June 25, 1876, is a date that shall live in controversy. Even if Lieutenant Colonel (General to his men) George Armstrong Custer came back from the grave to tell his side of the story, the controversy would still not die. The Battle of the Little Bighorn is like a 10,000-piece jigsaw puzzle on the south-central Montana landscape – the stuff of legend and historical gamesmanship. Custer and more than a third of the elite 7th Cavalry Regiment lost their lives in an epic struggle with the Plains Indians. Although the deadly conflict at the Little Bighorn is a multifaceted tale that rivals the Alamo as the most famous military clash in the American West, the main focus has always been the man in command of the losing side – thus, the battle's popular alternative name, Custer's Last Stand.
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Countless historians, authors and amateur scholars more often than not after coming down with a bad case of the Custer bug and finding it impossible to shake have analyzed the battle. The analyses have sometimes been in direct conflict, since the so-called experts have taken different routes in trying to explain the sequence of events, why things happened and who was to blame (Custer, his supporting cast or his bosses) for the 129-year-old U.S. military defeat at the hands of Sitting Bull's people. The controversy has not lost its intensity through the years. Recent archeological discoveries on the battlefield have cast new light on the engagement and opened the door to new interpretations and, yes, new controversies concerning Custer's Last Stand.
A previously unidentified cavalry combat position has been discovered near Last Stand Hill (also known as Custer Hill), the knoll north of the Little Bighorn River where Custer and about 40 troopers are said to have made a final stand while surrounded. It is my understanding that artifacts have been discovered on private property near the river, says Darrell Cook, superintendent of the Little Bighorn Battlefield National Park. The National Park is not involved in this; private individuals have done the research. The exact whereabouts of these newly discovered artifacts remains confidential to protect them from looters, but the general location is close to the Little Bighorn River west and slightly north of Last Stand Hill (see map, P. 45). Artifacts recovered from this site indicate that a portion of Custer's command fought at this location. What is particularly intriguing about this combat position is that, at the very least, it demonstrates that Custer's Last Stand was far more complex than most authorities have believed. Unlike Errol Flynn (see the 1941 movie They Died With Their Boots On), Custer did not simply ride over the hill to be suddenly surrounded and massacred by thousands of Indians in a few short minutes.
There is no record of dead cavalrymen being found at this location when burial details were conducted a few days after the battle. This lack of bodies suggests that the cavalry detachment that fought at this position was not overwhelmed by the Indian warriors and was able to withdraw from it in good order, taking any dead and wounded with them. The fighting that occurred at this newly discovered site, as well as the movement to and from this location, would also seem to indicate that Custer's Last Stand was a lengthy battle and one of maneuver, at least part of the time. That's not something that the Custer critics and haters want to hear.
As many students of the Battle of the Little Bighorn have concluded, Custer's Last Stand is one of the most overly intellectualized and politicized events in American history. Some of the most basic facts have escaped the public's attention, while yarns such as Custer running for president of the United States have been invented. As a result, the public perception of Custer today probably falls somewhere near or below Attila the Hun. This misinterpretation of Custer has in turn led to many misperceptions about Custer's Last Stand. Because of what happened on June 25, 1876, the Custer name has become synonymous with defeat in the minds of many, but those individuals are not seeing the larger picture, particularly Custer's extraordinary Civil War career as a Union cavalry officer.
Custer, born in New Rumley, Ohio, on December 5, 1839, was a member of the second class of 1861 at the Military Academy at West Point, graduating a year early because Southern artillerymen had opened fire on Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861. The newly commissioned second lieutenant fought in the Battle of Bull Run (First Manassas) on July 21, 1861. On his own initiative, he protected the Union retreat at the Cub Run Bridge, and his Company G, 2nd U.S. Cavalry, was one of the last Union formations to leave the battlefield. Custer went on to distinguish himself in nearly every major battle fought by the Army of the Potomac.
Because of his aggressiveness in cavalry charges, 23-year-old Custer was promoted from captain to brigadier general just days before the Battle of Gettysburg. The Union's youngest general was given command of the Michigan Cavalry Brigade. On July 3, 1863, when Maj. Gen. George Pickett's Confederate forces began their assault on Cemetery Ridge, Maj. Gen. J.E.B. Stuart's Rebel cavalrymen were maneuvering to make an attack on the Union rear. Saber-wielding General Custer and his Wolverines were there to stop what some historians have suggested could have been a battle-winning assault. Vastly outnumbered, Custer twice charged Stuart's forces, throwing them off balance and denying them access to the Federal rear.
The dashing young general stayed in the spotlight with the Michigan Brigade until September 30, 1864, when he was promoted to major general and given command of the 3rd Cavalry Division. Custer would hold that command post until the end, particularly distinguishing himself during the Appomattox campaign. After the Rebel surrender at Appomattox Court House on April 9, 1865, Maj. Gen. Phil Sheridan, who had been Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant's chief of cavalry, purchased the table on which the articles of surrender had been signed. He would later present this table to Elizabeth Bacon Custer, General Custer's wife, with a note saying: I respectfully present to you this small writing table on which the conditions for the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia were written by Lt. General Grant and permit me to say, Madam, that there is scarcely an individual in our service who has contributed more to bring about this desirable result than your gallant husband.
That such memorable service should be overshadowed by what happened one Sunday in June more than 10 years later is an injustice that irritates Steve Alexander as much as it does anyone. Alexander has portrayed Custer in Little Bighorn reenactments for more than 15 years and in nearly 20 documentaries, including Betrayal at Little Big Horn, Encounters of the Unexplained and Command Decisions. Custer may be the most misunderstood figure in American history, says Alexander, who has amassed a huge library of Custer reference material through the years. I have studied Custer most of my life and have been continuously amazed at his exceptional courage, military ability and character. Custer's greatest fault, or at least the characteristic that most offended his enemies, was his consistent success, eternal optimism, and zest for life.
Custer's Civil War record demonstrates that he was courageous and a leader beyond his years. He was a master at the use of surprise, maneuver and terrain. He led from the front and demonstrated his ability to seize opportunity in an instant; the soldiers he commanded held him in esteem. This is hardly the nasty and/or delusional Custer that has shown up in popular American culture. Custer was colorful, but he wasn't crazy.
By the end of the Civil War, Custer had been promoted to major general. In the peacetime Army that followed, his rank would be reduced to that of lieutenant colonel. Custer, as well as other U.S. Army officers who had been reduced in rank, was referred to in official documents and press reports as General. In 1866 he was made acting commander of the 7th Cavalry. For the next 10 years, Custer and the 7th Cavalry would chase hostile Plains Indians and take them on in many skirmishes and two major battles. In November 1868, after a harrowing winter march, Custer and his command attacked and captured a Cheyenne Indian village located on the Washita River in Indian Territory (present-day Oklahoma). About 100 Indians were killed, but Custer also took 67 captives, a fact that debunks the charge by some that it was a bloodthirsty massacre. Evidence found within this village and other allied Indian camps nearby, including murdered white captives, demonstrated that these bands were not at peace. At the Washita, as at the Little Bighorn, Custer had Indian scouts who led him to the enemy (other Indians) and were more than happy to participate in the defeat of people who were also their enemies.
In 1873 Custer and 10 companies of the 7th Cavalry were among the soldiers in Colonel David S. Stanley's Yellowstone Expedition, which was escorting a railroad survey crew across Montana Territory. When some Sioux warriors tried to raid horses from the expedition on August 4, Custer gave chase. About 300 Sioux suddenly burst out of the timber by the Tongue River, but Custer executed a skillful withdrawal and held them back, later saying that the warriors displayed unusual boldness. After attempts by the Sioux to burn the grass and smoke out the soldiers failed, Custer surprised the enemy with a counterattack and drove them off. Just seven days later, near the mouth of the Bighorn River, warriors fired on the cavalry from the opposite shore. Custer's 450 troopers, who faced about 500 Sioux, repulsed those warriors who tried to cross the river. During another counterattack, Custer had a horse shot out from under him but emerged without a scratch. In these two engagements, Custer demonstrated enough leadership and discipline to more than hold his own against a larger force of Plains Indians.
Not that it was always smooth sailing for Custer in the West prior to June 1876. Back in 1867, the 7th Cavalry had been plagued by factionalism, and Custer had been court-martialed for absence without leave from his command and for ordering deserters to be shot. He was convicted and suspended from command for one year. In March 1876, he was summoned from his post at Fort Lincoln, Dakota Territory, to testify in Washington, D.C., about corruption in the awarding of Western post traderships and other frauds that were cheating both the frontier Army and American Indians. His testimony was damaging to William W. Belknap, who had been the secretary of war in the Grant administration, as well as to the president's brother. Consequently, Ulysses S. Grant removed Custer from command of the troops at Fort Lincoln, but under pressure, the president later returned Custer to command of the 7th Cavalry (though Brig. Gen. Alfred Terry would be the overall commander of the Dakota Column that marched into Montana Territory in May 1876). On June 25, Custer rode to his death in a cloud of controversies, and his many enemies and later detractors would ensure that the earlier controversies and the ones generated by the military disaster that day would grow after his death.
One controversial notion should be put aside right away: that the Plains Indians at the Little Bighorn were defending their homeland. That is a myth. When Custer surprised the Sioux and Cheyennes village, he was not attacking peace-loving defenders. The Little Bighorn Valley is part of the Crow Indians traditional homeland, and the Sioux had driven the Crows from it. Back on March 10, 1876, Indian agent Dexter Clapp of the Crow Agency in Montana said that the Sioux are now occupying the eastern and best portion of their reservation and by their constant warfare paralyzing all efforts to induce the Crows to undertake agriculture or other means of self support, and added that the Crows expect the Sioux to attack this agency and themselves in large force. Other tribes such as the Shoshones, Blackfeet and Arikaras were also victims of Sioux raids and war making. The proud warrior culture of the Plains Indians was one reason that disenchanted Sioux warriors and their allies left their reservations in 1876 to join the influential medicine man Sitting Bull, who had never signed a treaty with the United States. Another reason was that the government was not fulfilling treaty obligations, which was something Custer had pointed out when summoned to Washington. In any case, the Indians defiance meant war.
The U.S. Army did have a plan of action to deal with the hostile Indians. The Terry and Custer force that departed Fort Lincoln on May 17, 1876, consisted of the entire 7th Cavalry of 12 companies, three companies of infantry, three Gatling guns, Indian scouts and a huge wagon train. Two other columns were also dispatched to seek out the hostile tribes. Plains Indians fought Brig. Gen. George Crook's column (which had marched up from the south) to a standstill in the Battle of the Rosebud on June 17, and by pulling back to his camp on Goose Creek instead of pursuing the enemy, Crook was of no help to Custer or anyone else. The third force, commanded by Colonel John Gibbon, marched east from western Montana and hooked up with the Terry/Custer force for a conference on the night of June 21. A scouting party headed by the second-ranking officer in the 7th Cavalry, Major Marcus Reno, had discovered a huge Indian trail leading toward the Little Bighorn Valley. The next day, Custer would separate from Gibbon's force and march up the Rosebud Valley to follow that trail. Gibbon, with Terry accompanying him, was to follow the Yellowstone River to the Bighorn River and then follow that river to the Little Bighorn Valley. In a communication addressed to General Sheridan dated June 21, Terry said, My only hope is that one of the two columns will find the Indians. His belief that either of the two columns would be able to handle any hostile warriors was realistic.
On the morning of June 25, after Custer's command marched several days, his advance scouts on the Crow's Nest, a high point between the Rosebud and Little Bighorn valleys, saw a large Indian encampment 15 miles away near the Little Bighorn River. Custer did not heedlessly rush into battle against the advice of his scouts. I told [guide and interpreter] Mitch Bouyer it would be a good thing if they would hide here until night and then surprise the camp, scout White Man Runs Him later said. Then the two Sioux appeared over there and I said we had better hurry and get over there just as soon as possible. Custer was able to pull off a surprise attack. Sheridan reported on November 25, 1876, If Custer had not come upon the village so suddenly, the warriors would have gone to meet him in order to give time to the women and children to get out of the way, as they did with Crook only a few days before.
Custer divided his command into battalions, and retained personal command of two battalions (five companies, about 210 men). Reno was given command of three companies and most of the scouts (about 175 men). Captain Frederick Benteen was given command of three companies (about 125 men). One company and six men from each company (about 135 men) were assigned to protect the pack train and provide a rear guard for the advance. It has often been claimed that this decision doomed Custer, but never before had a battalion (let alone an entire regiment) of cavalry been whipped by Plains Indians. Neither Custer nor any of the officers with him would have doubted that each of these commands, with the exception of the pack train command, was a formidable offensive force. It is accepted military doctrine that forces divide and maneuver for the offensive while they concentrate for the defense. Custer had divided his forces many times during the Civil War, as well as at the Washita and during the Yellowstone Expedition. At the Little Bighorn, each command had disciplined troops who were expected to carry out their commander's orders.
