When work on the upper fortifications began, a temporary outer line was established along some lower rises overlooking a stream and marshy ground lying west of the promontory. The outer abatis was run here from south to north. The northern end terminated at the shoreline, but the water on the southern side was shallow enough that worried officers extended the abatis some fifty yards into the bay. The rises of higher ground along this broken ridgeline became the sites for three triangular, open-ended artillery positions — called flèches — which were numbered consecutively from south to north. The rough ground between the outer and inner abatis provided protected spots for other guns, and one, the Three-Pounder Battery, was established behind the flches.

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The final touch in the defensive scheme came courtesy of the Royal Navy, which provided additional firepower off both flanks of the inner abatis. To the south a small gunboat took station, while to the north Vulture covered the shoreline. To further guard the land side against a surprise attack, picket posts had been established along the west side of the swampy moat. Although the 564 men who garrisoned the position represented less than half of what Washington later decided the fortress required, they were steady, veteran soldiers who would not succumb to panic.

Pursuant to Washington’s orders, Wayne completed his first reconnaissance of Stony Point on the evening of July 2. He pronounced the enemy position formidable, and rejected the prospect of a regular siege approach as too time consuming. Upon the whole I do not think a Storm practicable — but perhaps a Surprise may be Effected, Wayne noted, and invited Washington to join him in examining the layout of the target. Washington obliged and afterward, on July 10, sent a plan of attack for Wayne’s consideration that revealed him to be a solid analyst and a bold planner. Designating the Light Corps for the operation, Washington identified an approach along the promontory’s southern shore as offering the best chance for success. He proposed a party of picked men precede the column to silence the sentries and to open gaps in the abatis. The bayonet was to be the principal weapon, and to maintain the stealth of the whole affair the men were to march with muskets unloaded. Once the position had been taken, they were to turn the captured cannons on the enemy shipping and against Verplancks Point, which would then be attacked by another column moving along the Hudson’s east bank.

Washington also thought of small but vital elements of the plan. Knowing that defenders normally stand on alert at sunrise, when an attack was considered most likely, he suggested that the troops should move on the works at midnight rather than at the morning dawn. It speaks to the confidence Washington had in his new Light Corps that he unhesitatingly suggested a plan based on the most difficult military operation — a night attack.

The battle orders Wayne submitted to Washington on July 14 were essentially those he had received, with two important modifications. Instead of just one assault against the southern side of the position, there would be a second from the northern side. This wing would also provide an important diversion by sending one detachment with loaded weapons to demonstrate against the center of the enemy’s position, where the presence of a causeway made it most vulnerable. This small force was to draw attention to itself even as the strong columns closed from the north and south. Washington pronounced the alterations to be an improvement upon his own plan and approved the operation.

Secrecy was the overriding concern; if the British were alert and waiting, the Americans would be slaughtered. The hitherto separated wings of the Light Corps were quietly joined at Sandy Beach, near Fort Montgomery, for the July 15 march. A roundabout line of march was plotted to avoid observation of the strike force, the loose cavalry screen on the land side of Stony Point was tightened, and any inhabitants encountered during the approach march were detained until the action was over. It was a fourteen-mile trek along narrow trails, with the column often moving single file. The time was nearing 8 p.m. when the leading elements reached the staging area — the clear fields around David Springsteel’s farm, a mile and a half west of Stony Point.

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