The two Confederate armies did not unite in time. Instead, after trying to provoke Buell into a battle, Bragg quit the race to Louisville. He swerved suddenly to the east and encamped at Bardstown. Explaining his puzzling change of heart to Richmond, Bragg said that Buell had twice as many troops and a battle would materially cripple the Confederates even if they won, while a loss would be disastrous.

He said his troops were reduced to three days’ rations and ‘in a hostile country utterly destitute of supplies,’ so they ‘were compelled to give up the object and seek for subsistence’ at Bardstown. Others in the army, politicians in Richmond and hostile newspaper editors could not believe that this was the whole story of Bragg’s mystifying switch from aggressive pursuit of a ‘demoralized’ enemy force to the avoidance of a fight. Bragg really decided against an attack on Louisville because sources inside the city, who were in contact with him throughout the campaign, had warned him that an invasion would be’suicidal,’ according to a dispatch from the city to The New York Times. ‘He is in constant communication with this city through the medium of the rebel sympathizers,’ the dispatch said. ‘They have no doubt fully posted him with the formidable Federal force before this city and, dreading the fatal encounter which would follow an attack in this quarter, he may be making for the Bluegrass region in all haste.’ Even if the Rebels had captured the city, they could have held it for only a single day against the overwhelming Federal armies, the story said.

On September 24, Nelson announced that the first 12,000 men of Buell’s army had crossed Salt River. ‘Louisville is now safe. We can destroy Bragg with whatever force he may bring against us. God and liberty,’ Nelson boasted. ‘I have 35,000 men,’ he told Buell. ‘I am entrenched and believe I can hold the city….When you have brought Bragg to bay, then I will attack him.’

Two days later, Buell’s men were marching proudly along the streets of Louisville, and their commander had the satisfaction of sending a dispatch to Halleck: ‘My troops are concentrated at this place. They have made long and rapid marches and require clothing, which is being issued today. I shall immediately advance against the enemy.’

From Bardstown, Bragg reported to Richmond on September 25: ‘With only three days of provisions, we marched to this place (59 miles) and reached here after some privation and suffering. It is a source of deep regret that this move was necessary as it has enabled Buell to reach Louisville, where a very large force is now concentrated.’

Then Bragg put his finger on the main reason for the ruin of all his glorious hopes: ‘We are sadly disappointed at the want of action by our friends in Kentucky. We have so far received no accession to this army.’ Both Bragg and Smith had pinned their hopes on the solemn promises by prominent Kentuckians that thousands of their brave young men would join the Confederate armies. Colonel Morgan had predicted 25,000 recruits would come in for sure; he even talked about 50,000.

Kentucky’s delegation to the Confederate Congress had assured President Davis that the people, suffering under arbitrary Yankee rule, were fed up and ready to rebel if only a Confederate army would come into their state.

Bragg had felt so sure of their promises that he brought along 20,000 rifles in his wagons to arm the Kentuckians who were supposedly so eager to fight. He had counted on those throngs of volunteers to double the size of his army and Smith’s, so that they could defeat the combined forces of Buell, Nelson and Grant’s reinforcements and seize Louisville. Now those hopes had vanished. Capturing Cincinnati had never been a goal, but the feints in that direction had stirred up a hornet’s nest of Ohio troops, vowing to defend that city.

Smith, who had joyously forecast that the Kentuckians would rise en masse because their hearts were clearly with the South, now changed his tune. ‘The Kentuckians are slow and backward in rallying to our standard,’ he told Bragg. ‘Their hearts are evidently with us but their blue grass and fat cattle are against us.’

‘Unless a change occurs soon,’ Bragg told Richmond, ‘we must abandon the garden spot of Kentucky. Its cupidity, the love of ease and fear of pecuniary loss are the fruitful source of this evil.’ Kentucky and Tennessee could still be ‘redeemed, if we are supported, but at least 50,000 men will be necessary and a few weeks will decide the question,’ he said. ‘Had the forces in Mississippi moved as ordered, so as to have held the enemy there in check, we might have made some headway before arriving here but we find the armies of Generals Grant, Rosecrans, Curtis and Buell, with many more levies, opposed to us.’

In a final desperate appeal to the Confederate commanders in north Mississippi, Bragg sent a telegram from Bardstown on September 25 to Van Dorn: ‘General, we have driven and drawn the enemy clear back to the Ohio. Push your columns to our support and arouse the people to reinforce us. We have thousands of arms without men to handle them. Nashville is defended by only a weak division, Bowling Green by only a regiment. Sweep them off and push up to the Ohio.’

Subscribe Today

• Did you enjoy our article?
• Read more in Civil War Times magazine
• Subscribe online and save nearly 40%!!!
 

Help HistoryNet by bookmarking to