As would be expected, Custer commanded the largest force and planned to strike the main blow at the enemy. His company commanders included his brother Tom Custer, twice awarded the Medal of Honor during the Civil War, and other reliable officers Captain Miles Keogh, Captain George Yates, Lieutenant Alger Smith and Lieutenant James Calhoun (who was married to Custer's sister). Captain Benteen would later refer to these men, along with a few others, as the Custer gang. Perhaps so, but none of these proven soldiers would have conducted themselves the way that Reno and Benteen seemingly did at the Little Big horn by disobeying orders, exhibiting dereliction of military duty and displaying cowardice. Putting the majority of his most reliable officers in his own command may have been Custer's biggest mistake.
Benteen, by most accounts, resented Custer and had publicly criticized his conduct at the Washita. Their personal animosity was still going strong in 1876. Benteen demanded to lead the advance from the Crow's Nest, and for a brief time did, before Custer ordered him into the foothills on the left of the main force. That order may have been Custer's second critical mistake on June 25. What legitimate military purpose this order had, if any, has been much debated. Ordered to pitch into anything you might find, Benteen's battalion marched parallel to the main force but gradually fell behind and became separated by several miles. From a tactical view, Benteen's role became little more than that of the combat reserve, and it is possible that Custer's purpose for making that assignment was to humiliate Benteen. However, James Schreffler, a military science instructor at the College of the Ozarks who has studied the battle extensively from the military perspective, has suggested that Benteen headed a surveillance/reconnaissance force to keep the enemy from slipping away through the numerous draws and washes in the area. Schreffler adds, I believe the tactics used by Custer very possibly would have been used by any other officer of that era in his position and possessing the same information.
As the main force approached the Little Bighorn Valley, hostile warriors were seen, and Custer ordered Reno into the valley to attack the Indian camp while he turned to the right to advance upon the camp from the hills overlooking the valley. Reno crossed the Little Bighorn River and charged down the valley until he halted to form a skirmish line. According to the original map of Lieutenant Edward Maguire, who arrived with General Terry and the reinforcements two days later, Reno stopped his advance about two miles from the main Indian camp. As Maguire was a trained Army engineer who examined the battlefield shortly after the fight was over, it must be presumed that his map is more accurate than the revisionist maps that have the Indian camp shifting about and have Custer's advance drifting away from the path depicted by Maguire.
The accounts of the Indian participants frequently conflict, but one thing almost all the old warriors agreed on was that their camp (or village) was unprepared for the sudden attack. Reno was able to form a dismounted skirmish line in good order, and the horses were sheltered in low benchland near the river. While this is sometimes portrayed as a defensive action, Reno was actually creating a diversion while Custer maneuvered for a flank attack. It is evident to me that Custer intended to support me by…attacking the village in the flank, Reno later said. The now alerted Indians knew better than to make a frontal attack on Reno's skirmish line, so they advanced in the foothills to the left of his line to strike the cavalrymen in the flank and rear. Reno then ordered the skirmish line into a wooded area, where the men remounted. Up to this point, Reno's command had suffered few casualties and was still an offensive force threatening the Indian camp. Had Reno been in a defensive mode, he most likely would have concentrated his forces and kept his men on foot.
At this point, a bullet struck the scout Bloody Knife in the head and a shower of gore sprayed the face of Reno, who was standing next to him. Reno lost his composure, ordering his force to dismount, and then to remount again. Without bugle calls or any preparation at all, Reno bolted from the woods, leading his command in a disorganized retreat that almost immediately became a rout. About a third of the men were killed, lost or missing by the time the command had crossed the river and reached the top of the bluffs on the other side. Fortunately for Reno and the survivors, Benteen and his battalion were just arriving on the scene and the two forces were able to unite on the position now known as Reno Hill. Captain Thomas Weir led one feeble advance to go to help Custer. The company reached Weir Peaks (prominent points joined together and sometimes called Weir Peak or Weir Point), from which the Custer Battlefield is visible, but held this position only briefly before retreating to Reno's hill position. Only one of Weir's men, Vincent Charley, died in that short-lived advance. Until Terry's reinforcements arrived two days later, Reno and Benteen did nothing with their combined command of almost 400 soldiers except defend themselves on Reno Hill.
Custer had been at Weir Peaks earlier. From there, he could clearly view Reno's position, the Indian camp and the back trail. It is probable that from this position, Custer had made his final plans and had sent his last message to Benteen. The order, hurriedly scribbled on paper by Custer's adjutant, Lieutenant William W. Cooke, said: Come on. Big village. Be quick. Bring packs. P.S. Bring Packs. Custer biographer Jeffry D. Wert states the only reasonable conclusion: It would appear that Custer shaped his movements by his commitment to the offensive in the anticipated approach of Benteen. Custer had even given orders for the pack train to come quick. Reno had seemingly created a diversion, Benteen would be coming soon, and now it was time for Custer to do his thing – attack.
Maguire's map shows that from Weir Peaks, Custer advanced to the Little Bighorn River at the bottom of Medicine Tail Coulee. Although many people claim Custer was repulsed by warriors at this point, no dead cavalry horses were found to indicate a fight had occurred here. Furthermore, if Custer had been repulsed, his retreat line would have been to the rear and reinforcements, not away from them and toward what would become known as Last Stand Hill. Maguire marked the spot on his map with a B and later testified at the Reno Court of Inquiry that a ford was there and that it was supposed General Custer went there and attempted to cross. A map made by Captain Benteen also shows a ford at the point Custer reached the river. No beaver dams or other natural features would have prevented Custer from crossing the river at what has become known as Medicine Tail Ford. It is possible that Custer successfully crossed the river at the ford and actually reached the Indian camp. Sergeant Edward Davern testified at the Reno Court of Inquiry: I could see Indians circling around him in the bottom….I spoke to Captain Weir about it. I said that must be General Custer fighting down in the bottom. He asked me where and I showed him. He said Yes, I believe it is. Similar statements were made by Lieutenants Edward Mathey and Winfield Scott Edgerly.
According to Maguire's map, Custer's command advanced to Last Stand Hill by two separate trails. In a withdrawal from the river ford, Custer might have been expected to concentrate for the defense rather than divide his force. Perhaps, if these trails had been made at different times, one of them could have been made during an offensive maneuver. Custer commanded two battalions. He may have sent only the largest battalion (three companies) across the river, with the hope that it would soon join forces with Reno's command (not realizing that Reno's battalion had retreated in the other direction). That would have given him six companies, half the regiment, in or near the Indian camp, with Benteen expected to arrive with three more companies to reinforce the attack.
As for the other two companies, led by Captain Yates, they may have been part of a separate attack. Custer, ever audacious and offensive-minded, may have wanted them to threaten the Indian camp from another unexpected direction, or else he may have wanted them deployed as skirmishers along the ridges overlooking the camp. The artifacts recently discovered west of Last Stand Hill near the river might indicate the location of another Custer threat to / or attack on the camp. In his original map, submitted with his report of September 1876, Maguire had a dotted line, representing troop movement, extending almost to the river and marked by a prominent E (see section of that map on P. 44). These markings suggest the lieutenant may have believed that elements of Custer's command fought at that location (the area of new discovery on the aerial photo map seen on P. 45, where a purple line replaces Maguire's dotted line). Both the E and the dotted line running beside it toward the river were removed from a later Maguire map, which was used at the Reno Court of Inquiry in 1879.
The retreat of Reno's force from the valley, along with the subsequent failure of Benteen and Reno to advance to Custer's support, eventually would have forced Custer to go on the defensive. His immediate command of just over 200 men was vastly outnumbered by an Indian force of at least 1,500 warriors (some estimates are much higher). It stands to reason that Custer chose Last Stand Hill as a defensive position, and the reason he must have gone in that direction (instead of falling back to Weir Peaks) was to reunite with Yates force farther downstream. In the end, Custer's forces were dispersed and killed over a vast area. From Last Stand Hill, Captain Keogh's and Lieutenant Calhoun's companies stretched nearly a mile along a ridge that pointed almost directly at Weir Peaks, as if they were trying to reach that position or facilitate an advance from it. A second division of Custer's force appears to have created a skirmish line extending from Last Stand Hill west toward the Little Bighorn River, possibly to protect his flank or perhaps even to keep a corridor open toward the Indian camp for an eventual charge. Either Custer failed to concentrate for the defense or else he was still maneuvering for the offense. If the latter is true, he may very well have been expecting reinforcements from Weir Peaks. In any case, his divided forces had become vulnerable.
Survivors of the Reno-Benteen Battlefield and reinforcement soldiers who arrived on the scene a few days later described some 36 horses that had been shot down in a circle on Last Stand Hill. Behind those horses were about 40 cavalrymen, including George Custer, Tom Custer, Yates and Cooke. It has been claimed that a last stand did not occur on this hill, because artifacts have not been found there recently. But this premise ignores the fact that extensive leveling was done to the hilltop, a road and parking lot were built, and a huge water tank was buried almost on top of the hill. Last Stand Hill may be the most abused piece of historical ground in America. Artifacts not carried off or shifted during construction were also vulnerable to being picked up by the millions of people who have visited the battlefield. Once the horses were shot and the men were in a desperate defensive position behind them on June 25, 1876, the Battle of the Little Bighorn became a Last Stand.
Much of the famous battle (which officially ended on the afternoon of the 26th when the Indians broke off their siege of the Reno-Benteen position and withdrew from the field) will forever remain a mystery, and some people will never stop saying that it was all Custer's fault. The little band of Texans at the Alamo stood its ground against overwhelming odds, and those men became American heroes. Custer and some of his most trusted men in the 7th Cavalry did the same, but not many Americans view them as heroes today. There are, of course, differences. Underdogs William Travis and David Crockett knew that defeat and death at the hands of the overwhelming Mexican force were inevitable. On the other hand, there is every reason to believe that Custer thought a victory was possible until near the end. General Nelson Miles, a successful Indian fighter, later commented on the cause of the defeat: The fact that after Custer's five troops had been annihilated, the Indians who came back and engaged the seven troops were repulsed, and that they failed to dislodge these troops, is proof that the force was amply strong, if it had only acted in full concert. No commanding officers can win victories with seven-twelfths of his command remaining out of the engagement when within sounds of his rifle shots.
At the Little Bighorn, both Reno and Benteen had refused to follow their orders. They had for all intents and purposes abandoned their commander and the battle. Their actions, or inactions, made Custer's defeat and death inevitable, but it doesn't mean that George A. Custer didnt stand tall on Last Stand Hill.
This article was written by Robert Nightengale and originally published in the August 2005 issue of Wild West Magazine. For more great articles, subscribe to Wild West magazine today!
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Saying Reno and Benteen failure to follow their orders is a cause for the loss at LBH is lame. Reno's last orders from Custer were to "Pitch into them and you'll be supported" and Benteen's written orders were to Come quick and bring packs was mentioned twice.
Reno "pitched into them" for around a half hour (W.A.Graham, the story of LBH) until he got driven to the heights across the river by hundreds of Winchester armed Indians.
After Benteen got the note from Martini sent a runner to fetch the pack train and came upon Reno's command. "I've lost half my men" Reno said to Benteen. Benteen took over defacto command.
Weir did go to find Custer while Benteen organized what was left of the 7th. While under fire and amid the din of cries of wounded men and animals just as he began to follow, Weir came rushing back with more than enough Sioux on his heels to take care of the troopers.
Cooke's note mentioned packs twice and knowing Custer, Benteen wasn't going meet him without the packs.
I suspect you comments on Reno and Benteen's failure to follow orders is a way to get responses to the article.
GRAHAM & BRININSTOOL were haters of Custer. Brininstool proudly knew Benteen's wife & snubbed Mrs L.B.Custer on 4 occasions.
As Custer went down Medicine Tail Gulch, he sent Martini with the now-famous message. Martini, who named his son George Armstrong, stated to his dying day, benteen folded the note, put inside his coat (not coat chest pocket) & never told his commander about the note! Benteen = Betrayal.
Reno, another hater of Custer, was drunk, never should have left the woods, ran without bugle call from woods to hill, caused the death of Lonesome, Isaiah & one-third of his men. Herendeen, Weir, Gerard, Varnum, Edgerley, etc, etc, &c all said so. Herendeen & Gerard were injin scouts as was Lonesome & Isaiah & Varnum was chief-of-scouts. In the woods, hearing the order of Reno, Lonesome turned to Herendeen & Reno saying: What's this damn move? it makes no damn sense!—one-third of Reno's outfit died retreating to the hill, but enough men & bullets were left for a 15 minute ride to save Custer.
Col.Benteen never showed Cooke's message to Major Reno & Reno, in his cowardice said "let Custer take care of himself".
