British Aerospace Harrier

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The Falklands campaign demonstrated the difference in the mission requirements between the RAF GR-3 and the Sea Harrier. While the GR-3s performed in a ground-attack role in support of the landing force, the FRS-1s defended the fleet against Argentine air attack. In this, they were greatly outmatched in both speed and firepower. The Argentine forces flew the French 748-mph Super Etendard, and 863-mph Mirage III, plus 646-mph American A-4 Skyhawk. With the exception of the A-4, the Argentine pilots held the speed advantage over the slower 720-mph Harriers.

In air-to-air combat, the Harrier pilots only had one trick up their sleeves - a maneuver that could only be performed with vectored thrust. Borrowing a technique developed by the U.S. Marines in the Av-8B (the American version of the Harrier), the British Harrier pilots relied on a maneuver known as viffing, or vectoring in forward flight. Because of its high wing-loading, the Harrier is not as agile at high speed as are conventional fighters. But it does have one distinct advantage - its controllable-thrust nozzles. When enemy aircraft approaches from the rear in a dog-fight, the Harrier pilot at the most appropriate moment slams his thrust lever to the forward (vertical thrust) position and turns tightly away. The Harrier, with the nozzles now pointed down and away from the aircraft, almost stops in midair. It then falls away as the pursuer blasts by, and then pulls up and becomes the hunter.

A more decisive factor favoring the Harriers in air-to-air combat over the Falkands was the damage done to Stanley Airport by an Avro Vulcan bomber on May 1, 1982. It prevented the Argentine jets from operating from the islands. Flying at maximum range from the Argentine mainland, they did not have enough fuel to engage in dogfights with the Harriers for any appreciable length of time.

In the ground-attack role, the GR-3s of Number One Squadron, the only RAF Harrier squadron to participate in the war, demonstrated outstanding capabilities. Carrying armament that ranged from 30mm pod-mounted Aden cannons and Matra 68mm rockets to iron bombs, Number One Squadron flew sortie after sortie against ground defenses.

The best tribute to the Harrier’s capability lies in the fact that during the entire Falklands campaign only nine Harriers were lost, five shot down by ground fire and four due to accidents. None were shot down in air-to-air combat. Argentina, on the other hand, lost 31 aircraft to the Harrier in air combat with a further 30 destroyed on the ground by GR-3s.

Prior to May 1, many Argentines had dismissed the Harrier as a toy airplane. But their opinion changed after a number of encounters throughout the day. After several indecisive combats, first blood was drawn when Flt. Lt. Peter C. Barton of 801 Squadron from HMS Invincible sent a Sidewinder into a Mirage of Grupo 8 whose pilot, Primer Teniente Carlos Perona, managed to eject and despite his being injured in both ankles, struggled safely ashore north of Pebble Island.

From that day on, the Argentines referred to dark gray Sea Harriers as La Muerta Negra (black death) and concentrated their efforts solely on avoiding or speeding through the deadly screen of Harriers in their effort to take out the British ships. The Sea Harriers played a significant role in their ultimate failure.

The Harriers had finally proven themselves. But for all their remarkable attributes, the machines that fought in the South Atlantic had been almost obsolete in design when the war broke out. Vast improvements in aerospace materials and design techniques had taken place since the first GR-1 took to the skies. Composite materials and airframe bonding methods were replacing milled aluminum and rivets. In America, the McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Company had flown a new prototype Harrier, designated YAV-8B in 1978, that was vastly superior to the venerable British Aerospace design. But political and economic factors have a direct bearing on military expenditures for replacement items and Great Britain was in an economic decline. As late as 1988, the RAF and Royal Navy still flew the same aircraft that fought in the Falklands. Metal fatigue was setting in and replacement parts were running out. But late in the same year, a new machine began making a limited appearance in the RAF and Royal Navy hangars. The British Aerospace-assembled AV-8B Harrier II, now designated GR-5 by the British, began to arrive to replace aircraft assigned to bases in Germany. In all 60 aircraft were ordered, with options for more.

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