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	<title>Comments on: Edward J. Drea on Japan&#039;s Imperial Army</title>
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		<title>By: The Forester</title>
		<link>http://www.historynet.com/edward-j-drea-on-japans-imperial-army.htm#comment-791904</link>
		<dc:creator>The Forester</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 09 Mar 2012 22:25:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.historynet.com/?p=13681774#comment-791904</guid>
		<description>Without atomics, the U.S. would definitely have invaded, with a loss of ~1M Americans.  Apparently, you don&#039;t care about American lives lost, so presumably you would care about the loss of Japanese lives.  10-50M Japanese would have died as they fought to the death (which was the IJA plan.)</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Without atomics, the U.S. would definitely have invaded, with a loss of ~1M Americans.  Apparently, you don&#039;t care about American lives lost, so presumably you would care about the loss of Japanese lives.  10-50M Japanese would have died as they fought to the death (which was the IJA plan.)</p>
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		<title>By: Chingkhei</title>
		<link>http://www.historynet.com/edward-j-drea-on-japans-imperial-army.htm#comment-786678</link>
		<dc:creator>Chingkhei</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 12 Jan 2012 13:33:28 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.historynet.com/?p=13681774#comment-786678</guid>
		<description>Oh..Mike...&quot;yea&quot; whatever America does is true in its own way...saving lives in the name of peace and freedom, commitment to allies...and yea development of the victimized country..aint it?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Oh..Mike&#8230;&#034;yea&#034; whatever America does is true in its own way&#8230;saving lives in the name of peace and freedom, commitment to allies&#8230;and yea development of the victimized country..aint it?</p>
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		<title>By: mike</title>
		<link>http://www.historynet.com/edward-j-drea-on-japans-imperial-army.htm#comment-220966</link>
		<dc:creator>mike</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 11 Mar 2010 18:20:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.historynet.com/?p=13681774#comment-220966</guid>
		<description>Mr. Drea states we crossed a moral line bombing Japan killing 100,000 civilians. Please. That line was crossed when Japan
RAPED Nanking. That  line was crossed when Japan killed 
POW&#039;s  Please.  Atomic bomb not necessary???   We should have
dropped 3,</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Mr. Drea states we crossed a moral line bombing Japan killing 100,000 civilians. Please. That line was crossed when Japan<br />
RAPED Nanking. That  line was crossed when Japan killed<br />
POW&#039;s  Please.  Atomic bomb not necessary???   We should have<br />
dropped 3,</p>
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		<title>By: paul penrod</title>
		<link>http://www.historynet.com/edward-j-drea-on-japans-imperial-army.htm#comment-189907</link>
		<dc:creator>paul penrod</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 08 Feb 2010 16:13:29 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.historynet.com/?p=13681774#comment-189907</guid>
		<description>Another aspect that could have shaped the strategic thinking of Japanese Army officers was that they were all required to master the game of Go-played on something similar to a chessboard, but with teh emphasis not on taking the opponent&#039;s pieces and checkmating the queen, but surrounding the opponent&#039;s pieces and occupying the most space on the board. The Japanese Army had a senior officer with close ties to Germany, who strove to obtain patents and plans for German armor and aircraft, but they had no prewar insiders for any of the other belligerents. Conversely, the Japanese Navy did have contacts with US and British naval staffs (remember, Yamamoto tried to convince the Japanese government that the would be a terrible enemy to have, based on his observations and contacts while in Washington).</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Another aspect that could have shaped the strategic thinking of Japanese Army officers was that they were all required to master the game of Go-played on something similar to a chessboard, but with teh emphasis not on taking the opponent&#039;s pieces and checkmating the queen, but surrounding the opponent&#039;s pieces and occupying the most space on the board. The Japanese Army had a senior officer with close ties to Germany, who strove to obtain patents and plans for German armor and aircraft, but they had no prewar insiders for any of the other belligerents. Conversely, the Japanese Navy did have contacts with US and British naval staffs (remember, Yamamoto tried to convince the Japanese government that the would be a terrible enemy to have, based on his observations and contacts while in Washington).</p>
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		<title>By: Tony Tramonte</title>
		<link>http://www.historynet.com/edward-j-drea-on-japans-imperial-army.htm#comment-189208</link>
		<dc:creator>Tony Tramonte</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 05 Feb 2010 12:22:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.historynet.com/?p=13681774#comment-189208</guid>
		<description>Very interesting article.  I learned some new things and realized how important the Japanese defeat by the Soviets was as a gauge as to the condition of the Japanese army.  I agree with Mr. Penrod above- the Japanese army never took on a modern opponent until the Soviets in 1939, where they got crushed.  In the Russo-Japanese War, after all, the Russians essentially were half-way around the world from their heartland.  In the Japanese defense, though, it must be said they defeated the British on Singapore after the British had made defending that a big part of their global strategy.  I don&#039;t view the Philippines in the same light, although of course they were successful in destroying the US AAF on the ground, dooming the US and Filipino troops.

Mr, Penrod also makes an interesting point about the Japanese army not having contact with other armies.  Contrast with the US Army, for example, who had officers like Stilwell who was an expert on China and Chinese and Wedemeyer who was on expert on the German Army.  I am not sure on this point, but I believe the Japanese army officer corps was from a fairly narrow rural demographic slice, which can lead to insular thinking.  

I don&#039;t know if it is true, but I have read several times about the extreme brutality of the Japanese army in peacetime.  NCOs beat their men, Captains beat Lieutenants, etc.  I have also read that when 13 or 14 year old youths entered officer academies they would only grow about half an inch afterwards due to the starvation diets.

