Hi
If Haig was the worst general ever, how come that Joffre, Ludendorff, Nivelle, Falkenhym also lost similar numbers of manpower for France and Germany during the fighting yet the only successful breakthrough during the 100 days was by the British Imperial forces. The fact that the destruction was the same for many generals indicates that it is not simply an individual general who is to blame. Personally I think the politicians have equal blame. And who elected them ?

By Trevor Kneath on Aug 6, 2008 at 10:06 am

If Haig was so incompetent how come under his command the British Army had its greatest ever number of consecutive victories; he commanded it during the only time it played the major role in the defeat of a significant European adversary; smashed through the supposedly impregnable Hindenburg Line in ten weeks; in 1918 did as much damage to the Germans, in terms of prisoners & captured guns, as the combined efforts of Belgium, France and the US; had by 1918 developed tactics for advancing against fortified lines which were way ahead of its allies, US forces were still using 1916 tactics and suffering the consequences.

If Haig was so uncaring about causalities why then did he reprieve 9 out of every 10 men sentenced to death; why did the British have less than 1 million causalities compared to Frances 1.3 m and Germanys 2 m, even the US had 115,000 from very limited input.; why was it Haig, due to the increased level of causalities in winning the war, who argued for the armistice against the wishes of Foch and Pershing who wanted to finish Germany off, Foch being right when he said “we have bought ourselves an armistice for 20 years”. Wrong decision by Haig but made for the right reason. Why also did Haig spend the rest of his life caring for injured service men and set up the Haig Fund now the Poppy Appeal?

By Clipper2 on Aug 10, 2008 at 10:58 am

I concur with this analysis on Haig. Haig must bare the lions share of blame for the disasters on the Somme, Passhendaele, and Ypres. He clearly used the infantry as 'cannonfodder' in order to achieve unrealistic objectives. The problem with Haig is thus; the lives of the men under his command were clearly not a high priority to him. His overriding aim was sending 'good news' back home to the politicians who had come to manifestly distrust his abilities. His belief in attritional warfare was eminently a disasterous one. To it, men were sacrificed by the tens of thousands in often futile and pointless attacks. One suspects that Haig was merely carrying out such folies in order to appear in the light of a 'pro-active' commander.
Granted, you do not win a war by maintaining a static position, but Haig seems to have given little or no thought to the appalling casualties that ensued due to his plain pigheaded repetitive attacks. He appears to have little concept of, or made little use of, intelligence that was being supplied that warned him of German defense strength – this is particularly true at the Somme in July.
Of course, arguments can, and will be made for Haig's decisions and tactics, but the point remains that he sent hundreds of thousands of men to their deaths on a whim. Often believing that a 'breakthrough' was immenent. The very fact that he ordered thousands of men to 'walk' virtually shoulder-to-shoulder across No-Man's Land without any cover whatsoever, seals his fate as an incompetent albeit arrogant commander. Haig should have been removed, but I fear that his high connections prohibited this. Coupled with the fact that politicians were loathe to remove a top commander for fear of undermining moral at this crucial time, sealed the fate of the men in the trenches in the Great War.

By Ian on Aug 20, 2008 at 9:05 am

Haig was as bad as his press indicates. Those who point out his string of victories in l918 convenienlty fail to mention the complete collapse of Germany's social order durring this same time period.

While the German soldiers were facing the enemy at the front, it was the enemy in their rear that put the final nail in Germany's coffin.

In 1918, Germany was nearing the end of her rope. Revolution stalked the cities. General strikes hampered the war effort.In many cities, private armies clashed with police. Desertion in the ranks was increasing at an alarming rate. Talk of mutiny was making the rounds in German trenches. The morale of the German civilian populace was circling the toilet bowl, and ready for the final plunge. Oddly enough the man that hit the flush lever on the toilet wasn't Haig, it was Ludendorf.

The success of Lundendorf's 1918 Offensive was due in large part to the use of his "new tactics". The failure of Ludendorf's 1918 Offensive was due in large part in forgetting one "simply rule". Troops that lack significant mobility, should never advance beyond the protection of their own artillery fan.

Ludendorf violated this simple rule, and it cost the German people over 1 million of their sons, brothers, and fathers in a very short time period. For the German people the Ludendorf 1918 Offensive was the last straw.

