|
|
Churchill Takes ChargeBy Williamson Murray | Military History | 2 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post The issue came up again in early June, when desperate French appeals for air support led Churchill to re-approach the cabinet for additional air support. The most to which his colleagues would agree were three more squadrons of Hurricanes. Again Dowding spoke out strongly against the allotment, pointing out that between May 8 and 18, Fighter Command had lost 250 Hurricanes, with additional heavy losses among Spitfire squadrons on the Dunkirk perimeter. Subscribe Today
Churchill also had to address a looming technological issue. R.V. Jones, a 29-year-old Cambridge-educated physicist, had been recently appointed the Air Ministry’s deputy director of intelligence research. On the basis of fairly flimsy evidence, Jones determined that the Germans were planning to use intersecting radio beams for blind bombing at night or in periods of bad weather. Virtually the entire RAF senior leadership and many of Britain’s leading physicists dismissed Jones’ theory as sheer nonsense, unworthy of further investigation. Regardless, the matter went before the cabinet, and Jones was forced to defend his conclusions. No one in the room accepted his arguments—except the prime minister. Here Churchill proved his ability to divine what really mattered. Even if there were only a 5 percent chance Jones was correct, Britain could not afford to gamble. Churchill ordered the RAF to test Jones’ theory. Sure enough, on the second night of tests, an RAF aircraft equipped with sophisticated radio gear detected the German Knickebein (crooked leg) system. In the winter of 1940–41 the British were able to use countermeasures to distort the system, rendering ineffective most of the German night bombing raids at a time when the RAF had few other defenses.
May 20, the same day Churchill suspended further air reinforcements to France, the prime minister ordered the admiralty to begin gathering “a large number of vessels in readiness to proceed to ports and inlets on the French coast.” As the German drive curved toward Abbeville and the English Channel , the British were forced to consider how and when to save their army. The French showed no interest in preparing for any such evacuation from the steadily forming pocket. In fact, General Weygand, the new commander of the French army, seemed bent on creating a morass even the British could not escape. He proposed a major drive, led by units of the British Expeditionary Force, from the Allied left in Belgium to the south, where they would supposedly meet up with nonexistent French forces driving north. Here, Lord Gort, commander of the BEF, took matters into his own hands. Gort was not a great general, or even necessarily a competent one, but at the right moment he made the absolutely right decision. Initially, he was willing to launch a counterattack; a British tank attack near Arras had caused the Germans some bad moments. But now, facing a German advance toward his rear and with no significant help from the French, Gort ordered his forces to retreat to the channel coast. It was a decision of great moral courage that made possible “the miracle of Dunkirk,” enabling the British army to fight another day. Nevertheless, Gort’s decision caused Churchill great difficulties with the French. Weygand blamed the British for thwarting his plans to launch a counterattack. And now Allied forces were gathering along the channel coast to attempt the impossible—an amphibious evacuation of more than 300,000 men. To German and French generals, the channel was a realm where serious military operations simply did not take place. But in grand British naval tradition, the world’s oceans comprised a great highway. As Churchill was to say later, wars are not won by evacuations, but Dunkirk represented a great moral victory, one that Churchill’s magnificent oratory further magnified. Meanwhile, Churchill was shuttling back and forth in a desperate attempt to keep the French in the war, at one point suggesting to Reynaud a union of their two nations. But Pétain’s and Weygand’s infectious defeatism had spread, and no amount of Churchill’s persuasive rhetoric could dissuade the French leadership from its belief that all was lost. The collapse of French defenses along the Somme in early June forecast the impending fall of metropolitan France. Churchill urged the French to fight on from their territories in North Africa and elsewhere. But to French leaders like Pétain, there was nothing of worth outside la belle France. Moreover, they were convinced Britain, too, would soon fall to Hitler’s seemingly invincible legions. Or as Weygand put it, Britain would “soon have her neck wrung like a chicken.” Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6Help HistoryNet by bookmarking to
            Tags: Historical Figures, Military Technology, World War II
 |
|
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
||
What is HistoryNet?The HistoryNet.com is brought to you by the Weider History Group, the world's largest publisher of history magazines. HistoryNet.com contains daily features, photo galleries and over 5,000 articles originally published in our various magazines. If you are interested in a specific history subject, try searching our archives, you are bound to find something to pique your interest. |
From Our Magazines
|
Weider History Group |
Weider History Network: HistoryNet | Armchair General | Great History | Achtung Panzer! Terms of Use | Copyright © 2009 Weider History Group. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part without permission is prohibited. |
||
Loading ...
2 Comments to “Churchill Takes Charge”
What was Hitler’s attitude to making peace with the UK in 1940?
I offer the perpective of one British General and three German Generals, all primary sources.