Reno was a coward, Benteen a traitor
What Barney said. Maybe an absence of courage, but not disobedience. Reno's three companies were decimated; for Benteen to ignore a Major so crippled and threatened and to at the same time increase his distance from McDougald and place the packs at risk, would have likely struck Julius Caesar like a bad idea under the same circumstances.
The company commander assignments were made based on
seniority, not favoritism, except for Company C. There is a great
explanation of seniority and how the company and battalion
assignments were made in a book called, "To hell with honor." As
to the Benteen scout to the left, I believe it was to follow the spirit
of Terry's orders, "…to feel constantly to your left." Reno—-
Certainly displayed a lack of real leadership in the valley. Being
the first one out of the timber and across the river is not the way
of a battalion commander. Had Reno held for 30 minutes longer
in the valley, I think Custer would have prevailed. After Reno
retreated, the only thing that would save the Custer battalion
would have been a renewed attack on the southern end of the
village by Benteen.
"Saying Reno and Benteen failure to follow their orders is a cause for the loss at LBH is lame. Reno’s last orders from Custer were to “Pitch into them and you’ll be supported” and Benteen’s written orders were to Come quick and bring packs was mentioned twice."
You say it's 'lame' and then make the author's point for him. Both had orders as you stated and neither followed them, effectively taking out 2/3 of the force available for the fight, leaving the Indians free to deal with Custer separately.
"Reno “pitched into them” for around a half hour (W.A.Graham, the story of LBH) until he got driven to the heights across the river by hundreds of Winchester armed Indians."
Reno lost control of his nerves and his battalion. Most authorities on LBH agree that Reno should have been able to hold his position in the woods. Reno was not 'driven' anywhere by the Indians. He caused most of his own casualties by running.
"After Benteen got the note from Martini sent a runner to fetch the pack train and came upon Reno’s command. “I’ve lost half my men” Reno said to Benteen. Benteen took over defacto command."
Why did Benteen take over defacto? I guess you are now agreeing that Reno was not fit to command. Benteen is still under orders to come to Custer with his men and packs. Does he even try? No. Weir takes off on his own.
"Weir did go to find Custer while Benteen organized what was left of the 7th. While under fire and amid the din of cries of wounded men and animals just as he began to follow, Weir came rushing back with more than enough Sioux on his heels to take care of the troopers."
Again, what was left was almost 2/3 of the command. Wier has no more than 45 men in his Troop. Once the packs arrived, Benteen should have been able to quickly organize a strong battalion of several hundred troopers to try and get to Custer. Regardless of what he felt towards Custer personally, he was under orders and men from his regiment were in trouble. Weir has to beg for permission to go to Custer, and then takes off on his own. Benteen's conduct is only slightly better that Reno's, IMO.
Do u have any information on : SITTING CROW/Chief Sitting Crow? Thank u
Who Killed Custer…
For many years the answer to this question was kept quiet but the concensus answer is that Pte-San-Hunka, or White Bull, the nephew of Sitting Bull, killed Custer.
White Bull told his story, which was verified by a great many of the warriors who were present, detailing that he and Custer fought in hand to hand combat. Eventually, Custer drew his pistol but White Bull took it from him before he could fire. He struck Custer upside the head several times and when the Lieutenant fell, White Bull shot him once in the head and once in the chest. White Bull had never seen Custer and did not know who it was he was facing off against but was told after the battle who it was.
White Bull refused to tell his story publicly, as many of the warriors refused to admit their deeds, because he feared there would be some form of vengeance upon he and his family by those who governed the reservations. Stanley Vestal, in his book "Sitting Bull: Champion of the Sioux" reveals the full story of White Bull and the fall of Custer.
Interestingly enough, David Humphreys Miller explains in his book "Custer's Fall: The Indian Side of the Story" that one Rodman Wanamaker of Philadelphia sought to answer the question in 1909. He offered a cash reward amongst the Sioux people if they could provide the information. The Sioux debated the matter and their people were starving, so they "elected" Cheyenne chief Brave Bear to be identified as the one who killed Custer. The reported payment was $1,000 and enough beef to feed all the Sioux bands at the Last Great Indian Council. Brave Bear never spoke of Little Big Horn.
Many claims were made by warriors who fought in that battle but none have born out the weight or the back-up as the story told by White Bull.
Any claims of who killed Custer are spurious.
In the years following the battle it became clear that no Native American on the field that day knew they were even fighting Custer. Custer had recently cut his long hair, and was not wearing his signature buckskins on the day of the battle.
In fact, Chief Gall only recognized Tom Custer, Custer's brother, who he had had previously met… but every credible source in the years immediately following the battle testified to having no idea Custer was there.
General Terry, who arrived on the scene in the days following the battle conducted a thorough investigation.
Custer was found stripped with only minor mutilation of his body (arms and legs still attached, whereas most other corpses had been dismembered )
He had NOT been scalped
And he had two wounds, A bullet wound in his chest, and another, 'contact' wound to his temple. ( described as powder blackened )
This strongly argues that there was no such hand to hand combat, as no warrior defeating Custer hand to hand would have left the body unscalped. Contrary to reportage, Natives American did not leave bodies unscalped as a sign of respect, they did not scalp men they did not personally defeat.
Terry found that Custer's column rode in good order to the river and started to cross, but that not one Shod horse made it to the other side.
He found that Custer's column then retreated in disorder, back up the embankment, ending up at the disordered and confusing site of the massacre.
Chief Gall reported that he was on his way from the northern part of the encampment toward the sound of fighting to the South ( Reno) when he was drawn to gunfire from the river near the middle of the camp… and he arrived to see Custer's cavalry in full retreat up the far bank…
SOMETHING had stopped Custer's charge across the river.
The Cheyenne, who were encamped near Custer's attempted crossing, tell the story of the Four Warriors… that when the women saw the Cavalry coming down Medicine Coulee and shouted an alarm, that only 4 Cheyenne braves were close enough to react, and that they countercharged Custer's column in the river.
They reported that with the first volley, ONE SOLDIER fell from his horse… that the column stopped, and rescued the fallen man from the river, and then milled about, and the whole column retreated.
Terry and subsequent forensics has found no evidence of a major exchange of fire at the crossing… no bodies, and no dead horses and very few bullet casings.
Custer had never in his career dismounted in the face of the enemy, nor had he ever stopped a charge over the loss of one man.
There is only one person that could have been lost that would have stopped the 7th from crossing the river, and that man is Custer himself.
The disordered melee that is seen in the disposition of the shells and bodies on the battlefield indicate a detachment that no longer had cogent leadership…. and certainly not the audacious leadership that Custer displayed thru his entire career.
The most likely explanation is that Custer was wounded in the initial volley at the crossing, and his men, unsure of what to do, rescued him, and retreated to re-group.
Custer may or may not have been conscious thru the remainder of the fight, but his fatal wound is similar to many such wounds found among the last to die and is consistent with a self inflicted "save the last bullet" scenario, or with a fellow trooper dispatching Custer to keep him from falling into the hands of the Natives alive.
That he was not scalped is the clincher… No native would take the scalp of a coward… and all native tribes considered suicide to be a cowards death.
The main problem with this article is that it gets the timing of the battle all wrong. Custer's own fight was heard to start by the scout Girard whilst he was hiding in the timber some 15 minutes after Reno's flight. This would have been a few minutes before Benteen arrived on Reno Hill.
Custer's fight probably lasted 45 to 50 minutes thus his command was already destroyed by the time that Weir's company reached its viewing position. other later reports of gunfire from those, like Girard, in the timber and from McDougall with the pack train were either warriors firing ast dead bodies or more likely the sound of Weir's men skirmishing with warriors on Weir Peaks.
There was literally nothing that Benteen could have done. Even if he had ignored Reno and the 900 or so warriors in the valley and ridden straight on he still would not have got to Custer before his battle had finished.
Reno's charge to the bluffs actually pulled around half the warrior force away from the village and gave Custer an opportunity to strike. Unfortunately there were more than enough warriors still in the village to hold Custer off and then overwhelm him.
There were no villains at LBH – Custer mounted a reasonable attack based on the enemy he expected but there were too many well armed warriors and his tactics led to his own forces being defeated in detail. Reno's actions probably saved the majority of his command and Benteen through no fault of his own was just in time to save the remnants.
Regards
Mike
After the initial charge and halt Reno commanded nothing and caused the death of several of his men. Benteen disobeyed orders plain and simple. The above are supported by the facts, facts-not conjectural biased bull. A good unbiased research will show that the 1879 court of inquiry was a cover-up that has extended to this very day. It just wasn't the 7th that had a part, but Crook, Terry, and the other higher-ups including president Grant. All of them contributed to the debacle at the Little Big Horn. Custer was a lot of things, but a lousy commander wasn't one of them.
Its time to quit blaming Custer and give the blame where it is due. Also give the Indians credit for there outstanding perfomance, at least during the battle. Afterwords they resorted to the ways that made people dislike them so much. And lets be truthful about them also and the way of life they pursued.
Custer will always be a subject of discussion and nobody will ever know the exact truth as the timing is very important and there is not enough witnesses around to tell who did what when facing several hundreds of angry and proud sioux with 2 great leaders.
Benteen and Reno were human and why would they fight their men to death just in the sake of save a company allready lost.
I just react to the above comment that says about the indians :
'afterwards they resorted to the ways that made people made dislike them so much"
To speak about "biased bull" (quote apache105) any indian warrior made a better horseman and fighter than a white army servant. they rode and fougth all their lives. their lack of command and strategy fighting mostly amongst each other and not whites was their only failure in combat.
their culture was in the opinion of many people 1 of the most beautiful and inspirational ever …
Unfortunately so many stories and over-ups. I believe that George Armstrong Custer was not stupid and was a very good commander. That said he would have taken the steps necessary to have a planned attack. I do believe that Reno and Benteen covered up much of the true facts. They both changed their stories many times since the battle. The difference in stories between the officers and the unlisted men and the officers before the inquiry and after. The inquiry it self was obviously a fraud.
Now we have two camps, one who side with a competent GA Custer and one who still thinks Custer was a drunken fool. My own sister-in-law who really knows nothing about Custer and the LBH believes that Custer was a drunk and only wanted glory. The press has done a very good job convincing society of this through movies like Little Big Man and many cartoons.
It is unfortunate that a movie cannot be made to show the world who GA Armstrong really was and what probably happened at the Little Big Horn, a man who went down fighting waiting for two captains who disobeyed orders. That much we know for sure
It seems to me that it was Custer's own fault for his defeat. For you see, Terry's orders were percise to stay and wait for more troops.
Custer got hungry for Glory and decided to go ahead and divide his regiment into three groups and such. Simply saying that it was Benteen's or Reno's fault for the defeat is covering up for Custer's mistake.
This doesn't make Custer nessacarily a bad man though. he was doing his orders, though, I wish he did have more of a heart. For slaughtering Indian children and women was truely cruel. Insane even…
But, back to the point. Historians keep debating who's fault it was exactly for LBH. I've even heard that it is Terry's fault for not knowing how many Indians were in the camp. Why would somebody blame him? For, was it not Terry who sent away Custer to find out how many Souix and Cheyenne were in the camp?
I think I've stated my point. And yes, I respect other's opinons. But I'm in eigth grade, and feel as though it was George Custer's own fault for "The battle of Little Big Horn." Pointing the finger at Reno and Benteen is, as quoted by Tar Heel, "lame".
Custer was not stupid. He was a good, intellegant man, he just slipped up this time.
-Anonymous
Sorry Anonymous, but you obviously have not actually studied Custer or the last stand battle. You make the same mistake that most people do that no nothing but what they learned from our PC correct society.
First of all, Custer NEVER drank and was not a drunkard. Every decision he made that day comes right out of the Army manual of tactics of the day.
When attacking the Indians, you always wanted to come at them from different directions as they would Usually flee and not stand and fight.
Most historians now have concluded that Custer's only mistake, if you can call it that, was lack of intelligence as to the actual strength of the Indian camp.
Why? Because never before LBH and never after did so many Indians group together to fight the white man. They usually were killing each other and attacking other Indians. Custer or anyone else, had any idea that there could be that many in one location making up so many different tribes.
As to disobeying Gen. Terry's orders, that story line has been disproved a long time ago. I have read the actual orders. Custer was given the task of finding the indians and was told to use his discrecion as to what action to take when he did so. Think a minute, they had no immediate form of communications. A commander could not give an order without allowing his suborbinate the ability to do something different when the situation required it. He was simply ordered to find and destroy the Indians. The part where he was to hook up on the 26th with the rest of the Army would not have worked as Gen Terry command had been attacked days before on their way and were forced to retreat.
I just get so sick of people spouting off about a subject they refuse to research for the truth.
Custer led over 60 charges during the civil war and never lost a battle, even when outnumbered 7 to 1. Did some people hate him? Of course. Just as Gen. Patton and Gen. MacArthur were hated as well.
