Capitulation of German Army Group South - July ‘97 World War II Feature

At last, General Gyldenfeldt sent for Samuell and told him that it was too dangerous to move at night. He requested Samuell to notify the American division headquarters of this change in plans. Samuell informed him that the platoon had lost radio contact with the division. He told the general that he had no idea why communications had been lost and that it did not appear to be the result of any maintenance problem with the platoon equipment; it was more likely an atmospheric or terrain problem.

Gyldenfeldt understood the urgency of the matter. He authorized the American platoon radio operators to enter the large German radio communication vans near the castle grounds to use the more powerful sets belonging to Gyldenfeldt’s command. The platoon was fully aware of the irregularity of such authorization. A high-ranking German officer was authorizing the enemy to go into one of his most sensitive installations with authorization to use any of the equipment to establish contact with the enemy headquarters.

Platoon radio operators, led by Dominic Morabito, went into the vans and discovered that German military radio frequencies in the area overlapped the needed American military frequencies. There was only one alternate frequency on which they could hope to contact the 71st Division headquarters. The platoon radio operators worked all night to establish contact using both the platoon’s am radios and the German equipment, but to no avail. Then suddenly, without explanation, contact was re-established with the 71st Division on the Americans’ own radios at dawn.

Meanwhile, late in the evening, Captain Bates tried to arrange sleeping quarters for the American guests. He worked overtime to secure beds for the Americans only to discover them asleep, with the exception of the platoon’s posted guards, either on their vehicles or in the German intelligence office.

Once radio contact had been re-established with division headquarters, the message of the previous evening was sent with the follow-up explanation that no move had been initiated because of the danger of encountering hostile German forces unaware of the platoon operating in their area. Gyldenfeldt notified Samuell that the generals would be departing Waidhofen around noon for Steyr, and that information was passed on to the 71st Division.

During the early morning, with the help of the radio operators (who had access to German radio communication documents) and taking into account General Gyldenfeldt’s comment that Field Marshal Erich von Manstein had been the unit’s former commander, the platoon established that they were in the headquarters of German Army Group South. This was the largest German field command still in existence on May 7, 1945. Army Group South consisted of four field armies, each numbering approximately 200,000 soldiers. Three of the four armies surrendered directly to the 71st Division. The fourth was swept up by the advancing Red Army.

After spending the night at the German headquarters, the Americans were convinced that this organization was fully capable of withdrawing in a southwesterly direction toward Berchtesgaden and establishing a redoubt defense in the mountainous re-gion. They appeared to have the know-how, morale, equipment and supplies to put up a formidable fight that could cost many American lives. It was extremely important to get these German generals to Steyr to surrender before they had any second thoughts. Later, Rendulic himself revealed that he had moved a force up the night before to attack the cavalry platoon, but at the last minute had decided against it.

Samuell agreed to provide Gyldenfeldt with a means of direct communication between the general and his staff. Rhatican’s section, with an armored car, would remain in the castle courtyard with direct access to the general’s operations officer.

The column of vehicles carrying the German generals left Waidhofen shortly after noon. When they arrived in Steyr, they discovered that the 71st Division headquarters had set up a very formal surrender ceremony; Maj. Gen. W.G. Wyman, the division commander, met with General Rendulic. From Steyr, the generals drove in their own staff car with an MP escort to the town of Reith, to meet with General Walton Walker, the commander of the U.S. XX Corps, which was headquartered there. Rendulic signed the Articles of Unconditional Surrender at 6 p.m. on May 7, 1945, with an effective date of one minute past midnight on the 8th.