German government, and society proved to be much more fragile than that of their British cousins. While Britain was able to weather such disasters as all of 1915, the Somme, and Galipoli, the German People in 1918 could not do the same. There is a lot to be said for the British tradition of keeping a stiff upper lip

By the time Field Marshall Haig had finally figured out how to use his own army without killing most of it, the German people had already thrown in the towel. Haig's great string of 1918 victories, was in reality a campaign of mopping up an already demoralised enemy.

Ludendorf's final offensive may have finally succeeded in teaching Haig some things he had failed to learn in three years of throwing away British/Commonwealth lives.

1. How to concentrate troops to deliver a decisive blow.

2. How to avoid deluding the effectiveness of his own supporting artillery, bye concentrating their fires on key objectives.

3. To make sure his forces did not advance beyond the protection of their own artillery.

4. Most importantly, to give his men realistic objectives.

Still, most Buffoon's won't go down without a fight. Haig still managed to botch up quite alot of things in 1918.

By Tim on Sep 2, 2008 at 3:12 am

Reading a book on reassessing Haig and it would appear that a great deal of the problems stemmed from the attitudes of the day, leading up to war. Public schools, having the right contacts, the forces being the last chance for many rich families sons to have careers, the old school tie mentality as we say and training that set the British up for days of the empire.It would appear that the BEF did not adapt to changes in tactics, technology or training and certainly would not take advise from other countries. So yes the commanders & politicians should take the blame & accept responsibility for the slaughter. The British common man/woman had always been sat upon in this manner.

By Kimbo on Oct 4, 2008 at 5:09 pm

Hello, I am an A level student currently writing my essay on the Battle of the Somme. Who is the author of this article as I would like to quote some of these words in my coursework but need to know the author so I can credit him correctly.

Regards Simon

By Simon Bailey on Oct 22, 2008 at 10:45 am

Having just finished reading "In Flanders Fields", by Leon Wolff, I am astonished that anyone could believe that Haig was anything other than an
incompetent buffoon who believed he was being guided by god when he ordered hundreds of thousand of British, Australian and Canadian troops into a
situation where they were mutilated and slaughtered in the Flanders campaign of mid and late 1917. Here is a man, who in his pigheaded ignorance,
considered that rifle and machine gun fire had little stopping power against horses and whose plan for battle amounted to rupturing the German line to
let his beloved cavalry ride through to victory. He had little time for tanks, considering them to be of little value, and was so anxious for glory
he chose not to await and share a possible later victory with American and French forces, for whom he had little confidence.

For the ten years he lived after the war he spent much of his time helping create an organization, The British Legion, to benefit veterans and
families whose sons had been killed or mutilated in France and Belgium, . Of course had he not been such a pathetic dolt there would have been far
less of such people to comfort.

By Colin on Nov 2, 2008 at 9:16 pm

A competent general would have realized his error and ordered
his troops back into the trenches, saving countless lives.

By Mark on Nov 11, 2008 at 11:00 am

Also – lets not forget that the breakout when it did come was a
direct result of the Australians and Canadians – NOT the Brittish.
Monash and Currie punched a hole through the line at Amiens.

Ludendorf himself described it as 'the dark day' for Germany
during the war.

Monash also was the one who planned the (successful) attack on
the Hindenburg Line.

Indeed from Amien through to the end of the war it was the
Australian and Canadian troops (with their Generals Monash and
Currie respectively) who were the pointy end of the spear that
pierced the German lines. Indeed the French call the hundred
days offensive 'Les cent jours du Canada' (Canada's hundred days)
as both the Canadians and Aussies were permenantly engaged
the whole way.

Meanwhile Brittish 4th Army General Rawlinson (4th army
being the Brittish component of the spearhead) described the
Australian advance as the single greatest military achievement
of the war.

Basically – Haig's only 'success' came when he didn't actually
have anything to do with the planning of the battles.

Pretty damning record.

By Richard on Nov 11, 2008 at 3:43 pm

Beg pardon, Trevor, but Foch (and Petain) also favoured an
Armistice, though demanding stiffer terms than Haig. Only
Pershing wished to press on with the war.

Foch's famous remark about a twenty years truce referred to the
Treaty of Versailles, not to the November Armistice, which was
largely his own work.