You know why? Because it takes a very secure personality (arrogant) if you, to lead men into battle knowing that some will die. Study Gen. Patton and you get an idea what Custer was like. Even if you are an Indian and hate Custer, if you are an honest person, you have to say that he was a very brave soldier who knew his duty and did it well. He is one of our finest military officers that ever served in the American armed forces and we should all be proud that we have had him. Remember, Custer did not hate the Indians, he admired them and had stated that if he were an Indian, he would fight as well. Having said that, Custer was a good soldier and was following his orders as given, by a corrupt government.
I blame the US for the killing of Custer more than anything. While his troops had one shot carbines, the damn Bureau of Indian Affairs were giving Winchester repeating rifles to the Indians. Nothing like supplying your enemy with better weapons.
Do yourself a favor and read some books about the life of Custer. Find out what a gentleman and talented man he really was and not just repeat the BS that people throw out there.
you are right on roaddog. while other officers looked for ways to avoid carrying out orders custer always looked for a way to carry them out.phillip sheridan once said to custer,"you are the only man who has never let me down."i admire him. he was as close to being the perfect soldier as you can get.
****ADD ON****
I feel like an idiot. ^-^
The quote "lame" is not from Tar Heel.
But from Barney Cooney.
I apologize for the mess up.
-Anonymous <3
For whatever reason, as an Australian, I have always been fascinated by George Armstrong Custer and whathappened on the Little Bighorn – June 25 th 1876. I have read all of the comments above and appreciate the sentiment with which they have been written. George Custer is a highly controversial figure and there is much that could easily be read into his personality from many different perspectives. Do I believe that he was a competent commander? Yes I do. Do I believe that he was a deeply flawed and exceptionally vain man? Absolutely. Do I believe that he squandered the lives of over 250 of his men due to his own personal ambitions? No I do not! Do I believe that Major Reno and Captain Benteen deliberately disobeyed orders by not coming to Custer's aid? No – I am not necesarily convinced that this was the case.
There are so many things that are not mentioned in the above account. The fact that Custer marched his men to the point of near exhaustion – though understandible given the circumstances – is heavily underestimated in most accounts of the battle that I hav read. The entire 7th Cavalry was exhausted on the day of the battle and Soiux accounts have been often been quoted as saying that the soldiers appeared to be simply exhausted during the battle. Perhaps Custer's greatest fault may have been the fact that he may not have been able to understand the inability of his soldiers to match his own personal ability to endure quite intense physical hardship.
The most overlooked aspect of the battle – and an aspect that I have not read anywhere personally – although I am certain that someone has documented it – is the role of General Crook after his 'supposed' victory – as he claimed at the battle of the Rosebud about one week before the Little Bighorn debacle. From what little I have read, General Crook was experienced in the way that the Plains Indian fought. He, like Custer, never believed in his wildest imagination, that the Soiux would come out and confront a force of over 1000 US soldiers in an oen battle. More to the point was the fact that they fought almost as a coordinated group of warriors – this had never happened before. In the face of anything the size of the 7th Cavalry, the Plains Indians had always fled – not because they were afraid but because they new the firepower of the US sodiers. Crook knew this, yet the battle of the Rosebud was an encounter that was significantly different from anything that he had ever experienced from confronting the Soiux before. The battle lasted for a good couple of hours with the Souix and Cheyenne continually re-attacking and re-deploying against the US soldiers again and again. It has been reported – though they never really received any great credit for it – that the Crow scouts attached to Crook's colomn actually did more to prevent a major debacle occuring then the soldiers themselves. On more than one occasion Crow warriors dashed in to save isolated soldiers from certain death at the hands of the Souix and Cheyenne. General Crook demonstrated negligence – in my opinion – on two counts: The first was that even after that battle he still had at his disposal over 1000 soldiers – yet he refused to participate any further in the campaign until he was re-supplied and reinforced. The second, however, was possible the most crucial. He made ABSOLUTELY NO ATTEMPT WHATSOEVER to communicate with either Terry, Gibbon or Custer as to the nature of the engagement that he had experienced with the Indians on the Rosebud. Had he done so and informed them that the Indians were not fighting as expected but rather as a large coordinated unit then would Custer's tactics at the Little Bighorn been different? Custer was not a man without faults – and I am definately NOT a Custer lover or a supporter of the Custer faction. From what I have read, however, Custer was a competent and astute commanding officer.
The tactics that Custer applied on June 25th 1876 were close to flawless given his understanding of how the Souix and Cheyenne responded when confronted with a well armed and disciplined cavalry force. Even where the splitting of his forces were concerned. The Indians had never, prior to the Little Bighorn, even remotely attempted to turn away an offensive force anything the size of the 7th Cavalry before and, even though Custer's men were close to exhausted, this was still not enough reason for Custer to be dismayed. He did NOT know that he was confronting an Indian encampment that was NOT even remotely considering running away BUT was preparing to fight Custer to the death. This single piece of information was crucially missing from all of the information that Custer had at his disposal. If Crook had dispatched the information regarding the mood of the Indians immediately, it still may not have reached Custer anyway. We simply do not know.
Did Reno and Benteen disobey orders? Yes, I believe they did – BUT not willfully. The officers of the 7th Cavalry were simply not aware of the fighting mood or the fighting disposition of the Souix and Cheyenne. There were many more of them than they anticipated and – even with this number – they were completely unaware that the Indians had absolutely no intention of standing and fighting to the death. Did Reno display cowardice when he was in the valley and orered a retreat? This will always be up to the individual's own persoanl opinion. I can only try to empathise by asking the question 'What would I have done if I were in a similar situation? Reno was seriously outnumbered; he had been cornered into a wooded area in the river valley; he was running out of ammunition; the longer he stayed the more trapped he became in, from his perspective on things, an increasingly undefensible position; and he had no idea as to the whereabouts of his commanding officer. Under this set of circumstances, few people, if they have any honesty and heart, could blame Reno for his subsequent actions. Would we have done any differently?
Where Benteen is concerned, he arrived on Reno Hill with his 3 companies to reinforce Reno. Once the wagon train arrived he had at his disposal seven of the twelve companies of the 7th cavalry at his disposal – yet, three of these (Reno's battalion) were in no condition to continue in offensive mode. Remember that the entire 7th Cavalry was near the point of exhaustion. Had the entire 7th Cavalry moved to support their commanding officer (of which they were not completely clear as to his whereabouts – they knew the general direction on the basis of gun-fire and other pieces of information) it would have only contributed, in my opinion, to the tradegy that unfolded. Reno and Benteen may have disobeyed orders, however, I do not believe it was wilful – rather an honest acknowledgement and an honest appraisel of the situation that they were faced with.
I do not believe that any individual can be singled out as having to take complete responsibility for what happened on June 25th 1876. So many other issues have not even been raised in this response – the political situation of the day; the considerable under resourcement of the US forces on the Plains; the constant breaking of treaty's and the refusal of the US government to enforce treaty boundaries; the incredibly inept way that the US government treated those Indians who did come in from the Plains and moved onto reservations. The completely unjustifiable bloodbaths of Sand Creek and Wounded Knee! I do have to admit that I grow a little weary of reading accounts that continue to impart sole responsibility for the debacle of what happened on the Little Bighorn all those years ago. From my limited understanding of everything that occurred, I think that the US government administration at the time does need to accept a reasonable portion of the responsibility for what occurred.
Finally, SO LITTLE CREDIT is actually given to the Plains Indians for their bravery and ingenuitiy. They fought for their lands. The reasons for the sending in of US troops into Souix lands to force them onto reservations are spurious at best and very close to lies and deceit at worst. From all that I have read it was the US governemnt who violated any treaty signed between the two groups of people. The Plains Indians stood up against an overwhelmingly powerful enemy and fought for their rights. They outfought two very competent US army officers – Crook and Custer – but with their victories they guaranteed the loss of all that they held dear. Within ten years the culture of the Plains Indians no longer existed.
I have been to the Rosebud & The Little Big Horn battle sites a number of times & to a number of other battle sites across the country. What i have found is the fact that when the indians were ready to fight in most major battles they won. If not for Crooks crow allies he would have suffered a major defeat because he was completly surprized by Crazy Horse & about 2000 warriors, Crooks & all his men upwards of approx. 1500 including his crow were in camp & not ready for a fight when Crazy Horse & his warriors came over the hills around camp, if not for a couple hundred crows that raced out & put themselves between Crooks men & Crazy Horse there would have been alot more casulties on Crooks side if not whole scale slaughter. When it comes to Custer he usually had skirmishes with indians except for attacking a peacful village that wasnt expecting an attack. The Little Big Horn was the first time he went up against indians ready for a fight & who was not out numbered or out gunned. Custer pushed his men hard to get there first because he wanted the Glory, & by doing so his men were worn out & in pretty bad shape & this time the indians were ready for a fight. This is one battlefield that has markers like little head stones everyplace they found a dead soldier, & to me it dosent look like they put up much of a fight at all it looks pretty much like an all out rout of which I would say he was solely responsible for underestimating the indians. Another example of Indians abilities to fight happened alittle nothwest of The Little Big Horn when well over 1500 calvary attacked an Arapaho village early in the morning another Sherman tactic but were beaten and driven off by indians coming right out of bed into battle. In fact most of the real fights in the west were won by the Indians. That was one reason the calvary started fighting in the winter & there was a bounty put on buffalo to try and starve & fight them when they were most vulnerable.
Custer maintaining the operational tempo he did just before the engagement was an attempt to maintain the initiative. He did that successfully. The disposition of his forces were in keeping with the tactical practices of the time and theater. I would hesitate to call any man a coward in those conditions. None of us were there. As a combat veteran I can tell you that it's an exceptionally confusing experience at times. Maintaining your commanders intent becomes very subjective once the engagement begins. Certainly with the non ability to communicate real time. I am of the opinion (and its just that an opinion) The Gen. Custer lost tactical control of his command during his withdraw. This enabled him to be engaged piece mail company by company. During the staff ride I did It struck me how strung out the positions were. I truly think the inability to support each other during the engagement once the initiative changed hands decided the issue. Had Benteen and Reno moved north in an attempt to relieve Custer I firmly believe they would have been over run in the same manner Custer was. Im not convinced that Custer wasn't wounded earlier in the engagement thus contributing to the loss of tactical cohesion during the withdraw / maneuvering in the last 30 min or so of the engagement. Just an opinion of a guy whose spent a little time getting shot at in his life.
Respectfully S.
Major Reno lost his nerve and Captain Benteen had no intentions of helping out Custer whom he despised especially after losing his best friend Major Joe Elliott at the battle of the Washita to rescue white captives destined for slavery in Mexico!
Evidence suggest that Custer and his brothers along with scout Mich boyer and "Mr.Kellogg" the newspaper journalist were all shot-mortally wounded-while attempting to cross the Little Big Horn to capture the village. This stopped the attack cold so the troopers retreated by which time the Sioux and Cheyenne were coming back from repelling Reno at the south end of the huge encampment.
Refusing to leave the mortally wounded Custers at the rivers' edge, the demoralized troopers withdrew with a huge amount of angry Cheyenne and Sioux on their rather exhausted heels, cut off from Reno and Benteen….with only Lt. W.W.Cooke to guide them and try to save the badly wounded Custer brothers…!
I have never heard a convincing rebuttal to Benteen's claim that Custer did NOT have a plan. When he sent Benteen on his scout, without agreeing on a place and most of all, a TIME to rendevouz, Custer had no right to count on Benteen's support. It was just a fluke that Martin was able to reach Benteen at all. If Benteen had followed his orders to the letter, even if Custer had meant for him to rejoin the regiment at the Little Bighorn valley, rather than go “all the way to fort Benton” as Benteen sarcastically testified, he would have traveled all the way to present day’s Lodgegrass, before reaching the river. Then he would have had another 15 miles or more to ride before reaching the village. All, with worn out and underfed horses. In the meantime, Martin would have backtracked (as he was specifically ordered) all the way to Davis Creek, to then turn south trying to catch up with Benteen! And to top it all, Custer rode away at a gallop from the point where Martin had last seen him, so that when finally Benteen got to the area, Custer was nowhere to be seen.
What’s more, Martin conveyed no idea that Custer was in trouble. When he first saw the village, Custer (who had the largest of the three forces, each of which was believed to be able to engage the hostiles on its own) was buoyant, he thought they had “got them napping” and that they would “finish them up and then go home to our station”. In fact, Martin said that the Indians were “skedaddling. Even Weir had no reason to believe that Custer was in trouble. He was simply eager to be in the fight, as he had already indicated when he grew impatient when Benteen was watering the horses and took off without orders in the direction of Reno’s (not Custer’s) firing. This was BEFORE Martin brought Custer’s order to Benteen.
Custer was mortally wounded at the ford. That was the moment the command 's posture changed from offense to defense. It was also the moment it became leaderless and confused. Custer was carried with his officers around him to the most defensive point on the field, Custer hill, where he remained incapicitated and later killed in the Indian final charge. No other scenario explains the attitude and movement of the command. It also is supported by Indian eye-witnesses. The most likely killer of Custer was White Cow Bull who shot an officer on a sorrel with 4 white sox in the river.
