Until Ford became president, Cheney recalled, Reagan “was much better known….And the president had never run outside of Grand Rapids in his congressional races.” But as the incumbent, Ford enjoyed enormous advantages. Celebrating the country’s bicentennial in July 1976, the president functioned as the nation’s master of ceremonies, leading events in Washington, New York and Philadelphia. During these observances, Ford used the power of incumbency to woo uncommitted delegates, enjoying photo opportunities and a majesty that Reagan’s team could not summon. “We’d arrive in Air Force One, they’d arrive in charter. We’d have Secret Service, we’d have the trappings,” Spencer remembered. “All of those things we milked as much as we could.”

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A major political blunder by Reagan also greatly aided Ford. The challenger took an unprecedented step by naming his running mate before the convention. In an effort to attract moderates, Reagan chose liberal Republican Sen. Richard Schweiker of Pennsylvania, a pick that infuriated loyal conservatives. Making matters worse, at the convention, the Reagan camp tried unsuccessfully to change procedural rules to force Ford to name his running mate early, a tactic that Ford’s staff dubbed “misery loves company.” In Kansas City, the momentum shifted toward the president, who won the nomination on the first ballot. In doing so, Ford thus became the only man ever to beat Reagan in a head-to-head political race.

A Ford-Reagan ticket might have quickly unified the party. But Reagan had declared himself out of consideration, and given the bruising battles and the poor personal chemistry between the men, they would have had trouble patching up their differences. “Ford wasn’t eager to have Reagan on the ticket. Reagan wasn’t eager to be on the ticket,” Cheney said. “There was a belief that that would have been the best combination we could have come up with. But they had been so competitive with one another through the course of the primaries,” Cheney remembered, that a Ford-Reagan combination was nearly impossible.

Instead, Ford chose Dole, who could help the ticket in the typically Republican farm states, which, in 1976, were trending toward Carter, a peanut farmer. Dole’s conservative reputation could also help in mending fences with Reagan’s supporters, an idea that Reagan seemed to confirm when he met alone with the president after Ford clinched the nomination. After Ford mentioned six possible running mates, Reagan singled out Dole, saying he would be excellent.

The first campaign stop in Kansas—which Ford, Cheney and Spencer had so vigorously argued over—proved a political boon. As Air Force One descended into Russell, Ford gleefully pointed out the window, showing aides that the roads were clogged with vehicles for miles. Dole gave an emotional speech in front of his hometown crowd, weeping as he thanked supporters. The heavy media coverage gave the Ford-Dole ticket a shot in the arm.

Ford desperately needed such drama. Trailing Carter by 33 points in the polls, he looked doomed to lose. In his nomination acceptance speech, he took a gamble, challenging Carter to debate on national television—something no sitting president had ever done. Ford had more to lose by giving Carter television exposure, and a poor performance—such as Vice President Nixon suffered in his 1960 face-off against Sen. John Kennedy—could do inestimable damage. Still, with Carter so far out front, the president needed to convert millions of voters to his side within just two months. “Shaking hands wasn’t going to get you there,” Cheney believed. “You had to come up with something far bolder…that would let you reach out and touch a lot more people. And that’s why the debates were attractive.”

Ford’s campaign team took another strategic gamble. They noticed that when Ford hit the hustings, his popularity in the polls took a dive. Even though people who met the president personally came away impressed with his warmth, his oratory was wooden. In a confidential memo, White House photographer David Kennerly boldly criticized the president: “Your speeches are usually long, boring, and filled with rhetoric that turns people off.” Ford’s strategists decided to keep him at the White House to act presidential, leaving the heavy hitting on the campaign trail to Dole.

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