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Churchill Takes ChargeBy Williamson Murray | Military History | 2 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post Churchill was now in firm control of the political landscape. His rhetoric had reached deep into the soul of the British people. Even many Tory members of parliament, who might have supported Halifax in May when Churchill first took over, had by mid-June rallied around their prime minister. But Churchill still faced the most daunting question: How was Britain—standing alone, even if united—to win the war? Subscribe Today
Here Churchill’s deep sense of history and human nature came into play. The prime minister recognized the Third Reich for what it was: not only a terrible strategic danger to Britain but also a moral one. There could be no compromise. From Churchill’s perspective, the strategic interests of the United States and the Soviet Union also could not allow Germany free rein over much of Europe. The prime minister had his work cut out for him with regard to the Soviet Union, given his longstanding, open animosity toward the Bolshevik regime. But the Soviets represented no immediate threat, while the Nazis were a clear and present danger. Churchill was willing to suspend his views on Bolshevism. The prime minister sent Sir Stafford Cripps, the British ambassador to the Soviet Union and an ideological Marxist, to Moscow in an effort to persuade the Communists that their interests lay in opposing the Nazis. The Soviets, however, refused to see the obvious. On June 18, 1940, the day after France fell, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov extended to the German government “the warmest congratulations of the Soviet government on the splendid successes of the German Wehrmacht.” One year and four days later, on the morning of June 22, 1941, he would bemoan the onset of the German invasion of the Soviet Union to the German ambassador: “What have we done to deserve this?” In truth he was right; the Soviet Union had done everything it could over the course of the past year to appease Nazi Germany, including massive infusions of raw materials into the German war economy. In fact, the last Soviet goods train would cross into German territory barely two hours before the start of Operation Barbarossa. While Churchill had not managed to thwart the misalliance between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, he had correctly forecast that their marriage of convenience would not last long.
Accord with the Americans represented a more pressing need. Britain would soon exhaust its foreign currency reserves, thus losing its ability to foot the enormous production costs the war was already imposing, much less the projected vast expansion of the RAF and Royal Navy. The United States alone possessed the financial and productive capacity to keep Britain in the war. From the moment Churchill became prime minister, he engaged the Roosevelt administration in a delicate diplomatic dance. The U.S. president was himself in a precarious political position, as he was about to announce his candidacy for an unprecedented third term. Moreover, many Americans believed the United States should not entangle itself in Europe’s difficulties. Isolationist leaders like Charles Lindbergh vociferously denounced virtually every move the administration made to support the Allies. While more Americans believed the United States should support the British and French economically, many of them were also opposed to any direct American intervention in the war. As the French free fall accelerated in late May 1940, Roosevelt and his chief advisers seemed to have concluded Britain would soon follow. Spurring this belief was Joseph Kennedy, the pro-appeasement American ambassador to the Court of St. James, who insisted the British had little chance against the Nazi war machine and would quit the minute the Churchill government folded. Roosevelt and his military advisers especially feared that the Axis might gain control of the Royal Navy and French fleet and add them to the Kriegsmarine and Italian navy. Such a force would threaten the U.S. Atlantic Fleet at the same time the Imperial Japanese Navy posed a significant threat in the Pacific. The United States had ramped up naval warship production in 1938, but the fruits of that effort wouldn’t be available until 1942 at the earliest. Thus, Roosevelt’s initial communications with Churchill urged the prime minister to send the Royal Navy to Canada to work in coordination with the U.S. Navy, if and when—emphasis on when —the British position collapsed. Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6Help HistoryNet by bookmarking to
            Tags: Historical Figures, Military Technology, World War II
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2 Comments to “Churchill Takes Charge”
What was Hitler’s attitude to making peace with the UK in 1940?
I offer the perpective of one British General and three German Generals, all primary sources.
(1) http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWwesternO.htm
General Harold Alexander served under General John Gort who gave him the task of planning the rear guard action that enabled the British Expeditionary Force to be evacuated from Dunkirk.
At Charleville, on 24 May, when the B.E.F. was absolutely ripe for the plucking, Hitler informed his astonished generals that Britain was ‘indispensable’ to the world and that he had therefore resolved to respect her integrity and, if possible, ally himself with her.
(2) http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWsealoin.htm
Guenther Blumentritt was interviewed about Adolf Hitler’s views on the plans to invade Britain in 1940.