This is the simplest Question of all! Why did Lt Col Custer attack the souix in lands that were given to them by treaty? My responce is your countries greed. You attacked the native populace for the greed of gold. Now you are attacking other countries for your greed of oil. How long will it be before you attack this country of mine ( Canada). Good examples; our oil supplies and our water supplies. Your country needs us, yet you pull your companies out of here. You have nuclear power yet you do not want any other country to have it. Who in the H do you think you are. Your country has been the most destructive nation on the planet. You interfere in every countries business. Oh! You play the rhetorical game, but most nations are starting to see through this.
The land did not in fact belong to the Sioux or the Cheyenne. The land belonged to the Crow and various other tribes. The Little Bighorn expedition was dispatched because the U.S. promised to protect the Crow in their peace treaty. So when the Crow, amongst many others, asked for aid because they were being raided regularly, the expedition was sent. Furthermore, the Sioux and the Cheyenne were equipped with Springfield long rifles, taken from the peaceful tribes on the reservation. Custer and his men only had short rifles. Additionally, the single biggest factor in the outcome, was a lack of information. Custer and Terry were dispatched on orders that numbered the hostiles at under 1000. With this information they had no reason to expect anything else. However, a dispatch sent to the post at which Custer left his wife, stated that the numbers were much greater. Possibly as many as 3000. Runners were sent but could not reach Terry or Custer in time. In the book, "The Boy General," written by Custer's wife reveals that the entirety of the command of the 7th followed and obeyed their orders, except one. In the book, she does not name the failed commander, but states that he and his troops were put into an easily defensible overwatch position for the purpose of protecting Custer's detachment. However, this commander lost heart and gave ridiculous orders and then countermanded them. Finally, this commander caused a stampede, leaving his comrades exposed to a concentrated attack by the majority of the enemy host.
Read up a little bit there Dan Lee before you barf again, eh?
1. The Sioux were not in their native stomping grounds in Montana, that would be the home of the Crows, who the Sioux thought it was just fine to butcher and drive out.
2. Gold and Oil? OK Mr. Yukon Klondike, go back to England if you're so self-righteous about such things. Just why did you hamsters push the native population out of their native lands?
3. How long will it be fore we attack Canada? Don't know, you better build up your military – oh that's right – you don't have one because you've always relied on the U.S. to protect your sorry backside.
4.We pull our companies out of Canada? Boo Hoo. Go cut some ice cubes.
5. Nuclear Power? Nobody's stopping Canada from going nuke. We just don't want Iran and North Korea to have it, as opposed to yourself (see refer to response number 3).
6. Who in the H do we think we are? 10 times the force for good that Yukon Klondike thinks we are.
7. Most destructive on the planet? Again, go cut some ice cubes. We weren't around for the ice age or the twilight of the dinosaurs. Hopefully we are when you become extinct so we can come visit and dance on your frozen grave.
8. We interfere in every country's business? Really? Go sit on the ice cubes that you cut.
Way to go, Dan Lee – letting your intelligence (?) show. This is for comments on "Custer's Last Stand", not some ignorant Canuck's political views.
You're evidently not old enough to understand, but without the U.S., Europe would be speaking German and most of the Western World would have had to learn Russion about 30 years ago. We don't wave it under peoples' noses until idiots like you bring it up.
Don't worry, we won't won't be invading Canada any time soon – nothing there worth fighting over. On second thought, we're softies for things like freedom, so if it needed saving, we'd probably do the same thing again !
Who inhabited Canada before white people ? Musta been the Frenchmen who wanna leave & take their Province with 'em. Couldn't have been Indians (they woulda been treated better).
I have read so many Books on the Little big horn battle. custer to me is a Hero and I wish there was someone that lived to tell the truth about what happen. Custer too me is the most interesting person, and if you read his wife books they are wonderful. They tell a differnent side of Custer , she is a great story teller. I wish she had written more books. I don't blame Reno and Benteen but I am sure if they had helped him that no one would have lived. I know for a fact Benteen did not like him and proofed if over and over. Who knows what any one person would have done in the battle . I know that history waS not very nice to Custer. He was no Idoit , he was a man just like you and I . I know he loved every bit of being in the calavry and gave his life for his country. Thanks Custer!!!!!!
Go there like I have & read alot more & I think you will find that he simply bit off alot more than he could chew & got alot of his men killed including his two brothers his nephew, his brother in law, & good freind for the chance at Glory.
I found several new pieces of information I had not previously known about. Custer refused to take along the new Gattlin guns that had arrived. They were still in boxes. He had his men box up their sabres since he expected no hand-to-hand combat. He received offers of help from other commands but refused them wanting the 7th Cavalry to get full credit. His tactic had been to wait until the Indian men (braves) left the camp and then go in and kill the women & children and burn the camp. This was supposed to make them move out of the area and not come back. But this only angered and organized them into a heavy resistance. He also divided his forces at a critical time. The estimates are 200 soldiera against 4000 Indian Braves. Not too good.
To dj, anonymous, and others,
There is NO evidence of the Regular Army purposely killing women and children as a prescribed tactic. Women and children were killed, just as they are in war today, by accident and by the the acts of sick individuals. The evidence is overwhelming at the Battle of the Washita (for example) that the army strived to avoid non-combatant casaulties. The Sand Creek Massacre was carried out by Colorado Militia, not the Regular Army. I challenge anyone to show me evidence that the Regular Army ever puposely went and killed non-combatants on the post-Civil War frontier.
Some time ago, I read "somewhere" that one of the General's relatives rode back to Reno Hill, before Benteen's arrival. I cannot recall whether this was before or after Martini's delivery of the orders to Benteen. In any event, the General's relative then rode back to the battle, and to his death and glory. What this all means to me is that the public needs a reliable "timeline" about precisely what was "happening" at various locations, and precisely "when". My reading has left me with the firm conviction that Reno and Benteen failed the General, who has been much maligned.
I don't believe Reno or Benteen failed anyone. If they had continued the attack on the south end of the village, there woulda been 652 bodies for Gen Terry & Gibbon to bury instead of 210. They were so far outnumbered that even if Custer had accepted Terry's offer of the gattling guns and Major Brisbin's Battalion and kept his unit all together, the outcome would have been the same – it just woulda taken the Indains a little longer to do it.
Gen Crook got his butt kicked (and retreated to Wyoming with his tail between his legs) by those same Indians the week before on the Rosebud. He knew they would stand and fight and how large a force they had but never sent word to Terry, Gibbon, Custer, Reno, Benteen or the man in the moon.
The biggest failure to Custer was his own belief that the Indians would scatter rather than fight and that his 7th Cavalry could "whip any Indians they might come across".
As I see it, there were possibly a few thousand rested Indians fighting a few hundred tired soldiers.
Crook showed that a formidable sized unit was no guarantee of success against a foe who was not fighting as expected.
These elements had a major contribution to Custer's demise.
Cookes Benteen note, as I read it, was for Benteen to bring the packs, indicative of Benteen needing to locate the pack train THEN meet Custer. Custer's "scouting" orders to Benteen would indicate that Custer had not intended Benteen to be part of his battle. I believe that Benteen received his note, made for the pack train, found a decimated Reno and assisted him, By this time Reno's outfit were in a defensive position and fighting for their lives. I think that Benteen and Reno accessed that going to look for Custer would have led to the annihilation of the 7th.
It seems to me that if Benteen had gone to Custer, Reno would have run out of ammo. Benteen would have found Custer's command essentially finished and I believe he would have shared their fate. No doubt Reno's command with no ammunition would also have been destroyed.
Reno was originally told to attack the village and that Custer would support him with the whole "outfit". Reno attacked the village, was getting his ass whipped and Custer did not come to his aid. Reno then went on the defensive and ultimately saved his command.
If Reno and Benteen went to aid Custer, the end result would have been no 7th Calvary survivors and a busier burial detail when "relief" came.
Custer's command seemed to have a variance in its actions till its demise. Some companies fought and died in situ, others "ran". I believe that Custer was at least mortally wounded while attempting a ford crossing…and this meant the command was essentially broken to the point where individual company commanders fended for themselves…with no "battle plan" . I think that Custer was incapacitated is indicated by his head wound applied post Morten. I believe that due to the shortness of the Custer fight, his body was still warm and those who recovered him from the river, shot him in the head in the final moments, to ensure a living Custer did not end up tortured by Indians.
Fool -
Am in agreement with all your points except two:
When Martini gave Cooke's note (Custer's order) to Benteen, he (Benteen) would have headed southeast (away from Reno), to find the pack train, which was behind him with Capt McDougall's B Company. Thus,he would not have then "found a decimated Reno", as Reno was already northwest of him.
I too, believe that Custer was shot in the chest, either at or in the river (many believe he didn't go to the river), and that his troops carried or dragged him up the hill. But I like to think the post mortem temple shot was delivered by one of the Indians after the battle, as they were known to do. No particular reason – maybe just don't wanna think his own people had to do it.
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I also believe Custer was shot early in the engagement. Some sources believe Custer intended hanging around on the bluffs until Benteen came along before attacking the village. In my opinion Custer was not the type to hang around and he intended attacking that village there and then-let Benteen join in when he arrives. Something caused the charge to halt and I believe it was when Custer was mortally wounded near the ford. no doubt Tom, Cooke and possibly Keogh all dismounted to help and the hold up was fatal. Soon warriors began arriving in force and the troops began to retreat to the bluffs and wait for Benteen.
By now hundreds of warriors were hot on their trail and the rear most troops Calhoun and Keogh dismount to try and halt the warriors advance, while Tom,Cooke and Yates all head to Last Stand Hill and attempt to dig in. Calhoun holds out for a while but is overwelmed, Keogh trys to make a stand but cant hold out, the remains of the companies flee to Last Stand Hill. Now surrounded one company decides to break out but are forced into Deep Ravine. They hold out for a while and the handful of remaining troops on Last Stand Hill make a futile break out to try and join them.
I`ve read so many stories of organised resistance but I dont believe it happened, the soldiers simply didnt have time. It was over very quick indeed.
"It seems to me that it was Custer’s own fault for his defeat. For you see, Terry’s orders were percise to stay and wait for more troops."
The above statement is categorically false. It was one of the first I came across and copied it. But then I became overwhelmed by so many instances of misinformation, that go way beyond simple conjecture, that I became disheartened and gave the project up. I guess it's the manifestation of so many theories that have been promulgated over the last 133 years. The real problem is that there is much that we do know about the battle (such as Custer's orders from General Terry) and judging by many of the above posts the known facts or the most likely scenarios as supported by the evidence have been completely obscured and debased by the wild conjecture on the less supportive evidence. It seems that many people are unable to carry fact, very solid, very good, and good evidence from one article/book to the next. Or they're not interested enough to read more than one piece regarding the subject and then form their opinon on that one piece.
For example: after sifting through so much of the information of this battle for so many years, taking into account testimony afterwards by Curley, Martin, etc., knowing which horse Custer was riding that day (Vic), that Custer had taken off his buckskin jacket and tied it behind him on the saddle (Peter Thompson and the Arikara scout Soldier), the different colors of the horses in the various companies, I think it's very likely that Company E alone went to the river (Medicine Tail Coulee) for a reconnoiter of the ford there, and it was E Company C.O. 1st Lt Algernon Smith who was shot at the river, not Custer.
I don´t think Smith was shot at the river. He was found at Custer Hill. Why would the men from company E bring him there? What horse was Smith riding? White cow Bull shot an officer riding a sorrel with four white stox. I believe it was Custer who was shot at the river.
greatings from Belgium
Excellent roster of comments. A few minor contributions: (1) The Lakota (Sioux) — who originally lived as farmers in Minnesota and had been driven out by better-armed tribes with guns in the later 1700s — were indeed in Absaroka (Crow) territory in 1876 because the rations the Lakota had been promised by the Sioux Treaty of 1868 were not delivered. Friendly whites report that some of the agency Indians were near starvation when they left the agencies to hunt because they weren't being fed as promised. The war also also waged to protect the Black Hills, which had been promised to the Lakota in 1868. (2) Custer didn't intend to murder the women and children wholesale — he intended to round them up alive as possible and use them as hostages to make the warriors give themselves up. (CF Martini) It's not a nice tactic but it's better than mass murder and since the Indians could ride circles around his troopers it was probably a reasonable way to end what was essentially a runaway situation. (3) "Indian defiance meant war…." William Taylor, a Reno Hill survivor, points out that the fugitive Indians were ordered to move their camps in January and probably would have moved if the government had let them wait until April when they didn't risk freezing. (4) Custer killed off by his own men to escape torture…Not hardly…Custer wasn't terribly popular and in a rout like that I doubt people would have dragged a dying man around like a beanbag…Lakota don't torture much — they chop dead people up afterwards to invalidate their ghosts. They definitely killed men trying to give up — what else would they do with them? — and sometimes raped white women and sometimes didn't — Fanny Kelly was forced to teach them to read in 1864, but nobody raped her. Torture wasn't part of their culture….Interesting too. As early as 1860, the three Little Bighorn tribes has offered Agent Thomas Twiss a modus vivendi where the Indians would be fed for 20 years while they learned farming and skilled trades and literacy. Congress wouldn't pay for it. In 1868, after the stalemate of Red Cloud's War, Congress paid for it — but crooked politicians stole most of the food….the same politicians also cheated the soldiers, and when the much-maligned Custer stood up for his men, they tried to break him for it….Custer remains endlessly controversial, a turbulent mixture of brilliance, agression, sentiment, and headstrong violence, all mixed up together….but the Indians were the real heroes of the Little Bighorn, as any man is when he defends his wives and daughters from rape and murder.
there are no records of him carrying the gatling guns.,thus if he had……………………..?
