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Gen. William C. Westmoreland Was RightBy Dale Andrade | Vietnam | 7 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post This thinking did not stem from a “conventional mindset” on the part of Westmoreland, but rather from his observations of the situation on the ground. On March 6, 1965, two days before the first U.S. Marines landed near Da Nang, Westmoreland sent a report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff warning that in some parts of South Vietnam “the Viet Cong hold the initiative” and the “deterioration process must be regarded as critical.” On the other hand, South Vietnamese forces were “on the defensive and pacification efforts have stopped.” Subscribe Today
The only solution, he contended, was increased American intervention in order to stave off South Vietnam’s defeat. Westmoreland asked for more forces, and by the end of 1965 there were 184,300 U.S. troops in country. Although Westmoreland believed that he could “reestablish the military balance,” he cautioned the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Earle G. Wheeler, that reaching Washington’s objective of “convincing the DRV/VC they cannot win” was out of the question. The Communists are “too deeply committed to be influenced by anything but application of overpowering force.” Despite the obvious need for immediate action to correct the dangerous course of events, Westmoreland understood that he faced a new kind of conflict. “There is no doubt whatsoever that the insurgency in South Vietnam must eventually be defeated among the people in the hamlets and towns,” he wrote in one of his planning documents. “However, in order to defeat the insurgency among the people, they must be provided security.” This became the accepted course of action at the highest levels. During a meeting in Saigon in July 1965, the allies established the division of labor: The Americans would “stop and destroy units coming from DRV into South Vietnam,” while the South Vietnamese Army’s job was “to engage in pacification programs and to protect the population.” It remains difficult to see why this plan has come to be regarded as controversial. Those who argue that there was a choice between two approaches—one that first sought to neutralize the enemy main forces, and one that would have instead emphasized counterinsurgency—ignore the stark realities on the ground. South Vietnam was on the verge of outright defeat. It was logical to place the strongest forces—the Americans—in a position to tackle enemy main force units, while the South Vietnamese—who had failed to deal with those very same main forces—turned their attention instead toward securing a population with whom they shared language and culture. By many accounts, pacification—a term used in Vietnam for counterinsurgency—was all but ignored under Westmoreland’s command. The reality, however, was that it was Westmoreland who implemented many pacification programs and presided over ultimate reform in the effort. In September 1965, at the beginning of the U.S. troop buildup, Westmoreland wrote in a key directive that “the war in Vietnam is a political as well as a military war. . . . [T]he ultimate goal is to regain the loyalty and cooperation of the people, and to create conditions which permit the people to go about their normal lives in peace and security. . . .” The trick was to find a way to do this—and accomplish it in the face of increasing pressure from enemy main forces. With considerable personal support from Westmoreland, the basic building block of the pacification program—the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) organization—was formed in May 1967. Under MACV, the military would take over what had been a divided and ineffective program run by civilian agencies in Saigon. While CORDS did not make great strides until the Communists’ hold over much of the countryside was lost after the 1968 Tet Offensive , all of the programs then used to good effect were begun under Westmoreland. Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6Help HistoryNet by bookmarking to
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7 Comments to “Gen. William C. Westmoreland Was Right”
No mention is ever made that the “Allies” encouraged Ho Chi Min to fight the Japanese on the promise that Viet Nam would be united under his leadership. The Allis were influenced by Joe Stalan to separate nations i.e. N/S Korea, N/S Viet Nam, E/W Germany. Fortunately Japan was our war and the Atomic Bomb prevented Russia from entering to any degree (Kurel Is.) or we would have had a N/S Japan. Then the French tried to maintain the South Separate from the North and dien bien phu ended their attempts. Then comes Lyndon Johnson who tries to micro manage the conflict from the White House with the aid of that Ford car company reject, MacNamara. The rest is history. Sorry for misspelled words. But then, America is lost without a shot.
By Gilbert R. Switzer on Apr 3, 2009 at 10:02 am
To clarify the earlier comment, General Order #1 divided the Korean peninsula into North and South primarily to reflect the advances of the Red Army from the north. Stalin’s “influence” in Korea was in effect the same “influence” used in Germany, and for that matter the same “influence” that the US wielded: an occupying army.
It’s tempting at times for any combatant nation to view a campaign as “our war,” particularly when it was “our bomb” that arguably ended the war.
But it’s also important to note that literally hundreds of thousands of Soviet, Chinese, Korean, Filipino, ANZAC, and other soldiers fought in the theater as well.
By M. O'Connor on Apr 6, 2009 at 5:39 pm
Page 2 – “The popular conception of the enemy in Vietnam is that it was a grassroots insurgency sprung from the peoples’ content with an illegitimate government in Saigon and the presence of a foreign invader.”
The author here tries to downplay two historical truths- the government in Saigon was illegitimate, and the U. S. was a foreign invader. Thirty-three years after the war has ended, and the writer is still calling the Vietnamese “the enemy” and the “North Vietnamese.”
How long will Cold War propaganda be disseminated? When will the day come when American historians will be able to refer to Vietnam by the proper names (yes, that would mean recognition, wouldn’t it?) of the Vietnamese and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam?
Is the author still trying to prove to us the U. S. invasion was justified by reminding us of China and Russia’s involvement? This seems ridiculous when the U. S. supported the French, and then helped set up, support and control Diem’s dictatorship in the south. It took two to tango then, and it matters little now which side took the first step.
Perhaps if we compare the numbers of Chinese and Russian soldiers that served in Vietnam at the time with those of the U. S., Australia, Korea, Thailand, New Zealand, etc. – then we might have a case. Or have there been declassified documents of the Russians offering the Vietnamese nuclear weapons, such as Dulles offered the French, that we do not know about?
By jstrum_bn on Apr 9, 2009 at 1:30 am
As long as there was a “hands off” policy on North Vietnam the military could not effectively prosecute the war.
By R.Kassebaum on Apr 10, 2009 at 10:38 am
BUNDY: “It is an awful mess.
JOHNSON: “What is Laos worth to me? What is Laos worth to this country? We’ve got a treaty, but hell, everybody else has got a treaty out there, and they’re not doing anything about it.”
(From the transcript of a telephone call on May 27, 1964, between President Lyndon B. Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, his national security adviser. A year later. Johnson began the large-scale deployment of troops to Vietnam. The transcript was released in February by the Lyndon B. Johnson Library and Museum in Austin, Texas)
As my deceased friend would remind me, retired Republic of Vietnam Major Julian Dubuc, in September of 1954, the United States, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan formed the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, or SEATO. The SEATO charter was vitally important to the American rationale for the Vietnam War. The United States used the organization as its justification for refusing to go forward with the 1956 elections intended to reunify Vietnam, instead maintaining the divide between communist North Vietnam and South Vietnam at the 17th parallel. As the conflict in Vietnam unfolded, the inclusion of Vietnam as a territory under SEATO protection gave the United States the legal framework for its continued involvement there. The problem was Johnson’s structure in running the war as a fool.
From a Disabled Republic of Vietnam Combat Veteran
By JOHN C. BRUNGER on Apr 27, 2009 at 4:17 pm
As myself a Vietnamese who wanted the South to win. I agree that there was not a lot of chances for the United States but I am very thankful for everyone who fought in the war.
By Chuong on Jun 17, 2009 at 5:30 pm
RIP for the fallen on both side
By henrylim88 on Nov 10, 2009 at 12:28 am