If Gale was right, a lightning strike might succeed in seizing the bridges before the defenders realized what was happening. Intelligence reports indicated that the bridges were wired for demolition, but it seemed unlikely that detonation wires were actually hooked to a ‘hellbox’ that could trigger a detonation. A commander would probably not want to risk an accidental explosion.

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Even in the event of a surprise attack, Gale concluded, the German guards would not simply blow the bridge on hearing the first shot. It would take several minutes for the defenders to determine what was really happening.

Adding up all his suppositions, Gale estimated that he had five minutes to get to the bridges and disarm them before the defenders would put two and two together. If the attack took longer than that, Gale feared that the crossings could not be seized intact and his division would be in grave peril.

To lead a force that would have to mount the attack, Gale and his planners chose Major John Howard and Company D, Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry. Howard was allowed to reinforce his company’s four platoons by adding two additional platoons from Company B, along with 30 sappers from the Royal Engineers.

Howard’s force was regarded by many as one of the most elite in the British army. One veteran trainer — who had participated in the exercises to prepare Howard’s men before the mission — watched as the troops hurled themselves onto barbed-wire barricades so that following men could use their bodies as stepping-stones over the wire. Shaking his head, he said, ‘I pity the bloody Germans; these buggers are mad!’

Howard’s second-in-command was a good-looking captain named Brian Priday. The plan was for three gliders under Howard to land and seize the bridge on the Caen Canal, while the remaining three gliders under Captain Priday seized the bridge over the Orne River. Four hundred yards separated the two bridges over the waterways.

Throughout May, Howard and his men practiced their attack. They conducted a dozen mock assaults on sites replicating the two-bridge objective, while the glider pilots flew 43 training flights. At the conclusion of the training period, the ‘Ox and Bucks’ men were so conditioned that some felt they could probably do the job in their sleep.

Finally, at the end of May, the whole force was sealed in at the RAF base at Tarrant Rushton, while the rest of the Normandy assault force went into quarantined areas all across southern England. They could now only await the order to attack. Each morning his men spent at Tarrant Rushton, Howard awaited a dispatch rider carrying a single-word order that would mean that the attack was on. The word that Howard was looking for was ‘Cromwell.’ All other words were meaningless and meant the attack had yet to begin. On Sunday, June 4, the rider stopped and whispered the magic word to Howard. But Eisenhower was forced to postpone operations because of a fierce storm over the Channel.

On June 5 the weather was still foul, and Howard was somewhat surprised when the dispatch rider delivered his Cromwell message once again. By 10 p.m., the Ox and Bucks men were ready to board their gliders.

Howard went around to all his men as they were standing next to their aircraft. ‘I gave my `Ham and Jam’ farewell,’ Howard later said. ‘Those words were very important to us.’ ‘Ham’ was the success code word for capturing the Caen Canal Bridge intact, and ‘Jam’ was the success code for the Orne River Bridge. Howard then took his seat in Glider No. 1, while Brian Priday boarded Glider No. 4, along with platoon commander Lieutenant Tony Hooper and his unit, including Lance Sgt. Tich Raynor and Lance Cpl. Felix Clive.

Takeoff time was scheduled for 10:56, and right on the dot Howard’s Airspeed Horsa glider was airborne, towed by a Handley Page Halifax bomber. The other five gliders were right in line behind Howard. Glider No. 2 had David Wood’s platoon, No. 3 had Sandy Smith’s unit, No. 4 was occupied by Tony Hooper’s men, No. 5 carried Dennis Fox’s platoon and No. 6 was filled with Todd McSweeney’s unit. The crossing over the Channel would take just over an hour. Through the portholes of the gliders, the troops could see other planes headed toward targets that were to be bombed prior to the invasion.

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