Battle of Thermopylae: Leonidas the Hero

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Xerxes was bent on adding Greece by force to what was, without exaggeration, the greatest empire in the history of the world to that date. His domain extended from present-day Pakistan in the east, westward through central and western Asia to Macedonia in the north, and across the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt in the south. It took roughly four thousand miles of roads to travel from one end of the empire to the other. The realm covered nearly three million square miles, which makes it about as big as the continental United States of America, and contained perhaps as many as twenty million people. Yet with an estimated total world population in 500 b.c. of only about one hundred million, Xerxes’ empire held perhaps one-fifth of the people on the planet. In comparison, Greece was tiny, covering an area of less than fifty thousand square miles, much of it already in Xerxes’ hands before Thermopylae.

In June 480 the Persians had begun their march on Greece from the Hellespont. Xerxes commanded a huge army of about 150,000 combat soldiers and a massive fleet of about twelve hundred warships. After passing through northern and central Greece, the army would head southward, capture and burn Athens, and drive into the Peloponnese and destroy the enemy’s resistance. Greece would become a Persian province.

That the Great King led the invasion of Greece in person should not have been a surprise. Xerxes advertised heroism in his very name: Xerxes is Greek for the Persian Khsha-yar-shan, the king’s throne name, which means ‘Ruler of Heroes.’ Tall and handsome, Xerxes looked the part. And he followed in the footsteps of Cyrus the Great, founder in 550 b.c. of the Achaemenid Empire (named for Achaemenes, the semilegendary founder of Cyrus’ clan). Every king since Cyrus had led an invasion, and every king had conquered new territory.

Xerxes had marched his army through the northern regions of Greece in Thrace and Macedonia and past Mount Olympus into Thessaly. He then led them into Central Greece, through Phthia, the legendary homeland of Achilles, and into Malis, where myth had it that Heracles spent his last years. Meanwhile, the Persian fleet sailed nearby, along the coast. The army halted at the pass of Thermopylae, which it found blocked by the Greeks. The navy stopped about fifty miles to the north, at Aphetae, opposite the Greek fleet at Artemisium.

The Great King hoped to win the war in central Greece. He planned for his army and navy to overwhelm the Greeks there through Persian numbers and Greek defections. But in late August, when the Persian army reached Thermopylae, the Greeks were ready for him.

Only about three dozen Greek city-states rallied to the cause of defense against Persia. Most of Greece either supported the invaders or sat on the sidelines. Yet Greece had several things in its favor, among them superb infantrymen, a competitive navy, brilliant strategists (especially the Athenian commander, Themistocles), and — in southern Greece — knowledge of the terrain. Farther north, as at Thermopylae, the allies’ local intelligence was limited. But did the Greeks have the iron will needed to stand up to Persia? That was the question that Thermopylae would test.

Formal defensive preparations began in spring 480, when members of the Greek alliance against Persia — the Hellenic League — met at the Isthmus of Corinth to chart strategy. Their plan had three basic elements. First, since Persia would attack both by land and sea, the Greeks would respond with an army and a navy. The Peloponnese would provide most of the infantrymen, since Athens would devote all its manpower to its big navy. Second, since Persia was attacking Athens via northern Greece rather than by island-hopping across the Aegean, the allies would mount a forward defense in the north. It was better to try to stop Persia there than at the gates of Athens. Third, time was on the Greeks’ side. For political reasons, the Persian king wanted a quick victory, and for practical reasons, the Persian quartermasters could not supply their huge invasion force for very long. Therefore the Greeks had an incentive to drag out the war until the Persians gave up.

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Tags: Ancient-Medieval, Historical Conflicts

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