Charles Lee’s Disgrace at the Battle of Monmouth

By Noah Andre Trudeau | MHQ  | one comment  |  Print This Post  |  Email This Post

The military situation for George Washington in the spring of 1778 was far better than he ever imagined it would be in the darkest winter days at Valley Forge. It started with the most amazing fact of all — that despite all the terrible suffering, the sickness, starvation, privation, desertions and intrigues, the army had endured. More than just surviving, thanks to the opportune arrival that winter of the determined drillmaster Baron Friedrich Wilhelm Augustus von Steuben, the Continental Army was the best trained it had ever been. Finally, the fact that France was now in the war meant that significant assistance would be coming.

In many ways it was equally amazing that Washington had made it through the winter of 1777. He had been beset by congressional carping over his failures to defend Philadelphia, dogged by the continued circulation of forged correspondence purporting to represent his unflattering views on the war, and his leadership of the army had been subtly challenged, with several successors waiting in the wings. Washington also knew that his habitually indiscreet second-in-command, Maj. Gen. Charles Lee, had described him as suffering from a ‘fatal indecision of mind.’

Washington understood better than most the symbolic value of certain military actions. The British movement from Philadelphia represented a chance to score the kind of low-risk success that could reap important morale benefits with both the Congress and the army, as well as improve Washington’s influence. There was danger too in such a move, for a serious reversal might damage Continental prestige well out of proportion to its strategic value. In the next days Washington would wrestle with the problem of finding the right balance between potential jeopardy and possible advantage. The evidence suggests that he vacillated between several options and that this uncertainty contributed to a dangerous rift among his commanders.

This sharp difference of opinion emerged in a series of war councils Washington convened during the campaign. The first occurred at Valley Forge on June 17, just before word arrived that the British were moving. Anticipating the news, Washington sounded out his officers about the best course to pursue. Everyone agreed that sitting still was not an option, though a majority felt it would be equally wrong to hazard a general engagement. There was a minority who believed that the army should press the British closely and punish them as much as possible. Prominent in this group was Brig. Gen. Anthony Wayne, already known for his aggressive tactics. The discussion became more than theoretical when solid intelligence reached Valley Forge that the British were marching east into New Jersey.

Washington immediately dispatched a token force under Maj. Gen. Benedict Arnold to occupy Philadelphia, while the bulk of the army moved on a northeastern track, crossing the Delaware River at Coryell’s Ferry beginning on June 20. The Continentals, unimpeded by a large baggage train, were often able to march in three parallel columns, but march where? It was still unclear to the Americans whether Clinton would push north to New Brunswick and Amboy before crossing over to Staten Island, or angle to the northeast to reach Raritan Bay, near Sandy Hook, and complete the journey by naval transports. Either way, Washington would soon have to commit himself to a course of action. The same question posed on June 17 was still on the table when Washington and his officers gathered near Hopewell, New Jersey, at 9 a.m., June 24, for a second council of war. Overhead, an eclipse of the sun was taking place. Whether that augured good or bad remained to be seen.

It all boiled down to how much the officers were willing to gamble. Several felt that the circumstances warranted a strong effort. Major General Marie Joseph Paul Yves Roch Gilbert du Motier, marquis de Lafayette, said it ‘would be disgraceful and humiliating to allow the enemy to cross the Jerseys in tranquility.’ ‘People expect something from us,’ argued Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene. ‘I think we can make a partial attack without suffering them to bring us to a general action.’ Anthony Wayne’s response when asked was a succinct ‘Fight, Sir!’

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Tags: 17th - 18th Century, American Revolutionary War, Historical Conflicts, Historical Figures

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