Comments on: Deep Battle: The Drive to the Dnepr, Winter 1943 http://www.historynet.com/deep-battle-the-drive-to-the-dnepr-winter-1943.htm From the World's Largest History Magazine Publisher Tue, 21 May 2013 10:28:45 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.2 By: LouisvonDoren http://www.historynet.com/deep-battle-the-drive-to-the-dnepr-winter-1943.htm#comment-820173 LouisvonDoren Sat, 06 Oct 2012 10:21:51 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13685307#comment-820173 Forgive me if I'm being a bit thick out this. I see that the beginning of the overall well done article as saying it is about the winter of 1943 and also about Von Manstein's "Backhand Move" beginning in March of 1943. Between the article and the letters if you will, it sometimes is confusing to tell which German recovery that is being written about. The famous Von Manstein comeback in 1943 or one in early 1944. By the new year of 1944 any hope of a negotiated peace with Stalin to even get a "draw" and then decide on what lines will both armies be stationed once the draw is put officially on paper as most likely it would have been an armistace. The one most discussed is between Von Mansteins backhand in early '43 and the timing of either trying for a defensive victory using a war of movement that Manstein favored and let the Soviets strike first in 1943 then unleash the panzer divisions that had been reinforced by stripping most of the rest of the German forces in Russia. It was the thinking of some German Generals in the spring of 1943 to let the Russians attack first in that year and wear themselves out by attacking somewhat built up German infantry divisions but keeping the main force of equally built up by stripping other Army Groups in Russia to bring up to near full strength the German panzer divisions. Then in the summer of 1943 after the Soviets had run to about their end of logistics lines again, unleash Von Manstein's armour once again and sweep the Russians all the way back to the Dnepr while causing maximum damage to all Soviet units possible especially armoured. That if what I understood Manstein to write, was in his mind the only way that even a draw could be obtained in Russia on lines to be determined I'm sure by the two *honest* Foreign Ministers for both Germany and the Soviet Union. Only in that fashion could the Germans have brought enough units not gone through the meat grinder completely to the Western Theater for the Cross Channel Invasion defense. Though it would be a big if that both dictators to agree to an armistance say on the Dnepr line. However the Germans would and I'm sure Hitler would still have to leave plenty of German divisions in Russia to hold off the Soviets. To hold them off long enough when Stalin broke the pact, until the German forces sent west had time to have defeated the cross channel invasion and then return to Russia in time to stop the Soviet offensives which by then would have gained a very large amount of ground. Much of both fronts would have depended on timing if an armistace was signed in 1943. The Germans would have known that Stalin would eventually break the pact as the Germans did break theirs with the Soviets in 1941. It would be a delicate balance of time vs Germans defeating the western cross channel invasion and getting those armoured forces back east before the by then rampaging Soviets had gone too deep towards the rest against the mostly infantry German defense divisions. Though infantry had become a major problam for the Germans ever since the first winter in Russia. They never recovered from those losses and then again the deadly too high losses in the '42-'43 Fall Blau, Uranus and other plans unleashed in the Summer and Autumn of 1942. After the German 6th Army and most of 4th PZ Army were destroyed in early 1943 the German infantry numbers in Russia were in dire straights ever since. Forgive me if I'm being a bit thick out this. I see that the beginning of the overall well done article as saying it is about the winter of 1943 and also about Von Manstein's "Backhand Move" beginning in March of 1943. Between the article and the letters if you will, it sometimes is confusing to tell which German recovery that is being written about.
The famous Von Manstein comeback in 1943 or one in early 1944.
By the new year of 1944 any hope of a negotiated peace with Stalin to even get a "draw" and then decide on what lines will both armies be stationed once the draw is put officially on paper as most likely it would have been an armistace. The one most discussed is between Von Mansteins backhand in early '43 and the timing of either trying for a defensive victory using a war of movement that Manstein favored and let the Soviets strike first in 1943 then unleash the panzer divisions that had been reinforced by stripping most of the rest of the German forces in Russia. It was the thinking of some German Generals in the spring of 1943 to let the Russians attack first in that year and wear themselves out by attacking somewhat built up German infantry divisions but keeping the main force of equally built up by stripping other Army Groups in Russia to bring up to near full strength the German panzer divisions. Then in the summer of 1943 after the Soviets had run to about their end of logistics lines again, unleash Von Manstein's armour once again and sweep the Russians all the way back to the Dnepr while causing maximum damage to all Soviet units possible especially armoured. That if what I understood Manstein to write, was in his mind the only way that even a draw could be obtained in Russia on lines to be determined I'm sure by the two
*honest* Foreign Ministers for both Germany and the Soviet Union.
Only in that fashion could the Germans have brought enough units not gone through the meat grinder completely to the Western Theater for the Cross Channel Invasion defense. Though it would be a big if that both dictators to agree to an armistance say on the Dnepr line. However the Germans would and I'm sure Hitler would still have to leave plenty of German divisions in Russia to hold off the Soviets. To hold them off long enough when Stalin broke the pact, until the German forces sent west had time to have defeated the cross channel invasion and then return to Russia in time to stop the Soviet offensives which by then would have gained a very large amount of ground. Much of both fronts would have depended on timing if an armistace was signed in 1943. The Germans would have known that Stalin would eventually break the pact as the Germans did break theirs with the Soviets in 1941. It would be a delicate balance of time vs Germans defeating the western cross channel invasion and getting those armoured forces back east before the by then rampaging Soviets had gone too deep towards the rest against the mostly infantry German defense divisions. Though infantry had become a major problam for the Germans ever since the first winter in Russia.
They never recovered from those losses and then again the deadly too high losses in the '42-'43 Fall Blau, Uranus and other plans unleashed in the Summer and Autumn of 1942. After the German 6th Army and most of 4th PZ Army were destroyed in early 1943 the German infantry numbers in Russia were in dire straights ever since.