The main difference between Haig and the French was that he did
not wish to occupy the Rhineland. He suspected (correctly) that
they had notions of detaching this region and making a
protectorate of it – a sort of "Alsace-Lorraine" in reverse – and did
not wish any of his men to die in pursuit of such a dubious aim.

By Mike Stone on Nov 12, 2008 at 9:59 am

The fact is, Haig was not a bad general. He had served in the Boer and colonial confilcts, with great distinction, courage and intelligence. He displayed these qualities when he refused to retreat any further in 1918. Furthermore, he knew the suffering of his men, he refused to be painted by an artist in 1917 and insisted he paint the men "who are fighting and dying in the mud". By the end of the war, the British army was the best in the world, it had been transformed from a highly capable (yet 19th century oriented) army in 1914, to a highly capable, citizen army, adept in modern warfare in 1918. Haig and his generals, such as Rawlinson, Gough and the Austrlian and colonial cammanders, eg Monash are to thank for this, along with the suffering and courage of millions of British and Imperial forces.

By adam waugh on Nov 20, 2008 at 5:50 pm

Adam – thank goodness someone has provided a well-balanced piece on Haig in this thread!

It is shocking that there is still such a reliance on polemical works such as Leon Wolff's 'In Flanders Field' that, rather than treating the topic objectively, recycle memoirs written by statesmen in 1930s.

Haig was not the 'pigheaded' cavalryman that is generally perceived. He believed in the use of tanks and the modernisation of the battlefield – one needs only look at the all-arms cooperation of the Hundred Days campaign as a good example of this. It is interesting that generals such as Plumer and Byng do not come under fire even though they themselves were cavalrymen by trade.

By Aimée on Dec 1, 2008 at 10:37 am

i think he was a caring person because he provided good care and tactics

By Mole on Dec 3, 2008 at 12:35 pm

i thnk that a certain man oculd one say that a person was involved other than another certain person…….

By lews :) on Dec 3, 2008 at 12:50 pm

that one was false i now say that he was good and put others before him and had natural instinct and talent to be leader

By lews :) on Dec 3, 2008 at 12:52 pm

The battle of the Somme was indeed a great slaughter, but for both sides.

It was French pressure (justified French pressure) that largely forced Haig to attack at the Somme (which wasn't Haig's ground of choosing and a month before he wanted to launch an offensive) and engage in a grinding battle of attrition.

It is an objective fact that the Somme served its strategic purpose of drawing off German reserves which would have otherwise been used to break the back of the French army at Verdun.

While the British and French suffered 620,000 casualties during the battle of the Somme, the Germans also sustained 500,000 casualties.

Even with the negation of 500,000 German soldiers on the Western front, the French still almost lost the battle of Verdun. Their army was being bled white and was still almost broken as a fighting force even with the battle of the Somme drawing off German reserves that would otherwise have been used to almost certainly destroy the French army in 1916.

Revisionist history is all fine and good but anyone who advocates that Haig shouldn't have launched the Somme offensive should also be objective and concede that the Allies would have almost certainly lost the war if the British had sat and done nothing while the weight of the German was grinding down the French at Verdun.

I think it is also very unfair to ignore the fact that Haig was considered to be a very good general during and after the war. He was forced to make gruel but necessary decisions during the WWI.

Churchill later likened him to a surgeon who had to act dispassionately for the long-term good of the patient, no matter how messy were the short-term means.

The British public understood that at the time. Later revisionist historians tend to have forgotten it.

The British public was not alone in their admiration of Haig. No less than Black Jack Pershing, commander of the American army in France was quoted as saying that Haig was "the man who won the war".

.

By Steven Scott on Dec 5, 2008 at 7:22 pm

I used to believe all this rubbish about Haig being useless but the more I read the more I am convinced that not only was he the best strategest of the war but the best British General of this century with the possible exception of Slim.

The 1st of July 1916 was exceptional for its casualties but the daily rate for the rest of the Somme offensive was not exceptionally high compared with the other campaigns of the war ( and I don't just mean British campaigns) and nowhere near the rates of the eastern front of WW2.

Even the casualties of the 1st of July are not unduly higher than the 3 days of Gettysburg which was fought with much less effective weapons. How come then that Lee is said to be a military genius and Haig useless?