(1) http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWwesternO.htm
General Harold Alexander served under General John Gort who gave him the task of planning the rear guard action that enabled the British Expeditionary Force to be evacuated from Dunkirk.
At Charleville, on 24 May, when the B.E.F. was absolutely ripe for the plucking, Hitler informed his astonished generals that Britain was ‘indispensable’ to the world and that he had therefore resolved to respect her integrity and, if possible, ally himself with her.
(2) http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWsealoin.htm
Guenther Blumentritt was interviewed about Adolf Hitler’s views on the plans to invade Britain in 1940.
Hitler was in very good humour, he admitted that the course of the campaign had been ‘a decided miracle’, and gave us his opinion that the war would be – finished in six weeks. After that he wished to conclude a reasonable peace with France, and then the way would be free for an agreement with Britain.
He then astonished us by speaking with admiration of the British Empire, of the necessity for its existence, and of the civilization that Britain had brought into the world. He remarked, with a shrug of the shoulders, that the creation of its Empire had been achieved by means that were often harsh, but ‘where there is planing, there are shavings flying’. He compared the British Empire with the Catholic Church – saying they were both essential elements of stability in the world. He said that all he wanted from Britain was that she should acknowledge Germany’s position on the Continent. The return of Germany’s lost colonies would be desirable but not essential, and he would even offer to support Britain with troops if she should be involved in any difficulties anywhere. He remarked that the colonies were primarily a matter of prestige, since they could not be held in war, and few Germans could settle in the tropics.
He concluded by saying that his aim was to make peace with Britain on a basis that she would regard as compatible with her honour to accept.
(3) http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/GERhalder.htm
General Franz Halder, diary (July, 1940)
13th July: The Führer is is greatly puzzled by Britain’s persisting unwillingness to make peace. He sees the answer (as we do) in Britain’s hope on Russia, and therefore counts on having to compel her by main force to agree to peace. Actually that is much against his grain. The reason is that a military defeat of Britain will bring about the disintegration of the British Empire. This would not be of any benefit to Germany. German blood would be shed to accomplish something that would benefit only Japan, the United States, and others.
14th July: The Führer confirms my impressions of yesterday. He would like an understanding with Great Britain. He knows that war with the British will be hard and bloody, and knows also that people everywhere today are averse to bloodshed.
(4) http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWsealoin.htm
General Walter Warlimont was interviewed by Basil Liddell Hart about Operation Sea Lion in his book The Other Side of the Hill (1948)
There is no doubt in my mind as to the long-cherished and almost guiding political principle of Hitler’s to come to terms with England, on a world-wide and lasting basis. Also I think it true that after the collapse of France he returned to this scheme – but far a short while only, and for the last time. It was during this short period, late in June and early in July, 1940, that he showed himself at first entirely unwilling and later on rather reluctant in taking up the problem of the invasion of England.
By Steven Scott on Dec 20, 2008 at 1:08 pm
A wonderfully written account. I especially enjoyed reading about Churchill’s response to the German “blind” bombing threat and the RAF’s retort.
Some mention might have been made of the German general, Cuderian’s role in the French defeat.
Rather than wait for the expected French counter attack, after his success in reaching Sedan, Guderian raised the curtain on the final act of the Battle of France. Hitler trembled: He feared the French would cut off that “outstretched finger” lying across the map one hundred and twenty-five miles westward. Halder scribbled in his diary, “The Führer insists that the main threat is from the south. [I see no threat at all at present!]. . . [The Führer] is terribly nervous. Frightened by his success, he is afraid to take any chance and so would rather pull the rein on us.” Halder was now – for a change – the audacious soldier, Hitler the nerve-wracked commander-in-chief.
Guderian threw a tantrum: He insisted on attacking west. After a furious back-and-forth, he was allowed to press onwards to the Channel by Halder. At this point, had the French possessed independent armored divisions and mounted a counterattack from north and south direct at Guderian’s flanks, as Charles de Gaulle would have done, the French would have won a stunning victory. Ten German panzers would have been trapped, but Halder, like de Gaulle, had the capacity to disobey. In a furious exchange with Hitler, he forced him to accept Guderian’s audacious advance to the Channel.
Finally, I agree with Steven Scott. Hitler’s racial politics exempted the Anglo-Saxons from the same hatred he directed against Slav, Gypsy, Jew, and Communists and all the rest. He was prepared to invent a co-dominion with the Brits: Hitler and the Third Reich to rule the continent; Imperial Britain the seas , her colonies and dominions.
Sources: Benoist-Mechin. Sixty Days That Shook The West. New York: Putman, 1963; May, Ernest R. Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France. New York: Hill and Wang, 2000
Horne, Alistair. To Lose a Battle. London: Macmillan, 1969.
By Richard K. Irsih on Nov 2, 2009 at 2:20 pm