This website has too much information on it.
Of all the things I have read about this battle. All the arm chair quaterbacking, thoughts, guesses, ignorance. The comment from John K sums it up the absolute best. "but the Indians were the real heroes of the Little Bighorn".
John Koster Quote:
"as any man is when he defends his wives and daughters from rape and murder."
HUH?? Get real.
Been a Custer buff since first grade. I think perhaps the most accurate book, sadly for the myth, is "Save the Last Bullet for Yourself" by Dr. Thomas Marquis.
As a kid, I read Quentin Reynold's book, which had a two chapter last stand. As a history major at Haverford, I had to surrender the myths. Prof. Fox also wrote a book on the battle, using archeology to reconstruct what happened, a book which bears out what Marquis was saying.
I think those five troops fell apart.
When will we ever learn?
After going through the research and testimony I believe the answer to Custer's death is simply about fate. Custer was anxious to atack the village before the alarm went up. He believed and was correct to some extent that most of the braves were still asleep. However, when Reno advanced he was met with stiff resistance, forcing him to retreat. Custer, intending to ride through the village at the head of his column and drive the people towrds Reno and Benteen was shot in the chest as he crossed the river. He was remounted by his men, probably his brother, and ridden along with a contingent of his force to safety. A small force attempted to cover this retreat but was overwhelmed when braves swarmed in from the attack on Reno along with others, including women, joining the melee. Custer's men attempted to protect their commander but were overwhelmed and, at some point, someone made sure he was dead and not subject to capture and possible torture by shooting him in the side of the head. Custer was known for headlong charges and I truly believe he felt he was invincible to some extent. In the other hand, Reno and Benteen were more cautious. I don't believe they were cowards. This event stands as a testament to the nature of the men who fought it. Custer was no coward, but leading your men in charges puts you at greater risk for catching a bullet and it was his day. There is no way that the charge would have ended if Custer was still alive or unwounded. I believe he would have ridden into the camp alone if he'd had to. That's just who he was.
I have studied Custer for many years. Here's one big question for all to think about.
*****It is still a mystery much of what he did right after the Civil War against the KKK in the South before fighting the Natives.
My Great-Great Grandfather was discharged from the 7th in 1872 in Kentucky. He had been in Weir's Troop. Weir signed his discharge. The 7th had very high desertion rates. Half the names on my ancestor's discharge roll had deserted.
His own men called him Horse-Killer. He was courtmartialed for shooting deserters without a trial. Most of the 7th were Irish and German immigrants who had never been on a horse until they enlisted.
Yes, Custer impulsively checked Stuart at Gettysburg with charge after charge, but destroyed most of his command. He knew enough to order a charge.
At the Little Bighorn, he had ORDERS to await reinforcements. He refused to wait and did not even send couriers to the other two US commands. He did not have his men rested before the battle. He galloped his horses for miles before engaging, so the horses were tired.
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Custer did not take the advice of his own scouts. Against orders, he had a newspaperman with him for his own reasons.
**Although repeating rifles were invented in 1660, Custer refused to take them along. Some Native fighters had Sharps, Henry and Winchester repeaters. Custer had single-shot carbines.
**He also refused reinforcements that were there to help him, and
**he refused Gatling guns – the early machine guns used in the Civil War.
Native accounts say many soldiers were drunk, their canteens had whiskey. At the forts, Custer usually ran the "store" that sold whiskey.
At this battle, He did not "support" Reno. He rode off. There is no evidence Custer was ever at Weir Point. The survivors petitioned to have Reno named Colonel after the battle. Yes, Reno hated Custer because he rode off and deserted Major Elliot's detachment at the Washita, and never tried to find him. Elliot's men were tortured and killed. Custer did not look for their bodies till the next year.
Custer fathered a half-breed by an Native captive. He gave the Native women he captured to the officers he liked. Custer had his own family attached to the Regiment because the non-family officers did not respect him.
Do not mistake comments about Custer for comments against his troopers. The 7th had brave soldiers like most US forces, but the l-e-a-d-e-r-s-h-i-p let them down. There were brave US troops in Nam, but our leaders made many poor decisions.
God bless our men and women in the service today. May our leaders be worthy of their sacrifices.
Did Custer really father a half-breed by a Native captive?
I thought there was gonna be "One big question for all to think about". Sounds more like you've been sandbagging all your Custer dislikes for a long time & unloaded em all at once !
In defense of Custer (& I'm not a big Custer fan):
He's definitely NOT the first or only officer to ever shoot a deserter.
He DID NOT have orders to wait for reinforcements. Gen Terry gave him a written order that instructed him where to go and what to do. The order also states "It is impossible to give you any definite instructions in regard to this movement, and were it not impossible to do so the Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy. He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should comform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them.".
If there was any deviation from Terry's orders, it was Terry's fault !
Just after 4 p m after starting down Medicine Tail Coulee, Custer was seen to write a note & hand it to a trooper who left to the northeast, presumably informing Terry of his situation. However no message ever reached Terry. The one who SHOULD HAVE been sending messages was Gen Crook – telling Terry, Gibbon, Custer, Reno, Benteen and everybody about the size and strength of the Indians that routed his troops the week before on the Rosebud !
At the time when Custer turned down Terry's offer to send Maj Brisbin's Battalion & the gattling guns, none of them had a clue as to the enormous size of the village. I hope you don't think for a New York minute that about 150 troops and 3 gattling guns would have made any difference in the outcome of June 25th ! Remember – they all still thought Crook's 1300 troops were still coming up from the south.
By the time anyone realized the size & strength of the Indians, Custer DID try to support Reno – with about the only movement that would have had any chance – a flanking attack
Don't know what Vietnam has to do with this, but if Custer had the troop strength the 7th had when we were in Vietnam, he would have had less of a problem. He had 5 companies (about 40 troops per company). Our company strength was about 125 which would have given Custer about 625 – probably would have taken the Indians about 3 hours longer to get the same result !
I firmly believe that the ONE AND ONLY thing that could have given the U.S. Army a victory at the LBH was to have the forces of Crook, Terry and Gibbon all strike the village from multiple directions at the same time.
There was plenty of blame to go around at LBH. Start with Terry, and Crook – who were not keeping in any sort of communication with each other. Terry's orders to Custer were sufficiently vague that Custer was free to do what he wanted. So the charge that Custer disobeyed orders is blantantly false.
His two senior officiers Benteen and Reno both despised Custer. Benteen, a capable soldier, did not get along with any of his superior officers throughout his career – jealousy?. Reno was, by almost all accounts drunk during the majority of the battle. Neither had any reason to try to help Custer, Could they have made a difference? The very fact that the combined force of Reno and Benteen held off the hostiles for two days implies they could have made a difference. The only thing that kept both officiers from being court martialed was the need to cover up all the mistakes that those other than Custer made.
Not that Custer was without blame. However, if his officiers had obeyed orders, he could have prevailed even against the larger force.
Reno stopped his initial charge short of the village, many of the indians later said that if he had continued into the village and then been joined by Custer the chaos would have resulted in a complete routing of the indians. Instead he stopped dismounted, and then lead
a disgraceful retreat that resulted in the death of a large part of his command – by all accounts he was drunk the whole time.
Fate also played a part – the indian village was growing every day, no one had any idea it had gotten as big as it was. Indians were leaving the agency/reservation because the agency was running out of food. There was plentiful game at the Sioux camp. Had the 7th arrived a week(s) earlier the encampment would have been much smaller. When the first approach of the troops was noted by the indians, Sitting Bull was ready to negotiate, only after the attack began did the indians begin to attack themselves.
The terrain of the actual encampment played a huge role in the battle.
The whole scope of the village was never visible to Custer until the battle began. Here is the biggest fault that falls at Custer's feet – he had no idea the size of the force he was about to engage.
By most accounts he was on the offensive for a majority of the battle – thinking that Benteen and Reno were coming – by the time he realized he was on his own it was to late.
Most accounts, and evidence agree, he was not the officier wounded at the river. Ammunition, spent shells, surrounding Custers body suggest he was alive for a majority of the last stand.
When I initially began looking into the "legend" of Custer, I was not a particularily big fan. The more I read about him the more I was impressed. In many respects I think he is a victim of an anti military anti government mentality that has become all too common since the Vietnam era. Was he an egotist, a glory hunter – almost definitely. Was he an excellent soldier – without a doubt. Was he responsible for the military debacle at LBH? Only partially – fate, terrain, his commanding officiers (Terry and Crook) and his senior officiers (Benteen and Reno) bear much more responsibility for the fate of the 7th that day in June than action or judgment made by Custer.
Many of the foregoing comments remind me of a LBH discussion I shared with three colleagues recently. One of them is admittedly anti-government; another is a devout Southerner, biased against all Northern participants in that late war of 'Northern Aggression'; and the third believes Jamestown and Plymouth should have been shut down and given over to the local inhabitants.
As in the discussion with my friends, I'm compelled to shake my head and walk away because people are gonna believe what they choose, despite all legitimate evidence to the contrary.
Just once, it would be nice to enter a Custer forum somewhere and find a majority of comments that weren't unduly burdened by personal bias and the shifting sands of pop history.
I've read one book ("Morning Star") that gives a fairly detailed account of the wounds found in the men of the 7th, read National Geographic's battlefield analysis, watched two documentaries, and read a few websites like this. That's my background although I have a lot of military knowledge. I've never been to the battlefield which is probably a necessity for truly intelligent comment.
On General Custer himself, bringing along a newspaper man indicates he wanted publicity and refusing 150 men that were not of the 7th indicates he wanted that publicity exclusively for the 7th. This was not unusual at the time. Officers who obtained public recognition were often promoted or elected to political office and Custer was a career officer. These were both intelligent decisions for a career officer if you're expecting to win the battle. I expect that General Custer was elated when he saw the true size of the village.
I would also say the opinion of officers subordinate to him were mostly negative. Custer finished last in his class at West Point and this was probably not a secret to them. He suffered excessive Civil War casualties in his unit and this was probably not a secret from them either. I see no indication he was a man anyone would want to serve under. But he was an extremely brave man. I believe he substituted bravery for being last in his class. He let his record on the field outweigh his record in the classroom. And his field record was good. His movements at the Little Big Horn were quite sound IMO with the possible exception of Captain Benteen's men. Benteen's ordered movement does not make much military sense. He's moving away from the known position of the enemy. Major Reno's position fullfilled Custer's orders to watch his left. It does appear that Custer might have been using those orders to deliberately keep Benteen out of the action and the expected resulting glory afterwards. But, if so, Custer promptly changed his mind when he saw the size of the village and called for Benteen to reinforce him.
Major Reno impresses me as a man of caution, caution induced by fear. While Reno was not a coward, he was not a brave man either. Drinking in a battle not only impairs the brain but also reduces inhibitions. The more he drank, the more the cowardice he sought to conceal came out. In all likelyhood, Reno was drinking in the belief it would give him courage as there is no other reason to do so then unless he was a severe alcoholic. I suspect Benteen took command of Reno Hill because Reno was drunk, that Reno probably used his superior rank to try and keep Benteen with him, and he probably wanted Benteen to take over. In short, Major Reno fell apart under fire.
Did Reno disobey orders? Yes and no. Yes he obeyed in that he engaged the enemy from the south but "no" in that he engaged the enemy with a skirmish line – a defensive position. Did he do so out of good judgment or lack of courage? My vote is lack of courage as demonstrated by his flight from the woods, but history records it as good judgment because to attack was, in fact, military suicide in terms of firepower. The idea presented by some that Reno's cowardice cost Custer his life has intriguing psychological possibilities in that the unorganized enemy might have bolted and run from any size force in which case Reno would save the day. But, if the enemy didn't flee then Reno and his men would have all been killed as others have concluded. So I'm calling Reno a coward but a coward who obeyed orders.
