Battle of Shiloh: The Devil’s Own Day » HistoryNet - From the World's Largest History Magazine Publisher

Facing the Union divisions was a Confederate force of four corps, arrayed in three distinct battle lines. The first rank consisted of Hardee’s 9,000 men. Immediately behind him was Maj. Gen. Braxton Bragg, with 11,000 troops. The third rank consisted of two corps, commanded by Maj. Gens. Leonidas Polk and John Breckinridge. Additionally, the Confederates boasted 4,300 cavalry and more than 60 artillery pieces. This force fell full-bore on the Union position about an hour after the first contact between Prentiss’ patrol and Hardee’s advance guard.

Johnston hoped initially to sweep up the Union left flank along the Tennessee River and take Pittsburg Landing, thus preventing a linkup with the Army of the Ohio. To perform this maneuver, he had to brush aside the initial Federal resistance and then move a large portion of his force to the river and up toward the landing.

In the heat of battle, the experienced Johnston made three serious errors. First, he chose a poor attacking formation. With his corps lined up, one behind the other, he lacked the ability to move in an orderly fashion, and the units soon became intermingled once they had made contact with the enemy. Second, Johnston badly misjudged the road coming up from Corinth; his estimation of the rugged terrain was not much better. The rough countryside and lack of good roads prevented the easy maneuvering of sizable forces toward the river, even if the enemy would allow such a movement. Third, Johnston underestimated the spirited resistance of the Union forces, many of whom were green as grass when the battle opened.

Grant, who was nine miles downriver at Savannah awaiting a meeting with Buell, was just sitting down to breakfast when he heard the gunfire coming from Shiloh. He immediately knew that the army was under heavy, if unexpected, attack. He ordered the advance guard of Buell’s force, Brig. Gen. William ‘Bull’ Nelson’s division, to proceed to Pittsburg Landing and be ferried across to reinforce the Army of the Tennessee. Grant then boarded his dispatch boat, the Tigress, and proceeded upriver to rejoin his forces.

Along the way, Grant passed Lew Wallace at Crump’s Landing and ordered him to put his 3rd Division on alert to join the main body, seven miles south. Wallace assured Grant that he had already done so. Then, shortly after 9 a.m., four hours after the initial contact had been made and three hours after the battle had begun in earnest, the Union army’s commanding general finally arrived on the battlefield.

Confederate forces crashed into Sherman’s and Prentiss’ divisions. Amid furious fighting, the two Union forces were driven from their encampments with heavy casualties. Many of the soldiers, particularly in Sherman’s division, broke and ran. Meanwhile, McClernand, seeing a hole open up between Sherman and Prentiss, rushed his 1st Division into the gap. In the rear, W.H.L. Wallace and Hurlbut funneled their forces to the right and left of Prentiss.

Grant reached the battlefield about 10 a.m. and held a hurried conference with Sherman, who told him that the battle was going well but that he was worried about running out of ammunition. Grant, wearing his full major general’s uniform, complete with formal sword and sash, assured the rumpled Sherman that he had arranged for more ammunition to be brought to the front. Galloping through the woods toward Prentiss’ position on a sunken wagon road in the center of the line, Grant was nearly killed when a Mississippi battery fired a charge at his group, a piece of shell striking his sword just below the hilt and breaking his scabbard and blade in two. After this, Grant never bothered to carry a sword in battle.

Grant told Prentiss to hold his position at all hazards–so long as Union forces held the sunken road, the enemy would not be able to advance to the river and fall on the army’s relatively undefended left flank. Prentiss replied that he would try. Grant returned to the landing and sent orders to W.H.L. Wallace and Hurlbut to hurry their divisions to the front. He then sent staff officers in search of Lew Wallace’s 3rd Division and Bull Nelson’s Ohio troops.

While Sherman and McClernand fell back along the left flank, W.H.L. Wallace, Prentiss and Hurlbut held the center. Gunfire was so intense along the sunken road that it was dubbed the ‘Hornets’ Ness.’ Again and again, the Confederates charged the formidable Union position, yelling like ‘maddened demons ‘ in the words of one Iowa opponent. Major General Braxton Bragg, directing the Southern assault, stubbornly and futilely kept up the doomed frontal assaults, even as they were blown back like scythed wheat by the storm of Union fire. ‘The flag must not go back again ‘ Bragg commanded, sending his troops forward again–but never in sufficient numbers to carry the fortified Union line.

