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Gen. William C. Westmoreland Was RightBy Dale Andrade | Vietnam | 7 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post In the spring of 1972 Hanoi launched its biggest offensive of the war, a conventional combined arms assault against several targets throughout South Vietnam. More than nine divisions of infantry and armor attacked major South Vietnamese cities from the Demilitarized Zone southward to Saigon. Backed by U.S. air support, the South Vietnamese held. Subscribe Today
General Abrams left Vietnam in June 1972, following his old boss General Westmoreland into the job of Army chief of staff. Both commanders had faced very different challenges and circumstances, but both had failed in the end. America’s failure in Vietnam was partly a consequence of policy decisions—in particular allowing the enemy to maintain base areas in Laos and Cambodia (not to mention North Vietnam itself)—and South Vietnam’s ultimate flaws. But much of it stemmed from the Communists’ ability to hold the military and political initiative throughout most of the war. The strategy conducted by the North Vietnamese was arguably like no other in history: a combination of large main force units, a well-entrenched guerrilla movement with deep roots and the support of two powerful sponsors—China and the Soviet Union. All of this, combined with the ability to repeatedly attack South Vietnam with no threat of a serious retaliation, offered an unprecedented advantage. Therefore, to simply argue that the U.S. military ignored counterinsurgency is unsatisfactory. Both Westmoreland and Abrams found themselves in a quandary: unless a significant part of their forces sought out the enemy main forces, there could be no security in South Vietnam. Therefore, the key to either general’s plan had to be the ability to keep the main forces away from the population; whether the operational method was called “search and destroy” or “one war” made little difference. Judged by that standard, both generals failed. Despite the progress made by pacification in the years 1967 through 1972, it made no significant difference in the end. Indeed, both MACV commanders were caught on the horns of the same dilemma. While Westmoreland concentrated on the main forces and failed to prevent a guerrilla offensive in 1968, Abrams placed great emphasis on pacification and failed to prevent a conventional buildup in 1972. In the end neither commander had the resources or the opportunity to handle both threats simultaneously. Even as the Vietnam War fades further into history, it continues to influence the U.S. military. General David H. Petraeus, the current chief of the Central Command and the former commander in Iraq, wrote in his doctoral dissertation, “The American Military and the Lessons of Vietnam,” that the war “planted in the minds of many in the military doubts about the ability of U.S. forces to conduct successful large-scale counterinsurgencies.” But that is exactly what the United States again finds itself fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the comparison with Vietnam is inevitable. Unfortunately, the decades old debate over that war has only muddied the historical waters at a time when clarity is very much needed. Taking the wrong lessons from Vietnam will surely color how we wage counterinsurgency in the future. Dale Andrade is a senior historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, where he is writing the Army’s official account of the Vietnam War between 1969 and 1973. The foregoing, which represents the author’s own opinions and not those of the U.S. government, is adapted from a journal article in the June 2008 Small Wars and Insurgencies. Andrade’s books include America’s Last Vietnam Battle: Halting Hanoi’s 1972 Easter Offensive, and, with Kenneth Conboy, Spies and Commandos: How America Lost the Secret War Against North Vietnam. Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6Help HistoryNet by bookmarking to
            Tags: Historical Figures, Vietnam War
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7 Comments to “Gen. William C. Westmoreland Was Right”
No mention is ever made that the “Allies” encouraged Ho Chi Min to fight the Japanese on the promise that Viet Nam would be united under his leadership. The Allis were influenced by Joe Stalan to separate nations i.e. N/S Korea, N/S Viet Nam, E/W Germany. Fortunately Japan was our war and the Atomic Bomb prevented Russia from entering to any degree (Kurel Is.) or we would have had a N/S Japan. Then the French tried to maintain the South Separate from the North and dien bien phu ended their attempts. Then comes Lyndon Johnson who tries to micro manage the conflict from the White House with the aid of that Ford car company reject, MacNamara. The rest is history. Sorry for misspelled words. But then, America is lost without a shot.
By Gilbert R. Switzer on Apr 3, 2009 at 10:02 am
To clarify the earlier comment, General Order #1 divided the Korean peninsula into North and South primarily to reflect the advances of the Red Army from the north. Stalin’s “influence” in Korea was in effect the same “influence” used in Germany, and for that matter the same “influence” that the US wielded: an occupying army.
It’s tempting at times for any combatant nation to view a campaign as “our war,” particularly when it was “our bomb” that arguably ended the war.
But it’s also important to note that literally hundreds of thousands of Soviet, Chinese, Korean, Filipino, ANZAC, and other soldiers fought in the theater as well.
By M. O'Connor on Apr 6, 2009 at 5:39 pm
Page 2 – “The popular conception of the enemy in Vietnam is that it was a grassroots insurgency sprung from the peoples’ content with an illegitimate government in Saigon and the presence of a foreign invader.”
The author here tries to downplay two historical truths- the government in Saigon was illegitimate, and the U. S. was a foreign invader. Thirty-three years after the war has ended, and the writer is still calling the Vietnamese “the enemy” and the “North Vietnamese.”
How long will Cold War propaganda be disseminated? When will the day come when American historians will be able to refer to Vietnam by the proper names (yes, that would mean recognition, wouldn’t it?) of the Vietnamese and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam?
Is the author still trying to prove to us the U. S. invasion was justified by reminding us of China and Russia’s involvement? This seems ridiculous when the U. S. supported the French, and then helped set up, support and control Diem’s dictatorship in the south. It took two to tango then, and it matters little now which side took the first step.
Perhaps if we compare the numbers of Chinese and Russian soldiers that served in Vietnam at the time with those of the U. S., Australia, Korea, Thailand, New Zealand, etc. – then we might have a case. Or have there been declassified documents of the Russians offering the Vietnamese nuclear weapons, such as Dulles offered the French, that we do not know about?
By jstrum_bn on Apr 9, 2009 at 1:30 am
As long as there was a “hands off” policy on North Vietnam the military could not effectively prosecute the war.
By R.Kassebaum on Apr 10, 2009 at 10:38 am
BUNDY: “It is an awful mess.
JOHNSON: “What is Laos worth to me? What is Laos worth to this country? We’ve got a treaty, but hell, everybody else has got a treaty out there, and they’re not doing anything about it.”
(From the transcript of a telephone call on May 27, 1964, between President Lyndon B. Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, his national security adviser. A year later. Johnson began the large-scale deployment of troops to Vietnam. The transcript was released in February by the Lyndon B. Johnson Library and Museum in Austin, Texas)
As my deceased friend would remind me, retired Republic of Vietnam Major Julian Dubuc, in September of 1954, the United States, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan formed the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, or SEATO. The SEATO charter was vitally important to the American rationale for the Vietnam War. The United States used the organization as its justification for refusing to go forward with the 1956 elections intended to reunify Vietnam, instead maintaining the divide between communist North Vietnam and South Vietnam at the 17th parallel. As the conflict in Vietnam unfolded, the inclusion of Vietnam as a territory under SEATO protection gave the United States the legal framework for its continued involvement there. The problem was Johnson’s structure in running the war as a fool.
From a Disabled Republic of Vietnam Combat Veteran
By JOHN C. BRUNGER on Apr 27, 2009 at 4:17 pm
As myself a Vietnamese who wanted the South to win. I agree that there was not a lot of chances for the United States but I am very thankful for everyone who fought in the war.
By Chuong on Jun 17, 2009 at 5:30 pm
RIP for the fallen on both side
By henrylim88 on Nov 10, 2009 at 12:28 am