Supposedly their intel had said the rebels had control, but it had been taken back by the Libyan army before the drop. Some reports had said over 380 82nd troops were killed. (If the mission was as large as a brigade it should become obvious at some point…there are only 3 in the 82nd, right?)

This is unconfirmed, but there has been a lot of reports and news anomolies that seem to lend credence to the rumor. One strange thing building on another.

Maybe if you guys have any insiders you might be able to get some info.

Surely, Obama, Clinton, Sec of Def, the generals and whoever else responsible should be impeached and/or held accountable.

This would be a travesty of the highest kind if these chickenhawk warmongers are playing fast and loose with some of our best and brightest and bravest! And since it is a 'secret' mission, we never know the truth…

We cannot give up our strategic ability to drop troops anywhere in the world within 18 hours, but we should look at the package and ask ourselves if it is really required to maintain such a large airborne force. I just feel that the 82nd Airborne infantry units should be designated as airborne commando regiments to act as the shock troops for conventional forces. We have the Rangers, but they work for USASOC and is a special operations outfit. The 82nd infantry has nearly the same capability as the Rangers and they should be converted to a more commando type of role that conventional commanders can use at their disposal.

The mixed record of airborne ops has more to do with planning and execution than the actual use of the insertion method. Airborne ops are inherently dangerous (did my share of mass tactical jumps), but can be extremely effective for specific operations to either seize territory or assault key targets in a area. We have small kinetic engagements in today's world and airborne ops would be great in this atmosphere. WWII is a bad example to talk about the shortcomings of the airborne. It was a massive undertaking against a sizeable enemy force. Mistakes and failures were bound to happen at times given the scope of the missions and the logistics involved which only points at the shortcomings of the period since back in those days they could not drop any support elements like artillery and armor to help add to the combat power of the light infantry.

We still need the airborne, but it definitely needs to be changed.

Lets not forget that the 82nd Airborne was the first U.S. conventional ground combat force to arrive after Iraq invaded Kuwait. They were not dropped in but landed in Saudi Arabia. Since they were already packed and on stand-by as our quick reaction force, they were the first boots on the ground. It was kind of funny since the Navy came in soon after and gave the 82nd boys the food that was to be given to the Marines who the Navy thought would be the first ground force to arrive. It upset the Marines greatly to see the soldiers eating their chow.

One of your earlier comments about the lack of heavy weapons in an airborne operation are spot on! Having been engaged in "professional" wargaming for some time and using the results of those wargames to validate or write operational plans, two major concerns always came to the fore in developing the plans for an air assault (whether it was airborne or air assault) and that was 1) how do you get supporting artillery (and ammunition) to the LZ and 2) how soon can you push through with a ground relief due to the lack of logistics and heavy weapons. Too many times I saw a BDE air assault successfully secure their objective only to be destroyed by a lack of counterfire assets. The comments by Bill Nance (the Younger) about covering the "Paras" with air until you establish the link-up is a very modern American paradigm because of the overwhelming air superiority we have enjoyed since the latter days of WW-II and the better technology of our aircraft and air delivered munitions. However, imagine a much less permissive air environmet either through enemy air defense systems or weather (it still has a significant effect on the amount and accuracy of air delivered weapons).

One should consider that Operation Market, which was the airborne part of the operation, went pretty well, including the drops – especially considering they were in daylight. Very low casualties, accurate drops, and accurate follow-up glider landings. Remember, once the drop and assembly ends, it is no longer an airborne operation; the vertical envelopment is over.

The final phase of Operation Market was the ground tactical plan being executed by light infantry forces (the airborne units). Even considering the poor intelligence around the Arnhem area, the Operation Market ground tactical plan, designed for taking and holding the bridges for 3 days in order to set conditions for Operation Garden, went exceedingly well. I believe holding objectives for 7 days (4 days beyond the plan) with light infantry against enemy armor would be considered quite a success by most people.

What didn't go well was the planning and execution of Operation Garden, the ground maneuver unit plan. Planning on using one route, through restrictive terrain, with a less than aggressive exection of such, caused the airborne ground maneuver units to have to hold well beyond the 3 days against increasing enemy firepower. Eventually, that is what caused the failure and high casualties of M-G, not the airborne operation and vertical envelopment, however the Poles might beg to differ since the bad intell around Arnhem caused them to take massive casualties during their airborne operation on Day 2 or 3 I believe.

While large scale airborne operations success may be arguable, before painting them with the brush of failure perhaps we need to examine them in more detail and make sure we seperate the airborne operation from other factors that may have led to less than optimal outcomes. Operation Market, examined by itself, was a success. Operation Garden was a dismal failure. Due to the failure of Operation Garden, Operation Market-Garden failed.