Protected by the rugged terrain to the west, McPherson’s army moved toward Ship’s Gap with orders to proceed the next day through Snake Creek Gap, an undefended opening in the ridge 15 miles south of Dalton and directly across from the railroad crossing at Resaca. McPherson’s orders were to secure Snake Creek Gap ‘and from it make a bold attack on the enemy’s flank or his railroad …. Do not fail … to make the most of the opportunity by the most vigorous attack possible.’

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Thomas had devised the plan to attack through Snake Creek Gap nearly four months earlier. He wanted to send his own Army of the Cumberland striking through the gap at the Confederate rear. Thomas’ reputation for slowness, however, convinced Sherman to send McPherson-his ‘whiplash’-instead. Thomas, with his equally well-earned reputation for defensive fighting, was to hold the Union center and prevent Johnston from punching through Sherman’s own weakened lines to the railroad.

In retrospect, the Federal lines across the valley from Rocky Face Ridge were nearly as impregnable as Rocky Face itself, and probably could have been held by a much smaller force. True, the strike for the Confederate rear required speed and initiative-it also required (at least in the mind of its commander) more men than Sherman sent. Schofield later wrote, ‘Thomas’ position in front of Rocky Face Ridge was virtually as unassailable as that of Johnston’s behind it!’ He felt that half of Sherman’s infantry would have been ample for the ‘demonstration’ in front of Dalton. The other half could have been sent through Snake Creek Gap to strike the enemy rear. Of the 100,000 troops he commanded, Sherman sent 24,000.

McPherson moved through Snake Creek Gap and approached Resaca from the west. He brushed aside Confederate cavalry in the area and moved into the more-open country near the Oostanaula River and the roads into Resaca, which lay on the north bank of the Oostanaula at its junction with the Connasauga River. Johnston’s vital rail link at Resaca supplied his army at Dalton and Rocky Face. When he got word on the night of May 9 that McPherson had cleared the gap and was moving on Resaca, Sherman slammed his fist on a table at his headquarters and exclaimed, ‘I’ve got Joe Johnston dead!’ He was premature by nearly a year.

Johnston now had some 4,000 men at Resaca, including portions of Lt. Gen. Leonidas Polk’s 15,000-man corps, which was on its way to reinforce Johnston from the west. McPherson climbed atop a tree stump beside the Resaca road and viewed the Rebel defenses. Despite specific orders from Sherman and the urging of some of his own junior officers, McPherson decided against attacking the town. He was worried that Johnston would fall back so quickly from Rocky Face Ridge that he, McPherson, would be cut off from the rest of the Union army ‘as you cut off the end of a piece of tape with a pair of shears.’ Instead, he pulled his troops back to the mouth of Snake Creek Gap and dug in.

Sherman, who personally liked McPherson (as did Grant), later commented, ‘At the critical moment McPherson seems to have been a little cautious.’ That criticism could perhaps be directed against Sherman, as well, for sending too few men to do the job. Sherman conceded that McPherson had acted, technically, within his discretion as an Army commander. Still, when he saw his young subordinate, Sherman could not resist the pointed barb, ‘Well, Mac, you have missed the opportunity of your life.’

Johnston, at Dalton, apparently believed there were too few Yankees in the gap to threaten Resaca. He held on at Rocky Face for three more days, still expecting the main thrust to come from Thomas’ and Schofield’s Federals to the north. The men of these armies had been ordered to keep the Rebels’ attention riveted to their front-they did so gallantly and with great effect. One division from the Army of the Cumberland scrambled up the less precipitous northern end of the ridge and fought its way along the lower crest for nearly a mile. (The crest was so narrow that only four men abreast could pass along it.)

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