Pompey, meanwhile, planned a defensive war, raising troops to hold central Italy while using Rome’s fleet to bring his Spanish army home. Contrary to his boast in the Senate, few troops sprang up at the stamp of Pompey’s foot. He even had scant response from his own veterans in Campania, many of whom owed their farms and livelihoods to Caesar’s land-reform laws. When Pompey confessed to the Senate that he could field, at most, 30,000 men in Italy–all of them raw recruits except for Caesar’s two legions, which were politically unreliable–the patricians began to panic.

Subscribe Today

• Did you enjoy our article?
• Read more in Military History magazine
• Subscribe online and save nearly 40%!!!
 

Severing Pompey’s Spanish Forces
On January 17, Pompey ordered all senators to evacuate Rome or be officially deemed Caesar’s allies. He then moved Rome’s government to Brundisium on the Adriatic coast. By mid-March he had sailed from Brundisium to Dyrrachium in western Macedonia, leaving Italy–and Caesar–surrounded by his armies in Spain, Africa and Greece. Caesar moved through the peninsula with little opposition, pardoning his opponents after capturing them. Unopposed in Rome, he helped himself to the state treasury and raised additional troops, sending units to Sicily and Sardinia to secure Italy’s grain supply.

With Pompey temporarily out of reach, Caesar had two options: he could engage Pompey’s main army in Spain, or he could sail after Pompey and fight him in Greece before he could recruit troops from the east. Like Napoleon nearly 1,900 years later, Caesar chose to seek out and destroy his opponent’s main army. Leaving a detachment in Brundisium (now Brindisi), he took six legions to Spain. ‘I am going to fight an army without a leader,’ Caesar explained,’so that I can later fight a leader without an army.’

In early 49, Pompey’s Spanish army was divided, with five legions (roughly 30,000 men) and another 5,000 cavalry stationed in the north, and two legions in southern Spain. Despite their local superiority, Pompey’s northern force commanders made no efforts to block the Pyrenees when Caesar’s advance guard approached. Instead, they took up strong positions at Ilerda, and were soon besieged by Caesar’s entire army, supported by 7,000 cavalry.

In late July, the Pompeians attempted a surprise evacuation to positions south of the Ebro River. By forced march, Caesar’s troops overtook the retreating army, and dug entrenchments in front of and behind the Pompeians. Cut off from water sources and besieged in open terrain, Pompey’s commanders capitulated on August 2. Caesar took no reprisals and forced no one to take an oath of allegiance to him. He then sent two legions under Gaius Cassius Longinus to deal with Pompey’s forces in southern Spain, which also surrendered without a fight. Having neutralized any immediate threats from Spain, Africa or Italy, Caesar’s next objective was to engage Pompey in Greece, before he could train his raw recruits.

Caesar was right to be concerned. While he was in Spain, his rival had gathered troops from Asia, Pontus, Judea, Syria, Arabia, Palestine and Egypt–all places where the name of Pompey the Great was still respected. Pompey assembled his troops into nine legions, and could count on two additional legions from Syria, led by Metellus Scipio. Pompey’s total strength was roughly 36,000 infantry, with as many as 7,000 cavalry and another 4,200 archers and slingers. With his grain supplies from Egypt and Thessaly secure, Pompey assembled a fleet of 300 ships under the command of Caesar’s former co-consul and longtime enemy Calpurnius Bibulus.

By December 49, Caesar’s main problem was a lack of transportation. He had previously lost some 40 ships to Bibulus’ fleet, and had only enough transports to take half his army to Greece. Furthermore, the winter storms were beginning to blow through the Adriatic Sea, making any crossing difficult and dangerous. On the other hand, the storms kept many of Bibulus’ ships in port. Remarking that ‘the most potent thing in war is the unexpected,’ Caesar embarked seven understrength legions (about 15,000 men) with some 500 cavalry and supplies and sailed for Greece on January 4, 48 bc. His gamble was rewarded as he safely landed his troops near Apollonia. On the transports’ return trip, however, an alerted Bibulus swept down, destroying 30 ships and cutting Caesar off from the other half of his army.

Help HistoryNet by bookmarking to