mitscher.