Yes Haig had faults but so do most generals even the greatest, but he was more resposnible for winning the war than any other general anf if the weather hadn't intervened the German army may have cracked on the Somme or at Passchendaele. Certainly Ludendorf feared it would.

The point about attitional warfare is that it can very rarely be avoided whereever huge armies meet. The recent Gulf Wars being the exception, I would argue that the 'Gulf' was also in quality of the armies involved.

The American Civil War, The Western Front of WWI, the Eastern Front of WW2 and Korea were also wars of attrition. Grant accepted vast casualties as did Zhukov; They both won. Haig did also and he cared as much or more for the lives of his men than the other two.

Had Haig been French, Russian or American they would eulogise him, only the British would rubbish him and his achievements and those of,his staff and his brave officers & men that defeated the army of the greatest power of his day. Only Edward III, the Black Prince, Henry V, Marlborough & Wellington of all British Generals can equal that record.

I am amazed that the old story of Germany being undermined at home losing them the warstill being brought up. this was the main thrust of Nazi propaganda to blame jews & Communists for Germany's defeat. It was a defeat. The German army was being beaten.

Germany was a dictatorship, the Generals and The Kaiser at Spa in 1918 knew the couldn't stave off defeat any longer. They cared far less about the troubles at home than the propect of total ruin and occupation. The great German army of 1914 died on the Somme which was as great a failure of German tactics as it was British. 3rd Ypres was almost as destuctive to them.

Ludendorf's gamble of Spring 1918 used up the fresh divisions from Russia, but the German army was still a very formidable opponent just as it would be in Spring 1945. Haig & Foch together knew that the Hindenburg line could be broken. (It had been at Cambrai) and together they decided that simultaneous attacks by all the allied armies would prevent the Germans being able to move reinforcements to the point of attack and that is how the war was won.

If there were as many studies of Amiens, Bapaume, Epehy, Canal du Nord, the St Quentin Canal and the other victories of the hundred days as there are on the Somme & Passchendaele our country would realise what a debt we owe Haig.

As for Monash & Currie, they were both exceptional generals leading exceptional troops but many British divisions had exceptional records too and the Australians & Canadians were equally well led previously by Birdwood & Byng respectively and both were loved by their men.

For those who want balanced views on the War and its Generals I can recommend 'the Smoke and the Fire' by John Terraine, 'The Great War Generals of the Western Front 1914-18' by Robin Neillands .As for the Final campaign I reccomend 'Amiens to the Armistice' by JP Harris & Niall Barr.
I found this book invaluable on a recent tour with Leger Holidays. Unlike every atlas and most histories I have been able to find this has maps on the battles of the hundred days most of which were bigger and more important than Mons, Le Cateau, Neuve Chappele or Loos that those atlases and histories lavish their attention on.

By Martin Hill on Dec 13, 2008 at 8:31 pm

An extremely balanced piece of writing well done, sir. in fact why don't you contact the British Army now because it is obviousthat you should be a general in the British Army. How can you judge someone who has done something you have ever done? who won the war? the British. Who was their victorious Field Marshall? Haig- a National hero in life and death.

By A.W.M.S.Griffin on Jan 26, 2009 at 4:31 pm

I would just like to say that firstly Germany implemented the strategy of attrition (was not Haigs intention) and Haig was ordered reluctantly into the Somme by his political superiors. He did the best with what he had (which was relatively little) and used the innovations of the tanks at the first opportunity given. Any commander in his place would have done the same or indeed a worse job. I agree completely with Scott, and think that this kind of opinion is badly researched and ignorant of his political and military context
Cheers

By Marilee on Jan 31, 2009 at 3:47 am

this is a crap and badly researched article.
Martin Hill really said it all.

By whodoyouthinkyouare? on Jan 31, 2009 at 3:51 am

My view is that Haig and his abilities/shortcomings must be viewed against the circumstances and realities of the time.

Once the "race to the sea" had been completed both sides dug in causing a war of attrition to commence. Grand movements and clever maneuvering was simply not an option for Haig, as it was for Lee or many of the other historically successful generals mentioned by others.

Additionally, while generals (of today's "Super Power" nations) enjoy a wide variety of weapons and technologies, WW1 era commanders had noting but artillery and infantry at their disposal. Airpower at the time was effectively nothing more than recon. Since manevuering was out of the question there was no other way or means for WW1 generals to dislodge the enemy but by frontal attacks.

