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Gen. William C. Westmoreland Was RightBy Dale Andrade | Vietnam | 7 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post Indeed, the current belief about strategy in Vietnam is apparent: counterinsurgency will be more successful if it embraces the strategy used by Abrams and rejects that employed by Westmoreland. But this interpretation falls short for two reasons. First, most histories fail to examine what the Vietnamese Communists were actually thinking and doing. Second, many authors assume that Westmoreland misunderstood the enemy he faced and as a result made poor choices in how to fight. Therefore, it is argued, had things been done differently early on, the war might have been won. Subscribe Today
The popular conception of the enemy in Vietnam is that it was a grassroots insurgency sprung from the peoples’ discontent with an illegitimate government in Saigon and the presence of a foreign invader. South Vietnam was certainly plagued by an insurgency, and there was popular support for it, but the key ingredient throughout the entire war was North Vietnam. Hanoi controlled the insurgency’s leadership, Hanoi mustered the bulk of the main force units, and Hanoi sent the supplies south to keep the war going. Following the 1954 partition of Vietnam, the Communists spread their roots in the south, forming the National Liberation Front (popularly called the Viet Cong) in 1960 to control and cultivate the insurgency. Within three years the guerrillas were a serious threat, defeating South Vietnamese Army units in several battles. Three other important factors benefited the Communists. The first was military support from China and later from the Soviet Union. Chinese sources reveal that between 1964 and 1975 Hanoi received more than 1.9 million “guns” (small arms) and almost 64,000 artillery pieces, ammunition, almost 600 tanks and 200 aircraft. The second factor was the secure base areas in North Vietnam as well as neighboring Laos and Cambodia that gave the Communists the ability to move troops and supplies to the southern battlefield with virtual impunity—and to do so with little fear of having to fight on their own home ground. Finally, Hanoi began moving its own troops into South Vietnam in the spring of 1963. According to an official Communist history, a battalion from the 312th Division was sent south, followed by more units over the next year, including the entire 325th Division in the spring of 1964. These units would form the core of a burgeoning North Vietnamese presence in the South. The insertion of these main forces was at the heart of Hanoi’s strategy from the beginning. According to one Communist analysis, North Vietnam intended to “send individual regular main force units (battalions and regiments) from the North into South Vietnam and to form large main force armies on the battlefields of South Vietnam.” The use of these “very large and powerful military forces [would] create a fundamental change in the balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy.” The Communist leaders were particularly anxious “to completely defeat the puppet army before the U.S. armed forces had time to intervene.” Clearly, “classic” guerrilla war was not to be the Communists’ main vehicle for victory.  Gen. William C. Westmoreland Westmoreland did understand the dual nature of the threat he faced, yet he believed that the enemy main forces were the most immediate problem. By way of analogy, he referred to them as “bully boys with crowbars” who were trying to tear down the house that was South Vietnam. The guerrillas and political cadre—which he called “termites”—could also destroy everything, but it would take them much longer to do it. So his attention turned first to the “bully boys,” whom he wanted to drive away from the “house.” Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6Help HistoryNet by bookmarking to
            Tags: Historical Figures, Vietnam War
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7 Comments to “Gen. William C. Westmoreland Was Right”
No mention is ever made that the “Allies” encouraged Ho Chi Min to fight the Japanese on the promise that Viet Nam would be united under his leadership. The Allis were influenced by Joe Stalan to separate nations i.e. N/S Korea, N/S Viet Nam, E/W Germany. Fortunately Japan was our war and the Atomic Bomb prevented Russia from entering to any degree (Kurel Is.) or we would have had a N/S Japan. Then the French tried to maintain the South Separate from the North and dien bien phu ended their attempts. Then comes Lyndon Johnson who tries to micro manage the conflict from the White House with the aid of that Ford car company reject, MacNamara. The rest is history. Sorry for misspelled words. But then, America is lost without a shot.
By Gilbert R. Switzer on Apr 3, 2009 at 10:02 am
To clarify the earlier comment, General Order #1 divided the Korean peninsula into North and South primarily to reflect the advances of the Red Army from the north. Stalin’s “influence” in Korea was in effect the same “influence” used in Germany, and for that matter the same “influence” that the US wielded: an occupying army.
It’s tempting at times for any combatant nation to view a campaign as “our war,” particularly when it was “our bomb” that arguably ended the war.
But it’s also important to note that literally hundreds of thousands of Soviet, Chinese, Korean, Filipino, ANZAC, and other soldiers fought in the theater as well.
By M. O'Connor on Apr 6, 2009 at 5:39 pm
Page 2 – “The popular conception of the enemy in Vietnam is that it was a grassroots insurgency sprung from the peoples’ content with an illegitimate government in Saigon and the presence of a foreign invader.”
The author here tries to downplay two historical truths- the government in Saigon was illegitimate, and the U. S. was a foreign invader. Thirty-three years after the war has ended, and the writer is still calling the Vietnamese “the enemy” and the “North Vietnamese.”
How long will Cold War propaganda be disseminated? When will the day come when American historians will be able to refer to Vietnam by the proper names (yes, that would mean recognition, wouldn’t it?) of the Vietnamese and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam?
Is the author still trying to prove to us the U. S. invasion was justified by reminding us of China and Russia’s involvement? This seems ridiculous when the U. S. supported the French, and then helped set up, support and control Diem’s dictatorship in the south. It took two to tango then, and it matters little now which side took the first step.
Perhaps if we compare the numbers of Chinese and Russian soldiers that served in Vietnam at the time with those of the U. S., Australia, Korea, Thailand, New Zealand, etc. – then we might have a case. Or have there been declassified documents of the Russians offering the Vietnamese nuclear weapons, such as Dulles offered the French, that we do not know about?
By jstrum_bn on Apr 9, 2009 at 1:30 am
As long as there was a “hands off” policy on North Vietnam the military could not effectively prosecute the war.
By R.Kassebaum on Apr 10, 2009 at 10:38 am
BUNDY: “It is an awful mess.
JOHNSON: “What is Laos worth to me? What is Laos worth to this country? We’ve got a treaty, but hell, everybody else has got a treaty out there, and they’re not doing anything about it.”
(From the transcript of a telephone call on May 27, 1964, between President Lyndon B. Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, his national security adviser. A year later. Johnson began the large-scale deployment of troops to Vietnam. The transcript was released in February by the Lyndon B. Johnson Library and Museum in Austin, Texas)
As my deceased friend would remind me, retired Republic of Vietnam Major Julian Dubuc, in September of 1954, the United States, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and Pakistan formed the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, or SEATO. The SEATO charter was vitally important to the American rationale for the Vietnam War. The United States used the organization as its justification for refusing to go forward with the 1956 elections intended to reunify Vietnam, instead maintaining the divide between communist North Vietnam and South Vietnam at the 17th parallel. As the conflict in Vietnam unfolded, the inclusion of Vietnam as a territory under SEATO protection gave the United States the legal framework for its continued involvement there. The problem was Johnson’s structure in running the war as a fool.
From a Disabled Republic of Vietnam Combat Veteran
By JOHN C. BRUNGER on Apr 27, 2009 at 4:17 pm
As myself a Vietnamese who wanted the South to win. I agree that there was not a lot of chances for the United States but I am very thankful for everyone who fought in the war.
By Chuong on Jun 17, 2009 at 5:30 pm
RIP for the fallen on both side
By henrylim88 on Nov 10, 2009 at 12:28 am