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Churchill Takes ChargeBy Williamson Murray | Military History | 2 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post But Churchill’s political difficulties would pale in comparison to what he was to confront in the strategic and military realms. Subscribe Today
On May 10, 1940, the day Churchill took office, the Germans came west with a vengeance. Over the previous six years the West had lost every advantage it once held over Nazi Germany. Moreover, the refusal of Allied governments to undertake any significant military actions against the Reich since its declaration of war on Sept. 3, 1939, had allowed Germany to husband its strength for one great blow. That blow fell during Fall Gelb (Case Yellow), code name for the spring 1940 offensive. Though the Germans left less than half a dozen divisions along the border with Soviet-occupied Poland, the Soviets would stand by and watch the Western Front vanish. Germany held only marginal advantages in ground strength, but the Luftwaffe boasted air superiority on the Continent, as many of the Allies’ most advanced aircraft were committed to the defense of the United Kingdom. One lasting myth is that France collapsed before the German onslaught with little opposition. In fact, most French soldiers fought tenaciously: More than 100,000 of them would die pour la patrie during the Battle of France. Due to appallingly bad leadership at every level of the French military, however, their efforts were for naught. In March 1940, French commander in chief Maurice Gamelin, among the most arrogantly incompetent generals in French history, transferred the army’s main reserve from the Reims area, where it was ideally positioned to smash into the main German line of advance through the Ardennes, to the far west of the Allied line, where it was to play no significant role. On May 12, three German panzer corps arrived on the banks of the Meuse. Over the next three days, they achieved one of history’s most decisive tactical victories, which ultimately led to the Fall of France. Churchill’s first inkling of the unfolding disaster came on May 15, when, as he later recalled in his memoirs, he received a despairing call from French Prime Minister Paul Reynaud: “We have been defeated. We are beaten. We have lost the battle. The road to Paris is open. We are defeated.” The British immediately dispatched to France four more Hurricane fighter squadrons. The next day, as bad news continued to pour in, Churchill flew to Paris to meet with Reynaud and Gamelin. Churchill first asked in English, “Where is the strategic reserve?” and then in his appallingly bad French, “Où est la masse de manoeuvre?” Gamelin’s one-word reply, “Aucune!” (none), was an admission of strategic and operational bankruptcy. Churchill then faced the difficult task of bucking up a deeply discouraged French leadership that was certain of its pending defeat—a correct assumption at least as far as metropolitan France was concerned. That growing defeatism at the highest levels only deepened when Reynaud fired Gamelin, replaced him with General Maxime Weygand and recalled aged French Marshal Philippe Pétain from his position as French ambassador to Spain. Both soon participated in efforts to undermine the Reynaud government and seek an armistice with the Germans. Thus, Churchill also confronted the hard reality that Britain’s main ally was faltering in its willingness to pursue the war, while on the home front Halifax was insisting both within and outside the cabinet that the military situation was hopeless and Britain must cut a deal with the Nazis before it was too late. The most obvious aid the British could provide was to send further fighter squadrons to reinforce a French air force that had begun its rearmament far too late, was being badly battered by the Luftwaffe and was losing bases in northern France to onrushing German panzer divisions. But every squadron Britain sent to France diminished its own defenses. Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, the head of Royal Air Force (RAF) Fighter Command, vehemently resisted sending his squadrons to France. On May 20, Churchill, who unlike U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt was never to overrule his military advisers during the course of the war, bowed to Dowding’s strong protests. Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6Help HistoryNet by bookmarking to
            Tags: Historical Figures, Military Technology, World War II
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2 Comments to “Churchill Takes Charge”
What was Hitler’s attitude to making peace with the UK in 1940?
I offer the perpective of one British General and three German Generals, all primary sources.
(1) http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWwesternO.htm
General Harold Alexander served under General John Gort who gave him the task of planning the rear guard action that enabled the British Expeditionary Force to be evacuated from Dunkirk.
At Charleville, on 24 May, when the B.E.F. was absolutely ripe for the plucking, Hitler informed his astonished generals that Britain was ‘indispensable’ to the world and that he had therefore resolved to respect her integrity and, if possible, ally himself with her.
(2) http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWsealoin.htm
Guenther Blumentritt was interviewed about Adolf Hitler’s views on the plans to invade Britain in 1940.