Some will point to the misuse or disregard of tanks by Haig. The facts are, during battle WW1 tanks moved at a rate of less than 3 MPH. The terrain, having been mauled by literal years of artillery barrages, was utterly unsuitable for an aggressive use of slow and ponderous vehicles – no matter how armored they might be.

Haig, and indeed all generals of the time, faced a quandary; how does one advance against nearly impregnable defensive positions with nothing but artillery and infantry at hand? In the 90 years that have passed no one has been able to offer a suitable alternative or solution to that question.

As a commander Haig was chocked full of faults. That much is true. His showing during the 1912 Army Maneuvers was wretched, his Boer war activities were similarly undistinguished, and there is nothing to suggest that his actions throughout WW1 were infused with genius. That said, I am not sure that even General Grierson (who was heads and tails a far better leader than Haig and would have certainly been selected as the successor to General French had he not died prematurely) could have done much more than Haig if given the chance.

The war was won not due to Haig and his bloody (viz. suicidal) attacks. It was not won through daring or masterful operations. It was won because the Allies simply outlasted the beleagured German army. The people of Germany could and would no longer support the war. Once a home front crumbles it is only a short matter of time before the war itself is lost. 50 years later America would prove a similar tenet during Vietnam.

The staggering loss of an entire generation within Britain can and should be placed at Haig's feet. Does that make him a bad general? I cannot say. As a contrast, during the 1941 Battle of Moscow General Zukhov lost 140,000 men. (Another Russian general ,Kozlov lost about 40% of his men – between 150,000 and 175,000 killed!) And yet Zukhov has been hailed by many as a great general.

Personally, I do not like Haig. I do, however, have to give him just due if for no other reason than the circumstances during WW1 gave him no other options but costly (and suicidal) frontal attacks or sitting still.

Haig can be righty blamed for throwing his troops

By Dale on Feb 6, 2009 at 11:32 am

Most comments I read here tend to a mere 'black or white'-view.
In almost every occasion in history, a wide variety of circumstances and a good deal of unprecedented or unexpected events influenced the final results.

Although Haig may have been an able leader, in Belgium he tended to very conservative battlefield tactics, making him seem more audacious than bright.
Nonetheless, one can't blame him for everything that went wrong.

Keep in mind that we watch these events in retrospective, making it pretty easy to put judgement on people with regard to the known results of their actions. It's a complete different matter it you are about to make decisions not knowing how they'll turn out.

By Jan on Feb 21, 2009 at 10:01 pm

Haig was obviously so self-obsessed and wanting so much glory, that he didn't care how many people he put to death or sent onto the battlefield with no idea of the experiences they went through. He threw hundreds after hundreds of men into the battle, not caring about what happened to them, if he did care, after a few hundred had died, why didn't he stop?
I know he was put under pressure, but then why didn't he go out and fight? why didn't he come up with a strategic battle plan, rather then ruthlessly sending men to their deaths. I completley back up the statement. " the lions were led by lambs." I think Haig had power, but was cowardly and used these together to kill thousands of men.

By Emma on Feb 22, 2009 at 11:21 am

Haig was a victim of his era. He embodied the distance between classes, between soldier and commander, the exemplified the character dominating the upper classes mindset of the time. His distance from the battles compounded this isolation in thinking. I find Stephen Fry's character of General Malchet in Blackadder comically embodies this thinking well.

Haig undoubtedly made many wrong turns. His bloody minded adherence to a war of attrition in the face of massive failure was to say the least unwise. But was the fault all his? That I fear is an impossible question to answer. He was made by a society that considered themselves superior to the rest of the world.

Britain has a long colonial history of failing to learn from experience, they new about the folly of trench warfare, in both the Crimean War and the New Zealand Wars (against the Maori). They had experienced failure at trying to bombard earth worked fortifications, as outlined by Belich in the New Zealand wars books, yet, failed to translate this experience to the Western front.

The fault only partly lies with Haig in my opinion. He was a fine example of the colonial British mindset; arrogant, ignorant, foolish, and unimaginative. The silly notion of relying on the tried and tested, that had already failed in the past; the unwillingness to change tactics in the face of overwhelming loses: in my mind speak for itself.

