Charles Lee’s Disgrace at the Battle of Monmouth

By Noah Andre Trudeau | MHQ  | one comment  |  Print This Post  |  Email This Post

Foremost among the conservative counsel was Charles Lee, a man easy to dislike. Physically unprepossessing, even comical, Lee’s military credentials were solid, with service under both the British and Russian flags. Cast among the amateur soldiers of the American army, Lee exuded a superior air and condescending tone toward everyone, including Washington. For all this, he was a thinking man whose breadth of knowledge about warfare impressed John Adams, and whose commitment to the ideal of democracy was steadfast. His career through December 13, 1777, had been serviceable rather than spectacular. On that day, while in independent command of a portion of Washington’s army, Lee was captured by the British and held until exchanged in May.

Nothing in Lee’s character had changed during the interval, and there were some odd stories about his behavior in captivity that caused some to suspect his loyalty. It is ironic that among those gathered with Washington on June 24, Lee probably had the best grasp of the hazards of trying to do too much. Lee later wrote that the thought of embarking on an all-out attack on the British was ‘highly absurd,’ and that ‘the advantages to be gained by victory were not to be put in competition with the evils that might result from defeat.’

Washington decided to continue to harry the British column. His young aide, Alexander Hamilton, tartly observed that the results of this meeting ‘would have done honor to the most honorable body of midwives and to them only.’

Washington promptly began sending mixed signals. The long British column was already being plagued by New Jersey militia who were obstructing the roads and staging nuisance attacks. Washington now significantly upgraded those forces by sending forward a detail of six hundred select riflemen commanded by Colonel Daniel Morgan, followed later in the day by a second detachment of 1,440 picked men under Brig. Gen. Charles Scott. By these actions Washington seemed to endorse the harassment strategy. Within twenty-four hours he would dispatch a third force of a thousand men (like the others, drawn from the best soldiers in various units) under Wayne and would place all under the command of Lafayette — a posting that Charles Lee initially declined.

These sizable augmentations clouded the issue. If Washington’s purpose was to annoy the British, he was entrusting some valuable military assets to a relatively minor operation. If he intended bigger things, then there weren’t enough troops for the job. Lee, meanwhile, was having second thoughts about commanding the select troops and invoked his seniority to be placed in charge. Washington agreed, and to prevent any embarrassment to Lafayette, further enlarged the advance party with six hundred additional soldiers to justify Lee’s assumption of command. (Lafayette remained attached to the operation as a supernumerary.) This now-potent strike force of about five thousand men began concentrating at Englishtown on June 27.

It had become clear that the British march was aimed at Middletown, and beyond that to Sandy Hook. Clinton’s movement, while slow, had been steady, and on June 26 he had positioned his troops and wagons around Monmouth Courthouse on roads leading toward Middletown. Washington realized it was now or never, for as he later reported to Congress, ‘If the enemy were once arrived at the heights of Middletown, ten or twelve miles from where they were, it would be impossible to attempt anything against them with prospect of success.’

On the afternoon of June 27, after advancing the main Continental Army to within four miles of Englishtown, Washington met there with his generals. If he had hoped to clear the air, he failed. Those who had previously favored an aggressive action involving the entire army if necessary believed that Washington backed them. Wayne, for one, ‘understood that we were to attack the enemy on their march, at all events.’ Those who had cautioned against staking everything also heard what they wanted to hear. Lee was equally adamant that Washington expressed no ‘intention or wish to court a general engagement.’ The only thing agreed to by all was that the advance force would seek contact with the British on June 28.

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Tags: 17th - 18th Century, American Revolutionary War, Historical Conflicts, Historical Figures

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