Custer's battle plan is obvious. Reno would attack from the south while he circled around to the north and took the enemy from the rear. They would then trap the Indians between them. But the two forces are not evenly divided. Custer deliberately attacked with more troops for the rear attack than the front. This is known as a "feint" attack where Reno would engage the Indians to draw their warriors south while the "real attack" came from the north. This strategy is supported by the fact that Custer did not ask Reno to delay his attack until he was north of the village. He had Reno attack at first opportunity. Custer did not want a simultaneous attack as the Indians could then divide equally against both forces. He needed Reno to attack first so that all the Indians engaged Reno and not him. That would allow him to enter the village and route the enemy's rear. If this was the plan then Custer was aware that the Indians might not run from Reno and make a fight of it. This is supported by the three Indian scouts who cited Custer watched the Reno battle from a hill for several minutes in order to observe for himself what the result would be. Would the Indians run or would they fight? When he saw them fight he knew his plan was working and his next move was to move north and attack the women and children of the village from the rear while it emptied itself of warriors to engage Reno to the south. This was a sound military plan provided Reno did not retreat.
One can see this strategy in place when Custer reached the Medicine ford. Here, he found he was not yet at the north end of the village but only at the middle. So he failed to cross and, instead, moved north again, calling for Benteen to reinforce him as he realized the true size of the village. Calling for the pack train too meant he knew ammunition was going to be a problem – Custer was now aware he was in for a big battle as he encountered a few braves at Medicine ford. What he was not aware of was that, by this point, Reno was in retreat. Reno was no longer holding the warriors in front of him. The warriors to the south could now move north, Custer having been seen at the Medicine ford by them.
Custer was now demonstrating why he was last in his class at West Point. While he correctly understood the strategy of using Reno to draw the Indian warriors off, he failed to assign Benteen to Reno as a strategic reserve and he failed to realize the consequences of not crossing at Medicine ford. He had just lost the advantage of surprise and time. Had he crossed then and charged, mayhem in the village would have resulted and hostages taken. There were only 3-4 warriors in front of him. As a result of this decision, there was no mayhem and no hostages and the Indians were now moving from south to north and, indeed, tracking Indian cartridges fired at Custer show them moving from south to north.
And, in turning away from Medicine ford, Custer had made a third mistake. He had just made a fatal error in judgment of Indian psychology.
The Indians were not trained and organized along military lines. There was no real command structure. The Indians were simply a mob. "Morning Star" shows how the Indians fight. If you run, they chase. If you stop, they stop. When Reno retreated twice, they chased twice. But when he stopped at Reno Hill, they stopped too. When Custer turned away from the ford and headed north, he looked like he was running away. If you run, they chase. This why Custer had to post Calhoun's men in a skirmish line. This is known as a "rear guard" and was done to protect his rear. Calhoun's position demonstrates Custer didn't get very far before he came under fire from behind by Indians who probably crossed at Medicine ford after him.
And behind Captain Calhoun's company is Keogh's company. Why are they there?
They're holding Calhoun's horses. It takes one soldier to hold two horses and Calhoun's men would not organize a skirmish line with their horses with them or the Indians would shoot them. So they left their horses with Keogh's men, moved back south, and took up a skirmish line.
We know Keogh's men were holding horses because they were trained to do so in a line and Keogh's men were killed in a line without firing back, meaning they weren't holding their rifles. Keogh himself was found with his body still holding his horse's reins. Again, when Calhoun's men finally retreated back to Keogh"s position, the evidence shows they did so on foot. Evidence, again, that they had left their horses with Keogh.
How were Keogh's men killed? With buffalo rifles. These were very long range, accurate weapons – longer ranged than Calhoun's carbines. The Indians ammunition trail shows they had moved north along the river bank to put Keogh's men under fire, picking them off one at a time until the men of both companies broke and ran.
Meanwhile, Custer was still moving north with his remaining three companies and looking for a place to ford the river and attack the village from the north as planned. Yes. That's right. Custer is still on the attack. We know he's still on the attack because he didn't use the time Keogh and Calhoun's men bought him to prepare any defenses behind them. Calhoun's defense was actually superior to the defense of "Last Stand Hill" which was hastily prepared in spite of the time available to Custer to prepare one similar to Reno's on "Reno Hill". Yet while Reno's position held out for two days against the same number of Indians, Custer's lasted about five to ten minutes.
The cavalry position north of "Last Stand Hill" cited in this article, if true, explains what Custer was doing. I'll try and find the time to post that but this has gotten long enough already.
I'll conclude the remaining events, resuming my post above, A few minor corrections to what I already posted first. While the Indians did move from south to north along the river bank (While also flanking Calhoun Hill) they didn't actually fire on Keogh from the river as Keogh was on the backside of the slope (Keogh's position being intentional so that this very thing could not happen.). The Indians had to advance/infiltrate a coulee to get to a firing position. I also failed to mention Company C here which was a part of Keogh's rear guard. Company C was held in reserve by Keogh (and conducted the counter attack against the coulee) and, as such, probably held their own horses (possibly explaining why six horses of Company C reached Custer's Hill whereas none of Company L's or Company I's horses reached Custer's Hill.).
Continuing my narrative, Custer continued to move north with companies E and F. He moved at least 3/4 of a mile away from Calhoun Hill to Custer Hill and did not do so for defensive reasons, it being impossible for Custer's two companies to support Keogh's three companies from such a distance and vice-versa. Thus, we know he was still on the attack. To attack the Indians would have required that he cross the river and do so very quickly before he out distanced his own rear guard. He either would have had to ford at "Deep Ravine" or at the basin of Cemetery Ridge. And that brings us to the discovery claimed by this article of evidence of firing found near Cemetery Ridge.
If true, it can be interpreted at least two ways, one of which was already previously suspected when a body, believed to be newspaperman, Mark Kellogg, was found here. That theory was that Custer had taken Cemetery Ridge down to the river, encountered hostile fire, and Kellog was killed. It is possible and it is consistent with Custer's battle plan. It does not get my vote, however, and for two reasons. First, this was where the women and children were gathering. Had Custer reached this position and seen this, he would have crossed and won the day and the cost of one dead newspaperman would not have stopped him. Second, it is strategically too far away from his rear guard to travel this far north. Custer cannot pass by Deep Ravine and not risk having Indians come up it behind him, cutting him off from Keogh. Further, had Keogh seen General Custer move beyond his sight (to Cemetery Ridge), then Keogh would have been required to fall back to Custer Hill and set up a new rear guard skirmish line there. That is how rear guard's work. Those who support the idea that Custer tried to cross the river at Cemetery Ridge basin make the claim that Company E stayed at Custer Hill to cover Custer's rear against Indians coming up Deep Ravine and Custer went on ahead with only Company F. The explanation may work but it really would require that Custer be last in his class at West Point because he would know, if he took Company E with him, that Keogh would automatically move his rear guard to Custer Hill and cover Deep Ravine. Indeed! This is probably why Keogh retained Company C in reserve so that, if Custer got out of sight, Keogh could immediately send Company C to cover Deep Ravine while holding the horses of Company L to fall back too before joining Company C. Anyone conducting a rear guard action knows they are to fall back themselves at some point and that point would be the moment Custer was out of sight.
So while it is possible that Keogh continued to see Company E at Custer Hill and, therefore, did not fall back while Custer went on ahead with Company F it would be militarily unsound for Custer to do so. He lost the use of Company E in Company F's attack.
My own explanation is that this firing position, if it does exist, was indeed produced by Company F but not in an attempt by Company F to cross the river. Rather, it was done to support Company E in crossing the river at Deep Ravine. This makes far more military sense. Custer could not go by Deep Ravine. He either had to use it himself or post a guard over it. If he was going to post a guard over it, he would have done so with Keogh's men. If he was going to use it, then he had to secure the north slope of Deep Ravine by moving Company F to the north side of Deep Ravine (Cemetery Ridge) while Company E dismounted and moved down Deep Ravine. If so, Keogh would see Company E's horse holders on Custer's Hill and not fall back and maintain his position, which is exactly what he did.
The Indians noted that Custer stopped moving north and did nothing for 20-30 minutes. Some believe that Custer was waiting for Benteen to arrive. That's not possible because Custer had ordered Benteen to come with the pack train which was several hours away. Neither Benteen nor the pack train could possibly arrive in the 20-30 minutes Custer waited. However, Company F and Company E's horse holder's would have had to wait just about exactly 20 minutes for Company E to travel the 3/4 of a mile down Deep Ravine to reach the ford.
At the bottom of Deep Ravine the Indians opened up with murderous fire on Company E. We have the Indian shell casings and the bodies of Company E in the ravine to prove it.
As the Indians tried to move up the north side of Deep Ravine to finish off the soldiers trapped within, they would have come under fire of Company F, accounting for the discovery of the spent cartridges this article alludes to.
Company F would have stayed at this position for about the next 30 minutes or until it was obvious Company E had been wiped out. Company F may have suffered one casualty, Mark Kellogg. If so, General Custer was then with Company F as it would be expected that Kellogg would be with whichever company Custer was with.
It's possible that both Custer and Kellogg were with Company E and that Kellog chose to escape from Deep Ravine over it's north slope, knowing Company F was on the other side. If so, Custer was probably shot in the chest in Deep Ravine. The supporting evidence would be that Lt. Smith, commanding Company E, was found on Custer's Hill inside Company F's defensive perimeter killed by arrows. He was the only member of Company E found there. The Indians used arrows as well as rifles on Company E in Deep Ravine. Smith and Custer may have been pulled out of the ravine and up to Custer Hill by Company F's men.
The most convincing evidence that Custer was in Deep Ravine was what Company F did next which was almost nothing. They took up a defensive position on Custer Hill, apparently killing their own horses in a circle 32 feet across. Creating a circle at that time demonstrates a breakdown of command. There were no Indians behind them. Company F failed to retreat east (as Reno did) when opportunty allowed and when the entire company was still mounted (see below).
The only reason I can think of for Company F to form a circle would be to protect a dying General Custer. He was found peacefully laid out as his own men would do for him, apparently with three other shot soldiers of Company F. Excluding Custer and these three men, there was a live horse for every man found in the circle, but none for these four. Since all four appear to be dead (Custer may have lived awhile. His mouth was full of blood from coughing at his lung wound.), there's nothing to keep the rest of Company F from retreating except Captain Tom Custer who no doubt refused to leave his brother. Indeed! If Custer was with Company E in Deep Ravine it may have been his brother Tom who had the courage to go in and pull him out (There being no survivors of Company E to have done so.).
The popular theory that Company E panicked on Custer Hill and ran into Deep Ravine is without miitary foundation. That would require that only Company E men panicked on the hill and that all of Company E men did except Smith as only Company E men were found in Deep Ravine. The men are clearly there by order. Those who observed the dead in the ravine stated afterwards:
"It looked like they were separated from the main body." (Lt. DeRudio)
"They certainly did not go into it to shoot out of it." (Captain Benteen)
"(They) had been ordered to locate a ford for crossing the river." (General Godfrey)
The men caught in Deep Ravine did not attempt to get back up to Custer Hill, suggesting Company F was, indeed, not at Custer Hill at the time they were brought under fire but was, instead, guarding their right flank from Cemetery Ridge. According to McDougal at Reno's trial, of Company E "About half (were) found outside 9the ravine)." There were, indeed, 11 men found outside of the ravine, evidently the ones to get out of Deep Ravine. They appear to have all exited by the south bank and been running for Calhoun's rear guard which must have still been intact then. Again, this suggests Company F was not above them at Custer Hill at the time or they would have run there.
Company F then moved to Custer Hill after this happened. I am unaware of what happened to Company E's horse holders.
As to whether or not Custer committed suicide, at first I thought he had due to the fact that his body had not been mutiliated (According to "Morning Star" the Indians did not mutilate you if you committed suicide.). But it appears this may not be true as two soldiers may have committed suicide but were still mutilated anyway. Custer's wound to the chest probably left him too incapacitated (if not dead) to shoot himself in the left temple. He was right handed and no powder burns were left anyway. None of his fellow soldiers would have shot him as has been suggested by a few others here. The Indians then pumped an enormous amount of firepower into Company F, enough to kill every man in the circle within 5-10 minutes. That would certainly be enough bullets to hit Custer once more in the head.
My apologies for the lengthy post and for any mistakes I may have made.
I should add there is additional evidence that Custer was with Company F versus E. His staff officers Lt. William Cooke and Henry Voss were found with Custer in the circle formed by Company F as well as three civilians who would be expected to follow Custer. This evidence probably outweighs my evidence that Custer was with Company E and that Mark Kellog fled Company E north. Rather, Kellogg died with Company F on Company E's flank.