Another interesting counterfactual would be what if the US had come to the conclusion that it should forward deploy more of its forces in the Phillipines, i.e. it had more US Army troops and it deployed more of its Naval main force.  The US did of course forward deploy much of the Army Air Force bomber strength, as mentioned above, with disastrous results.  In retrospect this was very decision:  Either make a full attempt to defend it not, don&#039;t think land-based air power alone would do the trick.

I believe that this half-measure was done because the US command, correctly so, believed that the main force of the US Army had to be preserved and grown to be available for an inevitable fight with the Germans.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Very interesting article.  I learned some new things and realized how important the Japanese defeat by the Soviets was as a gauge as to the condition of the Japanese army.  I agree with Mr. Penrod above- the Japanese army never took on a modern opponent until the Soviets in 1939, where they got crushed.  In the Russo-Japanese War, after all, the Russians essentially were half-way around the world from their heartland.  In the Japanese defense, though, it must be said they defeated the British on Singapore after the British had made defending that a big part of their global strategy.  I don&#039;t view the Philippines in the same light, although of course they were successful in destroying the US AAF on the ground, dooming the US and Filipino troops.</p>
<p>Mr, Penrod also makes an interesting point about the Japanese army not having contact with other armies.  Contrast with the US Army, for example, who had officers like Stilwell who was an expert on China and Chinese and Wedemeyer who was on expert on the German Army.  I am not sure on this point, but I believe the Japanese army officer corps was from a fairly narrow rural demographic slice, which can lead to insular thinking.  </p>
<p>I don&#039;t know if it is true, but I have read several times about the extreme brutality of the Japanese army in peacetime.  NCOs beat their men, Captains beat Lieutenants, etc.  I have also read that when 13 or 14 year old youths entered officer academies they would only grow about half an inch afterwards due to the starvation diets.</p>
<p>Another interesting counterfactual would be what if the US had come to the conclusion that it should forward deploy more of its forces in the Phillipines, i.e. it had more US Army troops and it deployed more of its Naval main force.  The US did of course forward deploy much of the Army Air Force bomber strength, as mentioned above, with disastrous results.  In retrospect this was very decision:  Either make a full attempt to defend it not, don&#039;t think land-based air power alone would do the trick.</p>
<p>I believe that this half-measure was done because the US command, correctly so, believed that the main force of the US Army had to be preserved and grown to be available for an inevitable fight with the Germans.</p>
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		<title>By: paul penrod</title>
		<link>http://www.historynet.com/edward-j-drea-on-japans-imperial-army.htm#comment-188406</link>
		<dc:creator>paul penrod</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 01 Feb 2010 19:57:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.historynet.com/?p=13681774#comment-188406</guid>
		<description>In a scant fifty years, Japan had emerged from an isolated medieval society to a world power that defeated a rival power in battle. Unfortunately, the mindset and philosophy of it&#039;s leaders did not evolve so quickly. It would be like nineteenth century Britain still believing in the divine rights of kings to rule. Being on the periphery of world events had favored Japan during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, the occupation of Korea and the Russo-Japanese War. In the latter case, the russians were going through a political upheaval and were distracted from prosecuting a proper war. Their oppurtnism for profit continued after World War I, as they were awarded many of the Gearman Far East possessions as a reward for being a member of the Allies, although for not much effort expended. Therefore, by the time the Tanaka Memorial was employed and the partitioning of China began, the precedent of the Japanese Army being able to do what ever  it wanted  whenever had already been established.  Unlike the navy, it eschewed much contact with other army general staffs and didn&#039;s seem to find intelligence a very important function, Even the thrashing at the hands of the Russians didn&#039;t seem to bring the army to it&#039;s senses, but instead directed it towards other vacuums and easy pickings- the Indochina of the impotent Vichy French, the Dutch East Indies of the conquered Netherlands, Malaya and Hong Kong of the hard-pressed British, and the Phillipines of the &quot;soft and decadent&quot; Americans. In truth, the navy participated in this southern strike planning also. the unmechanized Japanese Army was less starved for the embargoed oil  than was the Rengo Kantai. It would have been interestin if the Japanses planning hadn&#039;t included war with the US.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In a scant fifty years, Japan had emerged from an isolated medieval society to a world power that defeated a rival power in battle. Unfortunately, the mindset and philosophy of it&#039;s leaders did not evolve so quickly. It would be like nineteenth century Britain still believing in the divine rights of kings to rule. Being on the periphery of world events had favored Japan during the Sino-Japanese War of 1894, the occupation of Korea and the Russo-Japanese War. In the latter case, the russians were going through a political upheaval and were distracted from prosecuting a proper war. Their oppurtnism for profit continued after World War I, as they were awarded many of the Gearman Far East possessions as a reward for being a member of the Allies, although for not much effort expended. Therefore, by the time the Tanaka Memorial was employed and the partitioning of China began, the precedent of the Japanese Army being able to do what ever  it wanted  whenever had already been established.  Unlike the navy, it eschewed much contact with other army general staffs and didn&#039;s seem to find intelligence a very important function, Even the thrashing at the hands of the Russians didn&#039;t seem to bring the army to it&#039;s senses, but instead directed it towards other vacuums and easy pickings- the Indochina of the impotent Vichy French, the Dutch East Indies of the conquered Netherlands, Malaya and Hong Kong of the hard-pressed British, and the Phillipines of the &#034;soft and decadent&#034; Americans. In truth, the navy participated in this southern strike planning also. the unmechanized Japanese Army was less starved for the embargoed oil  than was the Rengo Kantai. It would have been interestin if the Japanses planning hadn&#039;t included war with the US.</p>
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