]]> By: Rob Citino http://www.historynet.com/deep-battle-the-drive-to-the-dnepr-winter-1943.htm#comment-792185 Rob Citino Tue, 13 Mar 2012 01:03:54 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13685307#comment-792185 Derek--I agree. Can we not say that this is often what happens when one great power invades another? Is the result not war to the knife, ie, "guerre à l'outrance", total war, war until death? Not always, witness France in 1940. But usually--witness France in 1914? I just can't recognize the preconditions for a Remisfrieden in 1943. --RC Derek–I agree. Can we not say that this is often what happens when one great power invades another? Is the result not war to the knife, ie, "guerre à l'outrance", total war, war until death? Not always, witness France in 1940. But usually–witness France in 1914?

I just can't recognize the preconditions for a Remisfrieden in 1943. –RC

]]> By: Derek Weese http://www.historynet.com/deep-battle-the-drive-to-the-dnepr-winter-1943.htm#comment-792180 Derek Weese Mon, 12 Mar 2012 22:55:13 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13685307#comment-792180 I agree that Manstein's hopes of a 'stalemate' peace were mis-founded. I believe that the Soviet Union was fighting very nearly a 'holy' war of sorts against the Germans and their allies and no matter the cost or the amount of setbacks I do believe they would have fought to the bitter end: either the German's or theirs. I agree that Manstein's hopes of a 'stalemate' peace were mis-founded. I believe that the Soviet Union was fighting very nearly a 'holy' war of sorts against the Germans and their allies and no matter the cost or the amount of setbacks I do believe they would have fought to the bitter end: either the German's or theirs.

]]> By: Rob Citino http://www.historynet.com/deep-battle-the-drive-to-the-dnepr-winter-1943.htm#comment-792029 Rob Citino Sun, 11 Mar 2012 02:39:42 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13685307#comment-792029 ADTS-- Thanks for your kind words. I'm glad to read that you enjoy the column! Have I gone through a sort of "learning process" the more I read, study, contemplate, etc? Absolutely. I guess it is a kind of empathy (the word you used in your post), but I wouldn't use that term in its usual emotional sense. Rather, I might call it situational empathy. The one thing I might have learned after all these years of study--as a civilian scholar, rather than a military professional--is that none of this stuff is as easy as it sounds, that Clausewitz is right when he calls war the "province of uncertainty and chance", and that rarely are the generals in charge as much as historians like to think they are. As a result, while the buck stops with them in terms of victory and defeat, and some get decorated while others get mocked, we need to be wary of boiling war down to a simple contest of "mano a mano" generalship. Systemic factors, many of them well beyond the ability of any single individual to control, often have a lot more to do with who wins and loses. Thanks! --RC ADTS–

Thanks for your kind words. I'm glad to read that you enjoy the column!

