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Capitulation of German Army Group South - July ‘97 World War II Feature| World War II | 0 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post Meanwhile, after the German labor battalion officers had left the area near the 1st Platoon, Samuell saw the shiny Mercedes Benz arriving with flags flying on both front fenders. The car stopped and out stepped Staudinger, followed by Captain Bates. Staudinger walked up to Samuell and Rhatican and informed them that there was a high-ranking general in the nearby town who wanted to surrender. The German captain then approached Samuell and stated that he represented the commanding general of the units operating in this area and that his general would like to see Samuell personally. Bates then described the demands that Staudinger had made. Bates added that Samuell would have to come by himself to see the general and that it could be of considerable importance to Samuell personally. He made it clear that something of major importance was about to take place. Samuell agreed to go with Bates, but he wanted Staudinger to accompany him. Bates agreed to that and then blindfolded the two Americans. The three men got into the Mercedes and rode back to the castle in Waidhofen. When they arrived at the castle, Bates removed Samuell’s and Staudinger’s blindfolds and then took the men upstairs to the general’s office. Bates made the introductions and identified the German general as Lt. Gen. Heinz von Gyldenfeldt, who they later learned was chief of staff of German Army Group South. Gyldenfeldt asked Samuell if he had the authority to accept a surrender. Samuell replied that he had no such authority, but that he was in direct communication with his division, which did have authority. Gyldenfeldt asked Samuell if he had met any resistance on his way east. When the American replied that he had not, the German stated that orders had been issued to all German forces west of the Ybbs River directing them not to fire on American forces unless fired upon first. The order had been particularly emphasized to the SS troops in the area. The general added that special liaison officers had been attached to SS units to see that such units conformed to the special nature of these instructions. Gyldenfeldt was most anxious that Samuell, or any other Americans for that matter, make no attempt to cross the Ybbs River to the east. Samuell assured him that the troops under his own command would not cross the Ybbs, but he could not answer for other U.S. forces. During the course of the discussion, another general entered the room. He was dressed in the same fashion as General Gyldenfeldt but was not nearly as impressive-looking. This other general, who turned out to be Colonel General Lothar von Rendulic, commander of Army Group South, entered the discussions and explained that the reason for keeping Americans west of the Ybbs River was that, if they crossed the river, they might be inadvertently fired on by German forces. Samuell also gained the impression that if American forces were sighted approaching the German rear it might create panic among the German forces confronting the Soviets. At the beginning of Samuell’s conversation with Gyldenfeldt, the general had wanted to know what Samuell was doing in this area of operations and started to admonish Samuell for not conforming to normal military courtesies by letting him know that his platoon was in the general’s area. But he broke off when he remembered that he was talking to the enemy, not an ally. Thinking that telling the Germans that the Allies on the two fronts were attempting to link up might compel them to surrender, Samuell told him that his own mission was to locate the Soviets. Gyldenfeldt asked Samuell if he had any idea where the Red Army was at that time. Samuell replied that he knew that they were west of Vienna, but he was unaware of the location of their lead elements. Gyldenfeldt informed Samuell that the Soviet lead elements were located in the town of St. Poelten, about 80 kilometers east-northeast of Waidhofen. By the end of that first meeting with Gyldenfeldt, Samuell had agreed to inform the 71st Division headquarters of Gyldenfeldt’s desire to arrange for a surrender and to request an American officer with authority to come to Waidhofen to accept it. Through Gyldenfeldt, Rendulic had expressed the desire for Samuell’s commanding general to come to Waidhofen, but Samuell informed them that it was unlikely that he would come. Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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