SAC’s needs during the first two decades of the Cold War resulted in a number of changes in operational readiness for the bomber wings. First came the one-third ground alert posture, in which a third of the SAC bomber fleet needed to be prepared to be airborne within 15 minutes. The 1958 crises in Lebanon and Taiwan contributed to SAC’s decision to commence airborne alert posture in the last months of that year, and to disperse planes to keep them from being destroyed in a major strike on a single airfield. The changes put enormous strain on air-to-air refueling squadrons and wings. At the same time, SAC conducted speed and endurance tests with IFR to demonstrate the strike capabilities of its bombers, particularly B-52s.

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The Cuban Missile Crisis, from October 14-28, 1962, posed the greatest challenge yet to SAC, and tankers proved crucial throughout that watershed event. B-47 bombers were dispersed to select military and civilian airfields. RB-47 and KC-97 tankers joined Lockheed U-2 spy planes and other aircraft in the search for Soviet ships headed to Cuba with missiles and support equipment.

A few years later, spy flights by the fastest jet ever made, the Lock­heed SR-71 Blackbird, also involved Air Force KC-135 tankers. For those operations, however, specially designated KC-135Q tankers had to carry two types of fuel—their own and the unique jet fuel used by the SR-71. The use of a hydrogen peroxide supplement that is denser than jet fuel reduced the amount of JP-7 carried, but it allowed the KC-135Q to pump 147,000 pounds of fuel into the Blackbird in 11 minutes—a record 1,200 gallons per minute.

The Vietnam War brought IFR to the forefront, as it played a huge role in strategic, tactical, air mobility and recon operations. Early in the war, between 1964 and 1966, tankers helped to get fighter and bomber wings to Southeast Asia bases. Most of the tankers stationed in-country were SAC KC-135s that serviced fighters and recon aircraft. Refueling circuits were set up in northern Thailand and the Gulf of Tonkin, with a few in South Vietnam, and TAC control squadrons directed thirsty aircraft to airborne tankers at “anchors.” Pilots would routinely ask KC-135 crews if they were a “mama” (hose-and-drogue capable) or “papa” (flying boom only). A drogue adapter could be added to tankers, but only when they were on the ground.

There are plenty of stories about tankers refueling groups of four or more aircraft at a time in Vietnam, as well as many accounts of individual bravery by refueling crews. Staff Sgt. Michael P. Schmitz, a radar operator in the 621st TAC Control Squadron at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, remembered one mission in 1968 when his tanker actually towed a shot-up Republic F-105 Thunderchief back to base via its boom. “We were turning the tanker to roll out in front of him when the F-105 pilot called that he had a flame-out,” Schmitz recalled. “Instead of doing a normal 15-degree angle bank, the tanker put it down to a 30-degree bank, lowered its nose and rushed in front of the fighter, so the boom operator could hook him up. They dragged him back into Thailand and dropped him off at the nearest base.” The tanker crewmen received commendations for their extra­or­dinary efforts.

There could be no doubt about aerial refueling’s importance to aviators in Vietnam: In the course of just one year, 1966, KC-135 crews were credited with saving 53 planes and crews that otherwise would have been lost. Tankers were always on the alert for downed pilots and other emergencies, and frequently performed IFR during search-and-rescue missions.

Even after America’s involvement in Vietnam ended, escalating Cold War operations and Middle East tensions resulted in the need for SAC to continue to upgrade its assets. After studying aircraft developed for the new wide-body commercial fleets—the Boeing 747, Lockheed L-1011, McDonnell Douglas DC-10 and Lockheed C-5 cargo plane—the Air Force decided on the DC-10, contracting with McDonnell Douglas to produce 60 planes at a conversion cost of $88 million each.

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