Have I gone through a sort of "learning process" the more I read, study, contemplate, etc? Absolutely. I guess it is a kind of empathy (the word you used in your post), but I wouldn't use that term in its usual emotional sense. Rather, I might call it situational empathy. The one thing I might have learned after all these years of study–as a civilian scholar, rather than a military professional–is that none of this stuff is as easy as it sounds, that Clausewitz is right when he calls war the "province of uncertainty and chance", and that rarely are the generals in charge as much as historians like to think they are. As a result, while the buck stops with them in terms of victory and defeat, and some get decorated while others get mocked, we need to be wary of boiling war down to a simple contest of "mano a mano" generalship. Systemic factors, many of them well beyond the ability of any single individual to control, often have a lot more to do with who wins and loses. Thanks! –RC

]]> By: Rob Citino http://www.historynet.com/deep-battle-the-drive-to-the-dnepr-winter-1943.htm#comment-792027 Rob Citino Sun, 11 Mar 2012 02:32:17 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13685307#comment-792027 Derek--This was one of Manstein's beliefs, that if he won a sufficiently large operational victory, he might be able to bring the Soviets to a "Remis-Frieden" ( a "stalemate" peace, one again using a chess term!) It's an interesting notion, but it can't be said that Manstein based it on any real evidence, and he certainly didn't base it on any intelligence gleaned from agents in the Soviet camp. It was, rather, an article of faith, and we might add, misplaced faith! --RC Derek–This was one of Manstein's beliefs, that if he won a sufficiently large operational victory, he might be able to bring the Soviets to a "Remis-Frieden" ( a "stalemate" peace, one again using a chess term!) It's an interesting notion, but it can't be said that Manstein based it on any real evidence, and he certainly didn't base it on any intelligence gleaned from agents in the Soviet camp. It was, rather, an article of faith, and we might add, misplaced faith! –RC

]]> By: ADTS http://www.historynet.com/deep-battle-the-drive-to-the-dnepr-winter-1943.htm#comment-791885 ADTS Fri, 09 Mar 2012 19:28:56 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13685307#comment-791885 Professor Citino: What strikes me most about this post is the sheer empathy you display for the commanders about whom you write. I am sure you have no deficit of topics about which you wish to blog. That said, I'd be curious if you'd care to reflect on any emotional attachments you've built toward the people you've studied. To provide one academic, essay-style prompt, for example: has your attitude toward those whom you've studied, and about whom you've written, changed as you've learned more about them? What would be behind those changes - the emotional changes we all go through (I think) as we mature and grow older, reading different perspectives by other historians, the emergence of alternative and new primary sources, etc.? At the risk of being patronizing, a very enjoyable post that, once more, demonstrates an extremely remarkable command of the operational and strategic difficulties confronting the German commanders referenced. Regards ADTS Professor Citino:

What strikes me most about this post is the sheer empathy you display for the commanders about whom you write. I am sure you have no deficit of topics about which you wish to blog. That said, I'd be curious if you'd care to reflect on any emotional attachments you've built toward the people you've studied.

To provide one academic, essay-style prompt, for example: has your attitude toward those whom you've studied, and about whom you've written, changed as you've learned more about them? What would be behind those changes – the emotional changes we all go through (I think) as we mature and grow older, reading different perspectives by other historians, the emergence of alternative and new primary sources, etc.?

At the risk of being patronizing, a very enjoyable post that, once more, demonstrates an extremely remarkable command of the operational and strategic difficulties confronting the German commanders referenced.

Regards
ADTS

]]> By: Derek Weese http://www.historynet.com/deep-battle-the-drive-to-the-dnepr-winter-1943.htm#comment-791812 Derek Weese Thu, 08 Mar 2012 16:13:08 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13685307#comment-791812 I always found this particular segment of WWII history the most interesting (the Eastern Front in particular but especially 42-43) and my mind is still amazed at the brilliance of Von Manstein. However, my question is do you think that even after stabilizing the front which Manstein accomplished, could the Wehrmacht have pulled out at least a political victory in the East in 43 given the Red Army's new found professionalism? I always found this particular segment of WWII history the most interesting (the Eastern Front in particular but especially 42-43) and my mind is still amazed at the brilliance of Von Manstein. However, my question is do you think that even after stabilizing the front which Manstein accomplished, could the Wehrmacht have pulled out at least a political victory in the East in 43 given the Red Army's new found professionalism?

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