Hitler was in very good humour, he admitted that the course of the campaign had been ‘a decided miracle’, and gave us his opinion that the war would be – finished in six weeks. After that he wished to conclude a reasonable peace with France, and then the way would be free for an agreement with Britain.
He then astonished us by speaking with admiration of the British Empire, of the necessity for its existence, and of the civilization that Britain had brought into the world. He remarked, with a shrug of the shoulders, that the creation of its Empire had been achieved by means that were often harsh, but ‘where there is planing, there are shavings flying’. He compared the British Empire with the Catholic Church – saying they were both essential elements of stability in the world. He said that all he wanted from Britain was that she should acknowledge Germany’s position on the Continent. The return of Germany’s lost colonies would be desirable but not essential, and he would even offer to support Britain with troops if she should be involved in any difficulties anywhere. He remarked that the colonies were primarily a matter of prestige, since they could not be held in war, and few Germans could settle in the tropics.
He concluded by saying that his aim was to make peace with Britain on a basis that she would regard as compatible with her honour to accept.
(3) http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/GERhalder.htm
General Franz Halder, diary (July, 1940)
13th July: The Führer is is greatly puzzled by Britain’s persisting unwillingness to make peace. He sees the answer (as we do) in Britain’s hope on Russia, and therefore counts on having to compel her by main force to agree to peace. Actually that is much against his grain. The reason is that a military defeat of Britain will bring about the disintegration of the British Empire. This would not be of any benefit to Germany. German blood would be shed to accomplish something that would benefit only Japan, the United States, and others.
14th July: The Führer confirms my impressions of yesterday. He would like an understanding with Great Britain. He knows that war with the British will be hard and bloody, and knows also that people everywhere today are averse to bloodshed.
(4) http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWsealoin.htm
General Walter Warlimont was interviewed by Basil Liddell Hart about Operation Sea Lion in his book The Other Side of the Hill (1948)
There is no doubt in my mind as to the long-cherished and almost guiding political principle of Hitler’s to come to terms with England, on a world-wide and lasting basis. Also I think it true that after the collapse of France he returned to this scheme – but far a short while only, and for the last time. It was during this short period, late in June and early in July, 1940, that he showed himself at first entirely unwilling and later on rather reluctant in taking up the problem of the invasion of England.
By Steven Scott on Dec 20, 2008 at 1:08 pm
A wonderfully written account. I especially enjoyed reading about Churchill’s response to the German “blind” bombing threat and the RAF’s retort.
Some mention might have been made of the German general, Cuderian’s role in the French defeat.
Rather than wait for the expected French counter attack, after his success in reaching Sedan, Guderian raised the curtain on the final act of the Battle of France. Hitler trembled: He feared the French would cut off that “outstretched finger” lying across the map one hundred and twenty-five miles westward. Halder scribbled in his diary, “The Führer insists that the main threat is from the south. [I see no threat at all at present!]. . . [The Führer] is terribly nervous. Frightened by his success, he is afraid to take any chance and so would rather pull the rein on us.” Halder was now – for a change – the audacious soldier, Hitler the nerve-wracked commander-in-chief.
Guderian threw a tantrum: He insisted on attacking west. After a furious back-and-forth, he was allowed to press onwards to the Channel by Halder. At this point, had the French possessed independent armored divisions and mounted a counterattack from north and south direct at Guderian’s flanks, as Charles de Gaulle would have done, the French would have won a stunning victory. Ten German panzers would have been trapped, but Halder, like de Gaulle, had the capacity to disobey. In a furious exchange with Hitler, he forced him to accept Guderian’s audacious advance to the Channel.
Finally, I agree with Steven Scott. Hitler’s racial politics exempted the Anglo-Saxons from the same hatred he directed against Slav, Gypsy, Jew, and Communists and all the rest. He was prepared to invent a co-dominion with the Brits: Hitler and the Third Reich to rule the continent; Imperial Britain the seas , her colonies and dominions.
Sources: Benoist-Mechin. Sixty Days That Shook The West. New York: Putman, 1963; May, Ernest R. Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France. New York: Hill and Wang, 2000
Horne, Alistair. To Lose a Battle. London: Macmillan, 1969.
By Richard K. Irsih on Nov 2, 2009 at 2:20 pm