By Guerrilla Roach on Feb 26, 2009 at 5:46 pm

U R Sad

By Bob Marley on Mar 14, 2009 at 11:09 am

WW1 largely involved Europe and so this comment comes from an "outsider".

It is the later comments in this thread that allude to the real issue. WW1 articles tend to focus on describing battles, planning and commanders. There doesn't seem yet to be an article summarising the question of how that war SHOULD have been fought (tactically & operationally), given:

a. the onset of trenchlines on both sides in a continuous front; and

b. political pressure on military commanders on each side to deliver a military victory.

It seems to this outsider that any criticism of the tactics or planning or generals must be in the form of measurement against how the war should have been conducted (albeit this would still be the 'hindsight' view.)

By WongHoongHooi on Apr 16, 2009 at 12:47 am

It is interesting to read these comments and to get both sides of the argument surrounding Haig's ability to command. Why is it that all the armchair generals, who share a common lack of military credentials, are able to understand the basic statement, "A dead soldier is no good to anyone?" Lives are not there to be thrown away. Hindsight is not the driving force here. It is widely understood that Haig was forced to support the French in their defence at Verdun. But his lack of control over the battleground (eg: Gough and the the fiasco of Bullecort.) caused excessive loss. Haig does not deserve the adulation given to him. He was not an effective leader. The death toll was going to be high, his poor leadership made it worse.

By Will on Apr 25, 2009 at 4:56 am

If you ever read Haig's final summary of the war (a written document presented to King or Parliament, I forget now) you will be truly sickened. He treats it like a game of cricket, trading numbers between the Allies and the Central Powers.

Thank God that Lloyd George was able to exercise some civilising influence on the way the war was conducted.

By bob maris on May 22, 2009 at 11:41 pm

What is missing in these notes is the recognition of the stategic genius of the Canadian general Currie . It was he who organized the remarkable capture of Vimy ridge . So good was he at strategy and the fighting qalities of the canadian troops with superior leadership that they were the lead troops in future battless .Haig was hopeless and the ineptituteof the upper class officer class so hopeless that at the end of the war the class system began its decline

By walter coulthard on Jul 26, 2009 at 2:08 am

Why do you attack Haig so viciously. Nivelle and several Russian commanders was much worse than Haig.

Haig had his faults, but defense had over 100 years been improved, the attack was still based on Napoleon-tactics.

So faulting Haig for being clueless, is like faulting him for not ordering Navy SEALs parachuting behind enemy lines to conduct sabotage.

Such tactics wasn't invented yet. And Somme was ordered by Foch, not Haig. WWI was a war of attrition, and everyone knows that.

Haig was a competent general. And he advocated the dragoon role for cavalry, dismount to fight The original role.. Cumbersome, but look at the cars then. The T-Ford didn't even exist.

By Beaviz on Aug 16, 2009 at 2:56 pm

Haig was a bitch.

By Joseph S on Aug 19, 2009 at 1:46 am

Haig, should be remembered as an egotist of the highest order, insightless and odious in his lack of foresight. I personally, feel nauseus upon mention of his name. Churchill and Haig et al should all have been Court Marshalled… For Crimes against humainty…Ibid

By Dr Rj Daw on Oct 25, 2009 at 3:55 pm

The battle of the Somme was designed to relieve pressure on the French. It relieved pressure on the French. Therefore Haig achieved the aims put to him. If you can think of another way of relieving pressure on the French I'm sure everyone would be delighted to hear it.

By Jamie on Nov 4, 2009 at 7:50 am

Accepting the fact that sitting at home and chatting about war does not make anyone capable of judging past generals and their doings,would be a good beginning for those commentators that have given here their comments,with Adam 20.nov 2008. as an exception.In war soldiers have to follow orders,if necessary fight and die doing that.In making comments on Haig the question is.Did he fulfill his superior order or not.Did he do his duty.Those sacrifices he made,were they easing burden of comrads elsewhere,isnt that a duty of a soldier to be ready to sacrifice his life for his fellowfighters,freedom and fatherland.In Haigs situation,what other possibilities did he have.Did those men die to save lives of people elsewhere.Haig and his superiors must have looked at it as a sacrifice necessary to make.Sitting at home and commenting on terrible sacrifices like that,respect is what is often needed.Respect

