Many thanks, Paul I will give this some further thought and come back on it. I have not surrendered yet.

Germany was hungry but not starving by 1918, still capable of fighting. Also short of some key metals used in engine manufacture etc.

Remember Germany was not a democracy. The Imperial Reichstag was democratically elected, but had little power; the Prussian Landtag had an unequal franchise (Bismarck had, after all, fought his wars to keep the status quo in Prussia!). By this stage of the war there were demands to democratise Prussia and seek a compromise peace (Reichstag Peace Resolution), so Ludendorff's Spring Offensives had a lot to do with the Prussian old order/officer class clinging to power. When the war was clearly lost, the Army and other nationalists let the Social Democrat and Liberal politicians make peace and set up the Weimar Republic (it was better than communist revolution, after all) – then spread the myth that they had stabbed Germany in the back, undermining the Weimar Republic right from the start.

In months with no offensive, British forces used to take casualties of around 35,000 per month in what was called "normal wastage" – patrols, trench raids, mutual shelling. Call it 10,000 deaths for the sake of argument – you can calculate that there would still have been hundreds of thousands of British dead, and similar numbers in other countries, even with no major offensives, although perhaps less horror than the Somme and Third Ypres. (In reality "wastage" deaths were less than this because when major offensives were going on there was less wastage in the quiet sectors – so be careful not to double-count if you are doing the calculations.)

The Allies didn't know how long the war was going to drag on for – for nearly a year after the First Marne they thought victory was just round the corner, until summer 1915 when it became obvious that Russia was in serious trouble. Most historians believe that, despite his later claim that he had been practising attrition all along, Haig was aiming for some kind of decisive victory, certainly at the Somme and possibly the following year as well. It's easy to snigger, but on the other hand if it had come off he would have looked like a hero. None of us can foresee the future, and generals and politicians who had just wanted to sit and wait would have looked defeatist and risked their own people wanting to give up.

What would have happened if Abraham Lincoln had forbidden his generals to invade the South and had settled down for a blockade of many years instead? He certainly would have had to put up with Lee menacing Washington, and possibly Northern war-weariness.

Just one or two points:

1. 'The French were almost knocked out by mutiny.' Yes, but surely this adds some weight to my comment. They mutinied BECAUSE of the 'over the top' notion. In fact, this at one level seems to suggest that the French SENSED the 'over the top' strategy was clearly wrong.

2. 'Keeping the initiative' it was hardly an initiative more like you win some, we win some.'

3. "the Spring Offensive' was as the German commanders realised a massive once and for all 'GAMBLE, launched because the British Naval Blockade was having effects of a devastating sort in Germany. It squandered the lives of warn out German soldiers.

I am not convinced that sitting tight, letting the Germans bleed would not have won the day. By the time of the Spring Offensive Allied materiel and American manpower were increasng as Ludendorff and others knew.

I still believe that sitting it out would have won for the allies without the horrific effects produced.

Please come back to me Paul and punch holes in my comment.

The "Lions led by donkeys" lie was begun by Alan Clark in his book "The Donkeys" in the 60's. NO GERMAN (or any other) GENERAL EVER SAID SUCH A THING. Clark was an entertaining writer, but no true historian ever makes up quotes.

What you say about sitting in for a long siege may be true, but it wasn't acceptable to the French. Loos, the Somme and Arras were launched at French demand – then by summer 1917 the French were almost knocked out by mutiny. Third Ypres was a bit different, and was agreed to by the British War Cabinet with deep reluctance. By the end of 1917 Lloyd George wanted to leave the western front to the Americans and concentrate on fighting the Turks, but events overtook him – the German Spring Offensive and Allied counterattack.

The other caveat is that it might have left the Germans free to pick off the Allies – Russia, then Greece, then Italy, one by one. The Allies were quite keen on keeping the inititiave and killing Germans, even if they deluded themselves about howmany Germans they were killing.

Whilst I appreciate your points regarding The Somme and Verdun and the possibilities of the Allies losing the wAr, I think there are one or two other considerations to be taken into account.

Fiirst: your comments seem based on pure strategic calculation with no concern for the loss of human life, nor indeed on the horrific injuries and suffering entailed.The comment that was is not 'a ballet,' seems a rather cold assessment of matters.

Second: As time went on the whole object of the conflict in France was to turn it into a WAR OF MOVEMENT. I would argue that had the Allies simply dug in and allowed the Germans to attempt to impale themselves on the barbed wire around the allied trenches, things would have been different because :

1. the German attacks on the trench line would not have broken through

2. British and French manpower would have built up more and more behind the trenches had the Generals not squandered it by adopting the same 'over the top' strategy as the Germans.

3. as time went on the blockade of Germany was having an effect on German Supplies and causing immense suffering on the Home Front in Germany

4. With the eventual entry of the USA the Allies materiel and manpower advantage was overwhelming. Germany, despite the caving in of Russia was overstretched and COULD NOT WIN.

SO, although the Somme played a part in reducing the size of the German juggernaut IT ALSO HAD THE SAME EFFECT ON THE ALLIED MANPOWER.

I am sure you will come back at me and offer some evidence that my appraisal: sit tight, build up supplies, allow the enemy to expend itself, cut off its resources is somehow deficient.

I wait eagerly for your analysis.

The Canadian and Australian corps, about 5 divisions each, were fine fighting forces. The British Army was much larger, c 55 divisions. Although their quality was more constant than the Germans (there was a huge difference between a German trench division and an attack division), the quality of British divisions varied a bit and the best of them (eg. the Guards, the Scots, and several others) had as fine a fighting record, and were used as frequently where elite troops were needed, as the Aussies and Canadians. I refer the interested reader to the books of Andy Simpson for more up-to-date evidence on this.

No German general ever said the British were "Lions Led by Donkeys" – it is now known that Alan Clark simply made this up to use it as the title of a famous 1960s book on Loos. The quote probably dates from the Crimean War or Franco-Prussian War.

There is some evidence that the British were a bit slow to adopt their tactics in 1916, just as the Americans were in 1918. It's what happens when you build a huge army from scratch. By 1918 British tactics were as good as any.