Our forces were dug in on the banks of the Cua Viet River, preparing for a classic set piece battle. We were all that stood between the advancing NVA and Hue City. We stopped them. And with the help of U.S. air support, we began to push the North Vietnamese back.

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[After surviving the 1972 Eastertide Offensive, Walter Boomer climbed his way
up the Marine Corps command ladder. On August 15, 1990, he deployed to Saudi Arabia as commanding general of the 100,000-Marine-strong I MEF.] General Boomer’s narrative continues:

The Gulf War was fought with Marine leadership up front, which is the only place I believe that a leader can fight from….An important lesson of the Vietnam War was the lack of continuity of leadership. Ever since, I have repeatedly stated, ‘We killed Marines as a result of changing leaders every six months.’ Because just as a commander got his feet on the ground and began to understand a little bit about the terrain and the enemy, the System moved him. If the war in the Gulf had gone on for a year, I would never have made a change in unit commanders unless a guy collapsed.

Almost all senior Marine infantry commanders in the Gulf had been advisers to the Vietnamese marines. As the years have gone by, this group has stayed in touch. And our friendships endure. This was an important factor in the teamwork among Marine leadership in the Gulf. The intensity of the 1972 North Vietnamese Easter Offensive is something that none of us will ever forget. The tactical lessons from that stayed in our heads. We understood the importance of combined arms [coordination between land forces and close air support].

A major lesson I learned from having been an adviser in Vietnam was how to deal with other cultures. The coalition approach was essential to our success. We simply could not ride roughshod over our Arab allies. We had to deal very carefully. And there were significant problems….I assigned Colonel [now Brigadier General] John Admire, regiment commander of the 3rd Marine Regiment, Task Force Taro, to train the Arab coalition forces. It was a matter of necessity. It was fortunate that he had previous experience in Vietnam as an adviser.

General John H. Admire continues the story: During my second tour of Vietnam, I was an adviser with the Vietnamese Marine Corps….[In Saudia Arabia] the only people in my regiment of 4,000 Marines with previous combat experience were the senior officers and NCOs. There were very few Vietnam veterans. I would talk with people informally about lessons I learned as an adviser in Vietnam. My primary advice was: ‘Treat the Arabs as you would like to be treated. Don’t act like a godsend who is going to teach them everything they need to know.’

We gave classes in tactics, in weapons and in maintenance. When we talked with the Saudis, we were very honest. We said: ‘You are the experts in the desert. Would you give us classes in desert navigation, desert tactics and desert survival?’ They looked at us kind of amazed. For us to ask the Saudis for classes boosted their self-esteem. Their chests puffed up a little, and they were very proud that they were giving us instruction. Task Force Taro, as my regiment was called, became the brother unit to the Saudis.

Beginning the first week in October 1990, I rotated 150 to 200 Marines up north in shifts of eight to 10 days to live and train with Saudi forces. We familiarized them with all of our support aircraft, because we didn’t want them firing on our guys. We developed personal friendships, as well.

I got to know the Saudi brigade commander, Colonel Turki, and some of his battalion commanders. It reached the point, much like in Vietnam, where they invited us to their tents to share dinner with us….I learned in my Vietnam advisory days that sometimes with a smile and pantomime you can communicate a hell of a lot. At the end of December, we moved the whole task force up to the Kuwait border. We were the only U.S. combat force positioned in an exclusively Arab sector. And we were closer to the Iraqis than any U.S. force. If the Iraqis surprise-attacked across the border, we would fight alongside the Arab Coalition forces. That made the bonds between Task Force Taro and our Arab allies even stronger.

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