I also mentioned I did not know what happened to Company E's horseholders, my National Geographic being long gone. Someone else can correct me but it appears they would have been positioned halfway between the entrance to Deep Ravine and Custer Hill, probably on the west slope. The Cheyenne made constant reference to seeing the gray horses of Company E from Cemetery Ridge, confirming they were not in Deep Ravine with Company E. Evidence they were being held is two fold. Indians were seen near the horses without being killed (You can't hold horses and shoot Indians at the same time.). The horses were abruptly let go and stampeded, a sign their holders gave up holding them, either because they had been killed or to return fire (Probably the latter as they were released at the same time.). Mitch Bouyer's body was found in the area I'm referring too. Although I've never been there, I imagine those who have would find this to be a pretty stupid choice to stand holding horses with bullets coming at you. However, there's not a lot of choice here. The horses are being held for the dismounted men in the ravine so they must be held near the ravine for them but not in the ravine (the obvious safer move). They can't be held in the ravine or Keogh's men would lose sight of them, conclude Custer had moved north, and move north themselves to cover Custer's rear. So the horse holders must stay on the slopes in the open for Keogh's men to see them.
As mentioned earlier, Custer could not just ride past Deep Ravine or he allowed its use by Indians to get behind him and between him and the rear guard. Indeed! Indians did use Deep Ravine to access Calhoun Coulee. Keogh recognized the significance of Indians coming up Calhoun Coulee and ordered a mounted charge by Company C (Evidence again Company C was holding it's own horses) to clear Calhoun Coulee of Indians for a distance of about 500 yards – far enough to put the Indians back out of range. Company C then dismounted to form a skirmish line to keep the Indians from coming up it again but broke under Indian attack before they could do so. This appears to be the last command by Keogh as he appears to have now been hit, for Company C now did the wrong thing and joined Company L, the two combined companies firing in "bunches', a sign of no commanding officers to correct them. For Keogh to order the Calhoun Coulee charge demonstrates he understood the significance of Indians getting between him and Custer. Yet, when Company C came back, he did nothing about it, an indication he was no longer in command. The correct instruction at that point would have been for Company C to join Company L (which they did) and cover Company L's retreat to Company "I" to get their horses (Which they didn't.). All three companies would mount up and move north to the next defensible position. The companies could alternately stop, turn, and fire one volley at any pursuers, thereby assuring the pusuing Indians would receive three staggered vollies. This didn't happen either. Instead, someone bugled retreat and Company C mounted up and left Company L behind on foot. Company L had to run on foot to Company "I" and Company "I" had to stand there and wait for them with their horses. No one is stopping the Indians from catching up from behind with Company L. And they caught up. There is a trail of dead soldiers in the line of the retreat from Keogh's command to Last Stand (Custer's) Hill. These men died running with their backs to the Indians. This was not an organized retreat.
The point here is to demonstrate what happens when Custer rides past two ways up for the enemy to get between himself and his rear guard – the two ways being Deep Ravine and "Calhoun Cooley". You get yourself and your rear guard killed.
So the questions become, "Why did Custer ride by Calhoun Cooley? And why didn't Keogh place a guard over Calhoun Cooley using Company C when Custer did ride by?"
And the obvious answer is that Custer and Keogh saw there were no Indians yet in Calhoun Cooley and that, if Custer sent Company E down Deep Ravine, they would effectively become the guards over Calhoun Cooley themselves. Thus, Keogh saw no need to place a guard over Calhoun Cooley and why we see Company E in Deep Ravine.
Militarily, Custer had to send Company E down Deep Ravine and Keogh knew he intended to do so. Keogh would cover the left flank of Company E and Custer would cover the right flank of Company E with Company F.
The tactic of using Deep Ravine to reach the river had been developed during the Civil War in which Custer fought as a general and was referred to as a "sunken road". A "sunken road" was any pathway of lower elvation than the enemy was on such that the terrain obstructed the view of the enemy of your men moving down it. You could effectively march soldiers down a "sunken road" without the enemy seeing you or being able to shoot at you without shooting through the terrain itself. "Deep Ravine" is the military equivelent of a "sunken road". If you want to move down to the river without being seen, Deep Ravine is the way to do it. And, if you were going to use Deep Ravine to ford the river, you'd put Keogh's men exactly where they were. Nor would you go past Deep Ravine without using it. If you're going to go past it, then Keogh's men should be setting up their rear guard at "Custer Hill" instead of Calhoun Hill. It's the only way they can protect Custer's rear as demonstrated by what happened when Indians came up Calhoun Cooly.
One final note: If Custer was not with Company E then it's possible that he was alive and well and in command of Company F now reaching Custer Hill as the last six men of Company C arrive and the last two of Company "I". Certainly Company F had come under fire because not all of Company F is at Custer Hill. When one subtracts Smith of Company E, the three civilians, the three HQ officers, an assistant surgeon,, and the eight men of the rear guard, Company F seems to be short about fifteen men, evidence Company F had previously experienced casualties. Certainly, Custer could have been amongst them. Yet, if that was the case, one would expect that Custer would be receiving the attentions of his Army surgeon inside the circle. Only his surgeon isn't with Custer. He died outside the circle, a short distance away, as if he had stopped to examine the horse holders of Company E. That's something he probably wouldn't do if he had Custer to attend to. In that event, Custer may be in command of the circle and was simply hit twice as the Indians poured in fire. Personally, I doubt this because it means that Custer ordered his men to shoot their horses and make a stand of it. The only reason to do that would be to give the men of the fleeing rear guard a safe haven to run to and who were now arriving. But I see nothing in Custer's history to indicate concern for the safety of his men. Rather, I see just the opposite. For Custer to stop for others when escape to the east was still an option would seem to go against his character. But, if he had been hit, say, at the same time as his surgeon, then I can see Company F stopping for him. All in all, there are just two many variables for me to conclude where and when Custer died. If I have made a contribution here it's more likely to be why Company E is dismounted in Deep Ravine.
I submit to all on this forum, while I am a proud american and have served my country in the US Army and first and foremost a Native American I must disagree with most of you in regards to the Baby butchering 7th Cav. and their Leaders, that includes Grant and all the murderous thugs he sent to steal land from and kill women old men and children to acomplish this. If the Great white man said he wanted an indians land the Indian gave it up or was killed and sometimes he and his whole family were killed anyway. I stand in amazement when I read post like these and I hear the anger in the letters being typed because Custer lost. That was Custer's day and on your day it doesn't matter who you are and how many you have with you that day you will meet your creator. Give the Native Americans Credit they came to fight to the death for what they knew was right, to avenge the injustices done to them time and time again and to die withhonor and dignity, Custers men came to a fight but they had no honor had this been in any one of the thousands of men in the 7th Cav's. character they would have refused to fight a sovereign nation for Land, Menerals or any other reason.
Them sioux were cutthroat pirates itching for a fite since sept 1875 at the black hills treaty when the peaceful indians gave up the black hills. as red cloud came up to touch the feather, Gen Miles called him a thief who stole the hills from the cheyenne & the cheyenne from the Crow. One of sitting-stubborn's best friends was named crow-dog, because of racist hatred against the Crow Indians.
Then, in late February 1876, sitting-stubborn & 6,000 bucks invaded Crow territory itching for a fight. The waited until mid June & fought Crook. A week later they mutilated the bodies of over 230 men, at two fight sites, on Sunday June 25.
These sioux were as barbaric as aztecs or anasazi: committed acts of human sacrifice, mutilation and stone age forms of torture and murder.
I ACCUSE THE SIOUX OF STONE AGE BARBARISM:
1-to Indians & white Americans: mutilations, scalpings, cannibalism & human sacrifice.
2-Racism to white Americans that predates the French & Indian Wars and spying for the British;
3-un-American activities in the forests east of Mississippi against Americans & forest Indians; and on the Great Plains against white Americans, Crow, Arikara, Hidatsa, Mandan, Shoshone & Pawnee.
All those Indian tribes fought with Custer, Miles, Crook, against the sioux for their land and their sacred black hills.
Hello Greg,
I am a huge Custer history nut who taked ALL of Custer's career into account. If a person takes out their opinions based on hatred, you can only conclude that Custer was one of our finest military leaders who knew no fear and was instrumental in the Union winning the war between the states.
It is unfortunate that you describe yourself as "Indian" above all else. Nothing personal, but I am sick of people describing themselves as anything but Just American. That is why we are so divided.
As for Custer being a baby killer, which there is no REAL evidence to prove it, the Indians can hardly stand as warriors with stellar conduct.
You most likely do not know that Custer did not hate the Indians. As a matter of fact, he had commented that if he were an Indian, he would be fighting as well. You being in the military, you know that when you go to war, you follow orders. If the orders are unjust, it lies at the feet of the politicians and high commanders who send the troops to fight.
As for me, I do not hate anyone and try to see the past as those who lived it saw it. Being pragmatic about it, the Indians lost. It was not right, but we all know that life is not fair.
The way I see it, it was destiny that the white man won. If the Indians had won and kept the US, I suspect they would still be in teepees hunting buffalo.
The way I see it, the best thing we could do for the Indian today would be to take away his reservations and force him to assimalate into American culture. As it stands, you have nothing but a huge welfare state with alcoholism at 80%. I am sick of minority groups claiming the government OWES ME. Get over it and move on.
No apology necessary. Your comments are intelligent and based on facts presented from evidence gathered. I agree and appreciate your view. Incidentally, I discovered Keogh's birthday of March 25 is the same as mine.
My take is that Custer was shot at the river in the chest. His men carried him to the top of the hill, laid him down, and tried to protect him and themselves. When they realized that they were about to be over-run, one of them shot Custer in the head to save him from any torture the Indians were reported to do to wounded men.
I was wrong. According to Indian testimony, Custer fought very bravely and was one of the last to die.
According to James Donovan´s A terrible glory it was Lt Sturgis who was killed at the river and not Custer.
Excellent, sir. I will not argue the logistics of your last 1.5 hrs of the fighting 7th, but you may be interested to know the more medical aspects of Autie, his men & their mutilation.
Keogh's men's heads were bashed in by stone age clubs. 106 heads were bashed in out of 216+ men (almost 50%).
Autie must have been in the command center & personally ordered the Medical area. For an unknown reason, Mitch held a position, near Boston, between Autie's command center & Keogh's Line.
Victory was shot from under Autie as they charged up Custer Hill. Victory was identified near Mitch, who, like Autie, died from a standing position.
39 horses & 42 men composed a command center on Custer Hill on Battle Ridge. Autie saw his brother-in-law's men & Keogh's men murdered. Smith, Thom, Cooke, & Autie were in the command center. For an unknown reason, bulldogs in both hands firing, Autie stood up!!
A winchester bullet entered the left temple, mercifully, he never knew what hit him, his light went out. The bullet exited from his right temple, propelling him to his right & backwards, toward the obelisk. There were no powder burns on entrance or exit, but dried blood on both hole prove this was the bleed-out or hit site, The crash of the bullet in both temporal lobes caused the breaking of both inner ears & his lacrimal ducts. The forensics of Terry's men show lymphatic seepage from both ears, eyes, & nostrils. It was the Victorian Age & this result was kept from Mrs Custer.
Autie was found in a sitting position causing livor mortis to swell his thoracic cavity into a barrel. The top half black from decomposing & bottom half red with livor mortis. Given the heat of that week (Autie's buckskin jacket was tied to Victory's saddle), his position created a stench for swarms of flying insects & birds of prey.
Autie, like his men, was stripped, but was still in his sox. The wound om his left side/chest never bled-out & had no powder burn. This winchester bullet had no exit either. Thus, Autie was dead when he was shot at-a-distance in his chest. This shot was prob'ly from the same rifle minutes after the first shot.
Considering that 1876 is a time of black powder, no powder burns is significant forensic data & no blood always means a post-mortal shot.
An 11 inch gash on Autie's left leg, from calf to achille's tendon. This meant in sioux mythology that he would never be able to reach the grandfathers' land or walk the happy hunting ground with them. This wound also stimulates land & air insects, as well as carrion, to attack the body from within it.
Two arrows were jammed in his penis, arrowheads first, no bleeding out.
3 bullet wounds: the left temple & bleeding-out=death shot; right forearm (Autie was right handed)=no bleeding-out; so he'd never be able to use that hand in the after life; left chest below heart=no bleeding out.
The mutilations were beyond belief: pieces of heads, arms, digits, legs, thighs, necks, torsos, backs, eyeballs, etc.
Dr Porter described Custer's wounds & it was exactly those of John Hammond, who signed the Autie's death certificate on Custer Hill.
i read posts and don't usually reply to them but after reading rob koenigs post i was amazed.
1. custer had orders to await re-enforcements–no such order existed
2. custer refused to take repeating rifles along–no such equipment
was available to the army.
3. whiskey in the soldiers canteens–never heard this one before.
4. fathered a child by an indian woman–heard this one before but
it was a fact that custer could not have children.
excellent reply to greg roaddog.i don't understand why he has this opinion.
[...] Because of the controversial nature of the event, many people had reservations about Custer and mixed feelings about him as a general and his decision making. Because of this, his widow Libbie dedicated the [...]