By Petur on Nov 30, 2009 at 6:06 pm

Generals who use the strategy and tactics of attrition seem to lack imagination, but a really good commanding general will at least consider seriously suggestions by his more imaginative subordinates.
We have a great example in the memoirs of Grant (an attrition man if ever there was one) and Sherman (a strong believer in minmum casulaties once he obtained independent command and had gained experience). Grant in the end deferred to Sherman's strategy and tactics (cancelling orders to bring Sherman north and sending Sheriden on his great raid) and yet still kept his subordinate's respect. Haig should have done the same. His brilliance in handling politicians, like Grant's, could have created shield for more brilliant men and like Grant he could have vetoed the more outlandish ideas of bright subordinates.
Admittedly the British army of the early 20th century did its level best to crush all immagination; but the colonial armies had generals if not of genius at least men more willing to consider the options. Even the British army had Plummer, although he came from a lower class background than his colleagues on the general staff.
Haig failed not by being an idiot. He was in fact a bright man and quite probably was among the best of the British general officers, although the competition was not that high. Someone in war has to make the fighting decisions, and stick with them. He could that, just as Grant did that.
Haig's tragedy was not to recognise his own failings, and the similar failings in much of his narrow-minded yet brilliant staff, and seek and promote his Shermans. Supreme command requires more than just technical know-how and an ability to follow the rules of war; it also requires the ability to write those rules.
That in effect was what Ludendorff did, and if he had had a large Austrian army (the French equivalent) and been backed by a fresh great power (the Americans) Germany would have won.

By gareth on Dec 28, 2009 at 1:49 pm

is there a known author?

By Anna on Feb 9, 2010 at 8:58 pm

Bob Maris,

Was that the same Lloyd George who preferred to send re-inforcements to the middle east, salonika and italy and keep even more at home after russia had pulled out?

Robertson and Haig desparately tried to convince Lloyd George they need them in France to face the coming onslought. Lloyd George's 'civilised management' almost cost the allies the war.

Gareth – not promote his Sherman's? How do you think the combined arms battle developed?

As for those others in the vein of Emma, do you have any idea what war actually means? Commanders know that they could be ordering their men to their deaths, but misplaced sympathy will only lose the battle and the war.

The Somme is a good example; firstly the first day was not a complete failure, in the south their were good gains made, especially in relation to the norm at the time. It was only in the north that the popular perception holds true. Secondly, the battle had to be continued, the whole idea was to take pressure off verdun so that the germans would be forced to spread their men, thus decreasing their liklihood of breakthough. If they did, the war would probably be lost.

Bearing these things in mind, Haig had to choose between calling off the offensive, saving lives, but (possibly) losing the war, or maintaining it (knowing it would cost lives) to stop losing. To consider what the outcomes of losing would entail, you only need to look what happed in eastern europe after Brest-Litovsk. Not very pleasant.

For those that criticise the tactics, I recommend that you re-acquaint yourself with 1910s technology. I had an argument with a person once who couldn't understand why runners etc were used and not radios. He couldn't grasp that radios in 1916 wer quite large and bulky and certainly couldn't be carried around easily. I dare say some (thought not all) suffer similar shortsightedness.

As for the 'attritional' concept; it is an unescapable part of modern warfare. The great proponent of manouevre warfare in the 20th century (Nazi Germany) and its rival (USSR) fought horrendous battles costing large numbers of men and material, yet they are not considered 'attritional' in the WW1 sense, yet fundementally they are no different. Even when the British army finally fought a battle on the scale of WW1 (the breakout from Normandy) it was far bloodier (in terms of percentage casualties) than the somme and 3rd ypres.

If a modern conventional war was to be fought today between two industrial countries, it would be even worse given the increased accuracy and lethality of munitions. Keeping that in mind, and thinking if WW1 in those terms, the fact that Haig managed to overcome problems not even imagined in May 1914, and defeat the main bulk of the german army (ably supported by his subordinates) should be cause for at least some respect.

Lastly, how many people have read Field Service Regulations 1909? Doing so should demonstrate the flexibility in british operations leading up to WW1. Most of it is reproduced in the doctrinal pams of modern western armies, so it can't be too bad.

By Will Jones on Mar 14, 2010 at 7:39 am