Hitler was in very good humour, he admitted that the course of the campaign had been ‘a decided miracle’, and gave us his opinion that the war would be – finished in six weeks. After that he wished to conclude a reasonable peace with France, and then the way would be free for an agreement with Britain.
He then astonished us by speaking with admiration of the British Empire, of the necessity for its existence, and of the civilization that Britain had brought into the world. He remarked, with a shrug of the shoulders, that the creation of its Empire had been achieved by means that were often harsh, but ‘where there is planing, there are shavings flying’. He compared the British Empire with the Catholic Church – saying they were both essential elements of stability in the world. He said that all he wanted from Britain was that she should acknowledge Germany’s position on the Continent. The return of Germany’s lost colonies would be desirable but not essential, and he would even offer to support Britain with troops if she should be involved in any difficulties anywhere. He remarked that the colonies were primarily a matter of prestige, since they could not be held in war, and few Germans could settle in the tropics.
He concluded by saying that his aim was to make peace with Britain on a basis that she would regard as compatible with her honour to accept.
(3) http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/GERhalder.htm
General Franz Halder, diary (July, 1940)
13th July: The Führer is is greatly puzzled by Britain’s persisting unwillingness to make peace. He sees the answer (as we do) in Britain’s hope on Russia, and therefore counts on having to compel her by main force to agree to peace. Actually that is much against his grain. The reason is that a military defeat of Britain will bring about the disintegration of the British Empire. This would not be of any benefit to Germany. German blood would be shed to accomplish something that would benefit only Japan, the United States, and others.
14th July: The Führer confirms my impressions of yesterday. He would like an understanding with Great Britain. He knows that war with the British will be hard and bloody, and knows also that people everywhere today are averse to bloodshed.
(4) http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/2WWsealoin.htm
General Walter Warlimont was interviewed by Basil Liddell Hart about Operation Sea Lion in his book The Other Side of the Hill (1948)
There is no doubt in my mind as to the long-cherished and almost guiding political principle of Hitler’s to come to terms with England, on a world-wide and lasting basis. Also I think it true that after the collapse of France he returned to this scheme – but far a short while only, and for the last time. It was during this short period, late in June and early in July, 1940, that he showed himself at first entirely unwilling and later on rather reluctant in taking up the problem of the invasion of England.
By Steven Scott on Dec 20, 2008 at 1:08 pm
A wonderfully written account. I especially enjoyed reading about Churchill’s response to the German “blind” bombing threat and the RAF’s retort.
Some mention might have been made of the German general, Cuderian’s role in the French defeat.
Rather than wait for the expected French counter attack, after his success in reaching Sedan, Guderian raised the curtain on the final act of the Battle of France. Hitler trembled: He feared the French would cut off that “outstretched finger” lying across the map one hundred and twenty-five miles westward. Halder scribbled in his diary, “The Führer insists that the main threat is from the south. [I see no threat at all at present!]. . . [The Führer] is terribly nervous. Frightened by his success, he is afraid to take any chance and so would rather pull the rein on us.” Halder was now – for a change – the audacious soldier, Hitler the nerve-wracked commander-in-chief.
Guderian threw a tantrum: He insisted on attacking west. After a furious back-and-forth, he was allowed to press onwards to the Channel by Halder. At this point, had the French possessed independent armored divisions and mounted a counterattack from north and south direct at Guderian’s flanks, as Charles de Gaulle would have done, the French would have won a stunning victory. Ten German panzers would have been trapped, but Halder, like de Gaulle, had the capacity to disobey. In a furious exchange with Hitler, he forced him to accept Guderian’s audacious advance to the Channel.
Finally, I agree with Steven Scott. Hitler’s racial politics exempted the Anglo-Saxons from the same hatred he directed against Slav, Gypsy, Jew, and Communists and all the rest. He was prepared to invent a co-dominion with the Brits: Hitler and the Third Reich to rule the continent; Imperial Britain the seas , her colonies and dominions.
Sources: Benoist-Mechin. Sixty Days That Shook The West. New York: Putman, 1963; May, Ernest R. Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France. New York: Hill and Wang, 2000
Horne, Alistair. To Lose a Battle. London: Macmillan, 1969.
By Richard K. Irsih on Nov 2, 2009 at 2:20 pm