Churchill Takes Charge
By Williamson Murray

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In a meeting with the French less than a week before they capitulated, Churchill urged them to at least pursue the option of guerrilla war, a suggestion Weygand rejected out of hand even though their ancestors had pursued precisely that course against the Germans during the Franco-Prussian War. Churchill underlined Britain’s intention to fight on no matter the cost. When Reynaud asked what the British would do when the might of the Wehrmacht fell on them, Churchill replied furiously, “Drown as many as possible on the way over, and then frapper sur la tête [strike on the head] anyone who managed to crawl ashore.”

That “certain eventuality,” as British chiefs of staff termed the Fall of France, became official on June 22, when Marshal Pétain’s government signed an armistice with Nazi Germany, ending the first phase of the conflict.

As France steadily succumbed, a new threat had reared its head: Fascist Italy. The worse the news was from France, the more obvious became Benito Mussolini’s desire to join his fellow dictator at feasting on the spoils of victory. The French leadership pleaded with its Allies to bribe “Il Duce” to stay out of the war. No one, Churchill included, recognized the incompetence that would undermine Italy’s ability to be anything but a drain on the Germans.

There had been an opportunity in late August 1939 to draw Mussolini’s regime into the war. At the time, Allied ground forces in Egypt and Tunisia could have savaged Italian forces in neighboring Libya while their navies drove the Italian navy into hiding. But Allied generals, admirals and politicians had been too pusillanimous to take the plunge. Chamberlain had actually raised the possibility of a preemptive strike, but the French and British chiefs of staff had talked the prime minister out of the idea even as the Blitzkrieg enveloped Poland.

On June 10, Mussolini made the first move, announcing from the balcony of Palazzo Venezia in central Rome to the bellowing multitudes below that Fascist Italy was entering the war on Germany’s side. Roosevelt summed up the move in a speech later that day at the University of Virginia: “The hand that held the dagger has struck into the back of its neighbor.”

In the week before the French quit, Mussolini launched a series of ill-planned attacks on southern France that resulted in tens of thousands of Italian casualties. Over the coming year the Italians would suffer further disastrous defeats at the hands of small British forces. But that was in the future.

As the situation on the Continent deteriorated, Halifax pressed Churchill to reach a deal with the Germans. The differences between the two boiled over during a May 27 cabinet meeting. The prime minister criticized France’s repeated attempts to drag Britain into negotiations with the Germans. “Under no conditions would we contemplate any course except fighting to the finish,” he insisted. Halifax suggested to colleagues that Britain should still entertain a German offer “which would save the country from avoidable disaster.” He pointed to Churchill’s own recent admission that peace might be possible should the Germans offer terms that would not compromise Britain’s independence.

As Halifax recorded in his diary: I thought he [Churchill] talked the most frightful rot, also [cabinet minister Arthur] Greenwood. And after bearing it for some time, I said exactly what I thought of them, adding that if that was their view, and if it came to the point, our ways would separate.

But there was never any indication Germany was willing to guarantee Britain’s sovereignty. And, of course, Hitler never had any intention of allowing Britain true autonomy. This would become clear in late June after Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Rab Butler slipped a message to the Swedish ambassador to London suggesting the British government was willing to deal with the Germans, should it receive any indication Hitler was willing to offer reasonable terms. Unfortunately for Butler and Halifax, who undoubtedly knew of the backdoor offer, the import of the message leaked out. Churchill sent a terse note to the Halifax, saying that he found Butler’s language “odd” and making clear that if push came to shove, Halifax would go the way Hoare had gone. The foreign secretary quickly replied that he had seen Butler’s notes on the conversation, and it all was a terrible misunderstanding.

Tags: Historical Figures, Military Technology, World War II

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