Eastertide Offensive Lessons for the Gulf War

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We had no armor to fight against Iraqi armor and mechanized forces. At best we had some ‘Humvees’ with TOW anti-tank weapons. But the Saudis and Qataris had tanks. So through our cross-training we worked on infantry-versus-tank tactics. That paid off 100 times over when the actual war started.

[On the night of January 29,1991, Iraqi armored units made a surprise attack from Kuwait into Saudi Arabia. The main target was the coastal city of Khafji and the oil industry in the nearby area. The probe was an attempt by Saddam Hussein to intimidate and destroy the willpower of the Allies, particularly the Arab Coalition.] General Admire continues:

Ra’s al Khafji is a fairly large city by Saudi standards, close to the Kuwait border. In that area, the Iraqis had six to eight times more artillery, and four to six times more armor than our Coalition had. So we set up a defensive line south of the city.

On the night of January 29, a reinforced Iraqi battalion came across near Khafji. They had two divisions north of the border poised to follow. In Khafji I had two six-man recon teams. When the Iraqis attacked, while Navy SEAL [sea-air-land] teams fell back through our lines, my teams made the decision that they would stay. Corporal Ingram was the leader. The teams occupied two different rooftops in the southern portion of the city.

That night, along the coastal road, I met with Saudi Colonel Turki and Major Omani of Qatar. We had a frank conversation. I explained that my two recon teams were in the city. I said, ‘I believe that my teams can operate for 36 to 48 hours before they are jeopardized by the Iraqis.’

The courage of those young Marines had an impact. Colonel Turki listened quietly. Then, in my opinion, he said the two most important words of the war: ‘We attack.’ Until Colonel Turki spoke those two words, the Iraqis were considered by the Arab Coalition to be giants, 10 feet tall. The Iraqis were the most hardened, disciplined forces in the region, primarily because of their eight-year war with Iran. Plus, they were the fourth largest army in the world… We didn’t do a lot of planning. We just drew it out in the sand and went for it. I emphasized that the Arab force would do the main attack….That was one of the most difficult decisions I have ever made, because most commanders wait an entire military career for an opportunity to conduct a major counterattack. I had all the confidence in the world in my Marines. It was an opportunity for us to validate six months of arduous training in the desert. But I felt that if we had tried to take charge, all of a sudden it would be like Vietnam–where the Americans come in and do it all, and the home forces get the idea that they have a secondary role.

At first, the Coalition conducted a probing attack. Our recon elements in the city radioed to us where the Iraqis were shifting their forces to react to our movement. We pulled back. Then the Arab forces led a forceful counterattack. Within six to 12 hours, we destroyed 93 Iraqi armor and mechanized vehicles. We captured more than 600 prisoners, including a brigadier general and five colonels.

Most of the Iraqi reinforcement vehicles north of the city were destroyed by Marine Air and Air Force A-10 Warthogs. The fighting in the city was a courageous tactical victory for the Arab forces. But it was also a strategic victory for the United States.

Khafji was a watershed for three reasons: First, the morale and confidence of the Arab forces went sky high. They had defeated the veteran Iraqis rather soundly…. Second, it was our evaluation that the Iraqis had no resolve or determination for a toe-to-toe slugfest with a determined opponent. If you hit them fast and hard, they’d quit early. We briefed Maj. Gen. Mike Myatt, the 1st Marine Division commander, and gave our opinion that we would have prisoners of war in large numbers. Third, and most important, after Khafji, the Saudis, Qataris and other Arab Coalition forces requested, if not demanded, to be equal partners when the attack came. They volunteered to attack along the coastal road.

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Tags: 20th - 21st Century, Historical Conflicts