- Dropped out of West Point a second time after having failed at math his 1st quarter the first time around. (Would like to know if it was math or something else that leads to his leaving the second time)

- Described as "swaggering"

- "Fredendall was once described by American General Lucian K. Truscott as,

Small in stature, loud and rough in speech, he was outspoken in his opinions and critical of superiors and subordinates alike. He was inclined to jump to conclusions which were not always well founded. Fredendall rarely left his command post for personal visits and reconnaissance, yet he was impatient with the recommendations of subordinates more familiar with the terrain and other conditions than he."

- "Fredendall stayed on his command ship, HMS Largs until after fighting was over (during the Torch landings)

- " Orders from his headquarters in the Grand Hotel of Oran were headed with “II Corps – In the Field” which prompted laughter from his troops living in tents and slit trenches."

And I think perhaps most damning:

- "Fredendall was given to speaking and issuing orders using his own slang, such as calling infantry units "walking boys" or artillery "popguns." Instead of using the standard military map grid-based location designators, he would make up confusing codes such as "the place that begins with C." This practice was unheard-of for a general and distinguished graduate of the Command and General Staff School, who had been taught to always use standardized order procedures to ensure clarity when transmitting orders to subordinate commanders under the stress of combat. Fredendall's informality often led to confusion amongst his subordinates, and precious time was lost attempting to figure out his meaning."

Could we blame Fredendall for the poor performance of his troops in the field. Who really knows that answer because his troops were untested in combat and the United States army had no previous high intensity engagements with the Germans. Well World War I but that was 1918 and we are in 1943. Sidi Bou Zid and Kasserine Pass were the bar after the first encounters with the Germans. Eventually the bar for combat performance against the Germans gets raised by future victories but how can anybody expect American commanders to do better with such raw troops and more importantly untested field commanders. Fredendall deployed his troops in excellent positions and his offensives earlier in the campaign look very similar to Patton's later on. Is their anyway that Fredendall could have stopped his troops from routing once they were under aerial bombardment or under attack by panzers. I doubt it unless he decided to deploy his artillery closer to the lines but that would have taken the artillery out of a more effective defensive position where they were later used to stop Rommel from exploiting his victory at Kasserine. Also, why does Fredendall get the blame for losing at Kasserine when in truth he won when it comes to the overall operation? He won with a less experienced army and inferior equipment with the proper use and deployment of his artillery.

Fredendall lost his job because of style points. He wasn't at the front but in his HQ which in public opinion doesn't look good. Second, even though Kasserine was a US victory it wasn't a pretty victory. Terry Allen may have very well kept his job by leading the defense of the 1st ID at the front. Finally, two people were going to lose their jobs after Kasserine and the logical choice in 1943 was Eisenhower. So Eisenhower fires Fredendall and places the blame on his shoulders for Kasserine and he puts Patton in his place to whip the II Corps into shape.

According to Nance, Fredendall had a couple hundred engineers spend a couple weeks turning a mining shaft into a bunker. Was this such an unreasonable decision? Weren't the Allies suffering from incessant air attack? Wasn't it true that II Corps lacked sufficient housing, and that headquarters staff were killed by German air attacks? Isn't it true that Fredendall also used engineers, many more engineers, to construct a minefield across Kasserine Pass? Why then do we turn this mythological bunker into such a decisive damning piece of evidence. Clearly, the bunker represented a mere fraction of Fredendall's efforts, and it certainly had some justification.

I don't think anyone is going to realistically argue that it was possible for the 2nd Corps to hold the eastern Dorsal against a determined German attack. Instead of building a headquarters bunker, Fredendall could have instead constructed a couple of pillboxes in Sidi bou zid, and we all know it wouldn't have made one iota of difference. Yes, he could have done better, but everyone can do better. Meanwhile, the fact remains that the Germans were stopped.

Thus, I think that criticisms of Fredendall tell us more about American culture as naively perfectionist, than they actually tell us about Fredendall's performance. We hate Fredendall like we hate professional sports players who fumble a ball or miss a free throw. Nevermind that they are actually quite good, or that something might very well have been unavoidable, because people don't really care about the facts, they just care about the dramatic story in which Fredendall -must- be derided so that we can feel good about the subsequent progress.

Ultimately, it is foolish to think that one battle can be used to indicate whether a general was competent or incompetent. The variables are far too complex for such simplistic analysis. Indeed, I seem to remember that the Germans were very happy with their bunkers in Italy, which served to protect their headquarters from endless Allied air attacks. How is it that the Germans become geniuses for building bunkers, but yet Fredendall remains a moron? How is it that the French were idiots to build their Maginot Line, but yet the Germans were brilliant in constructing their Seigfreid Line. It seems that most people are far too quick to confuse success with competence, and failure with incompetence.

Meanwhile, to reiterate, the fact remains that the Germans were stopped at Kasserine! It was clearly a defeat for the Germans! Just what exactly are we blaming Fredendall for? Because he lost control of an outpost position at Sidi bou zid? Who is crazy enough to think that there was any way to adequately defend the southeastern Dorsals? In response to the German attack, Fredendall did just exactly what all of you wanted him to do. He ordered an immediate counterattack by Alger… and it failed miserably. It seems that Fredendall is damned if he does and damned if he doesn't. One might say that he has become a bit of a scapegoat.

That said, since no other US commander had any greater combat experience, let alone a combat command, there was no way to anticipate Fredendall's weak showing. Had his subordinate commanders held the eastern dorsal, or had any other of a number of variables gone his way, his weaknesses may have gone overlooked and we could now look fondly on President Fredendall while analyzing the failings of General Eisenhower who was too distracted by personal and foreign affairs to give a good account of himself as a commander in North Africa. Both Fredendall and Ike are the result of the fortunes of war.

As Pappy Boyington said "Show me a hero, and I'll prove he's a bum."