Meade understandably denounced the Historicus account, reaffirmed his opinion that the salient position was untenable, and objected to the many statements prejudicial to his reputation. He wanted action to be taken against the author, presumably Sickles, and requested that Lincoln convene a court of inquiry. In reply to Meade’s letter, Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck advised Meade to ignore Sickles and said the latter’s authorship of the story could not be proved. To pursue the matter would only benefit Sickles by providing him with another forum in which to glorify himself.

Sickles and his supporters attempted to show that the salient position had acted as a breakwater that deflected the Confederate attack before it could reach the main Union line. This breakwater effect, they contended, enabled the Federals to hold Cemetery Ridge and ultimately win the battle. The argument may have some validity, but it ignores the fact that Sickles had no such end in view when he disobeyed his orders to stay put.

The Confederates had intended to seize the Peach Orchard and surrounding high ground as artillery positions in support of their attack on the ridge. Lee’s offensive plan had not foreseen that these positions would be occupied in force by Federal troops, and Longstreet did not believe at first the reports of heavy enemy concentration there. With some difficulty, the Confederates reacted to meet the unexpected Federal troops. Major General John B. Hood, commanding the division at the far right of the Rebel line of attack, recognized the danger Sickles’ salient posed for Meade’s line. Sickles’ advance, and his failure to occupy or anchor his line on Little Round Top, had opened the back door to Meade’s entire line. Hood pressed Longstreet to allow him to swing around behind the Union line to attack Meade from the rear.

From the crest of Little Round Top, Brig. Gen. Gouverneur Warren, Meade’s chief of engineers, discovered the danger on Meade’s left just in time. Warren skillfully diverted Colonel Strong Vincent’s brigade, which was hurrying to reinforce Sickles’ salient, to defend Little Round Top. His efforts, with not a moment to spare, prevented the hill from being seized by Hood’s Confederates. From this vantage point, the Rebels could have enfiladed Hancock’s position on the ridge and rendered Meade’s entire line untenable. Only Warren’s quick action prevented disaster.

Sickles further contended that the III Corps, in its original position, could not have withstood Longstreet’s attack or prevented a breakthrough. In its advanced position, the III Corps certainly did not withstand the attack but was decimated to the tune of about 4,000 casualties. A huge hole that could have facilitated a Rebel breakthrough was made in the Union line. Had Sickles stayed where he was, in close proximity with the rest of the army, his flanks would have been protected, and it would have been much easier for Meade to support and reinforce him against such a breakthrough. As it was, Meade summoned so many units to help Sickles that other parts of his line were threatened.

On two separate battlefields, Sickles moved to create salients that accomplished little of tactical value and served mainly to satisfy his own personal designs and purposes. His tactical decisions at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg did not take into consideration the best interests of the army as a whole. Sickles refused to subordinate his views and actions to the instructions of his commanders. He did not seem to accept that, as a corps commander, his duty was to act in unison with other army corps to accomplish the objectives of the army commander.

At Chancellorsville, Sickles had not disobeyed his orders, but he had stretched them beyond their expressed intent. At Gettysburg, he had disobeyed orders outright and acted without approval to create another salient, much to the dismay of his new commanding general. Ultimately, Sickles’ generalship can be appraised in terms of his famous battlefield salients. Sickles’ salients represented the brazen, rash actions of a glory-seeking political general whose dangerous tactical follies promoted his own interests at the expense of the Army of the Potomac and the Union cause. It is a wonder that he–and they–survived his blunders.

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Gary Rice is a lieutenant in the United States Navy. For further reading, see: W.A. Swanberg’s Sickles the Incredible; or Edgcumb Pinchon’s Dan Sickles.

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