Meanwhile, off to Prentiss’ left, Hurlbut’s troops took shelter in a 10-acre peach orchard incongruously in full bloom during the terrible battle. Albert Sidney Johnston, seeing his advance floundering along this front, rode into the fray aboard his favorite charger, ‘Fire-eater.’ Passing along the Confederate battle line, he clinked the men’s upraised bayonets with a little tin cup he had picked up earlier that morning. ‘I will lead you ‘ he assured the men.

The ensuing charge was successful, driving an entire Union brigade from the orchard, but success came at a high cost. Johnston, dashing conspicuously through heavy gunfire, had been struck behind the right knee by a Federal minie bullet. In the excitement of battle, the experienced soldier neglected the wound, calling out at one point, ‘They didn’t trip me up that time!’ But as the charge wound down, Johnston suddenly reeled in his saddle and fell into the arms of Tennessee Governor Isham Harris, who was serving as a volunteer aide during the battle.

Frantic efforts were made to save Johnston’s life, but they were unavailing. ‘Johnston, do you know me? Johnston, do you know me?’ Harris repeatedly asked. At about 2:30 p.m., the highest-ranking field general in the Confederacy died, having neglected a wound that almost certainly would not have been fatal with the proper attention. Ironically, Johnston had dispatched his own staff physician a few minutes earlier to look after the Federal wounded. And a field tourniquet that might have staunched the deadly flow of blood was found later in Johnston’s pocket.

Command of the Southern forces now fell to General P.G.T. Beauregard, who also realized that the Hornets’ Nest must be taken. He called a brief respite to organize his reserves and allow Brig. Gen. Daniel Ruggles to assemble a force of 6 2 cannons–the largest concentration of artillery then seen on the continent. This artillery opened a hurricane-like fire on the Union positions at a deadly range of 300 yards.

Hurlbut’s 4th Division fell back under the onslaught. W.H.L. Wallace tried desperately to lead his 2nd Division away from the deadly fire, but fell mortally wounded with a bullet to the head. With its command structure shattered, the 2nd Division simply fell apart, ceasing to exist as an organized fighting force.

This disintegration on his flank left Prentiss alone and sure’ rounded. Remembering Grant’s order to hold at all hazards, Prentiss fought on alone for two hours in the face of Ruggles’ cannons and the massed might of the Confederate army. But at 5:30, realizing further resistance was hopeless, he surrendered what was left of his command. Some 2,200 members of the 6th Division, considerably less than half the division’s original strength, went into Rebel captivity.

A lull now fell across the battlefield. It took time to round up all the Federal prisoners, and jubilant Confederates stopped to gawk at the enemy. Many had never seen a Union soldier– much less a general–being marched off in captivity. Some grabbed regimental flags from the 12th and 14th Iowa regiments and dragged them back and forth in the mud, while officers tried frantically to restore some sort of order.

Confederate units had become hopelessly mixed during the fighting at Hornets’ Nest, and Beauregard was able to rally only portions of two brigades for a final assault on the Federal left at Dill Branch ravine, a quarter-mile from the river.

There, the Southerners ran into solid opposition from Hurlbut’s troops and the advance guard of Buell’s Army of the Ohio, led by physically imposing Bull Nelson. The Federals were supported by heavy artillery from the gunboats Tyler and Lexington, which hurled 20-pound shells into the Rebel ranks. The shells did little actual damage, but the horrible shrieking noise demoralized many of the now exhausted Confederates. Beauregard called a halt for the night.

After the war, Beauregard was criticized by some Confederates, including the incorrigible Bragg, for missing a golden opportunity to win the battle outright. But Bragg and his supporters failed to point out that their own daylong failure to carry or flank the Union position at Hornets’ Nest had effectively doomed the Southern offensive. When Beauregard halted, his soldiers had been in battle for 12 straight hours, his units were disorganized and fresh supplies of food and ammunition had not yet arrived from the rear. At any rate, Beauregard believed he would finish off the Federals the next morning.

Grant, however, was through retreating. He had lost two full divisions, and the remaining three were down to halfstrength, at best. But 20,000 fresh troops from Buell’s command were in the process of crossing the Tennessee River on his left flank, and Lew Wallace’s 5,000-man 3rd Division, which had mysteriously failed to arrive on the battlefield during the long day’s fighting, at last arrived from Crump’s Landing, five hours behind schedule. With the added support of Union gunboats at their backs, the Union forces were now in a formidable defensive position.