Battle of Nashville: Enemies Front and Rear

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Major General George H. Thomas, 48-year-old commander of the Department of the Cumberland, and Brigadier General James H. Wilson, the 27-year-old chief of cavalry of the Military Division of the Mississippi, sat huddled over supper at Nashville’s St. Cloud Hotel on the night of December 12, 1864. ‘Wilson, the Washington authorities treat me as if I were a boy,’ Thomas lamented. ‘They seem to think me incapable … of fighting a battle.’

That night, Thomas was a commander faced with too many enemies. A few miles south, Confederate General John Bell Hood’s Army of Tennessee stood on the outskirts of Nashville, where a winter storm had coated the hills with a paralyzing blanket of ice and snow. Thomas, meanwhile, was also besieged by demands from Washington, and from Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant’s headquarters at City Point, Va., to attack Hood or lose his command. ‘If they just leave me alone,’ he told Wilson, ‘I will show them what we can do.’ Thomas would be left alone just long enough to deliver on that promise, destroying Hood’s Army of Tennessee in the Battle of Nashville on December 15-16, 1864.

Events foreshadowing the fight at the Tennessee state capital began as Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman set out on his March to the Sea. To protect Tennessee from a thrust by Hood, Thomas was given command of a patchwork army of 29,000 men of the IV and XXIII corps under Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, along with 6,500 cavalry led by Wilson.

At Spring Hill on November 29, a Rebel trap nearly snapped shut on Schofield. But the next day at Franklin, 18 miles south of Nashville, Hood’s 30,000-man army suffered 7,000 casualties in head-on assaults against Schofield’s entrenched troops. Still, Hood continued to advance his army toward the defenses of Nashville, where Thomas was concentrating his forces. In addition to Schofield’s and Wilson’s men, plus 4,000 capital garrison soldiers, Maj. Gen. James B. Steedman’s 5,200 troops were marching from Chattanooga and 9,900 Army of the Tennessee veterans, led by Maj. Gen. Andrew J. Smith, were en route from Missouri.

The feud between Thomas and his superiors had begun percolating the morning of the Franklin battle. From Nashville, Thomas wired Schofield that Smith’s full force had not yet arrived, asking, ‘Do you think you can hold Hood at Franklin for three days longer?’ Schofield responded before the battle: ‘I do not believe I can. I can doubtless hold him one day, but will hazard something in doing that.’ Regarding Maj. Gen. Nathan B. Forrest and his 8,000 troopers, Schofield added, ‘I have no doubt Forrest will be in my rear tomorrow … .’ Thomas instructed Schofield to be prepared to march to Nashville.

On December 1, Thomas telegraphed Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, chief of staff in Washington: ‘I determined to retire to … Nashville … .If Hood attacks me here, he will be more seriously damaged than he was yesterday … .’ The next morning, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton wired Grant, the Federal general-in-chief, in Virginia, ‘The President feels solicitous about the disposition of General Thomas to lay in fortifications for an indefinite period … the President wishes you to consider the matter.’

The military styles of Grant and Thomas were simply at odds. It was Thomas’ men who had smashed the Army of Tennessee atop Chattanooga’s Missionary Ridge, but Grant fumed at the general’s caution. Nor was Grant alone. At the war’s beginning Sherman predicted, ‘[Thomas] will do it well — he was never brilliant but always cool, reliable, and steady — maybe a little slow.’

After Stanton penned his December 2 message, Grant prodded Thomas, ‘If Hood is permitted to remain quietly about Nashville, you will lose all the [rail]road back to Chattanooga … .’ Grant soon wired Thomas again and complained, ‘After the repulse of Hood at Franklin … we should have taken the offensive against the enemy where he was.’ Thomas explained that Schofield had retreated before an attack order could be delivered, and piqued Grant by explaining, ‘It must be remembered that my command was made up of the two weakest corps of General Sherman’s army and [much] dismounted cavalry … in a few more days I shall be able to give him a fight.’

By December 3 Thomas had positioned his infantry in entrenchments that stretched across the south of Nashville and touched the Cumberland River above and below the city. From right to left, Thomas’ line was occupied by General Smith’s troops; Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Wood’s IV Corps; the XXIII Corps, led by Schofield; and Steedman’s troops. Wilson’s horsemen crossed north of the Cumberland to refit.

Hood, with three battered corps, could not begin to envelope Nashville, but built a line stretching from the Hillsboro Pike eastward to near the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad and Murfreesboro Pike. Hood positioned the troops of Lt. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart on his left, Lt. Gen. Stephen D. Lee’s corps in the center and the corps of Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham on his right.

Despite his disadvantage, the only cavalry he kept with his force was Brig. Gen. James R. Chalmer’s division. Forrest’s two other cavalry divisions and some of Cheatham’s infantry were sent to threaten the Union garrison at Murfreesboro, commanded by Maj. Gen. Lovell H. Rousseau. Hood wanted to force Thomas to come to Rousseau’s aid and fight in the open. But Rousseau held out, and Thomas did not budge. The Union commander believed that Forrest commanded 12,000 troopers, nearly double Forrest’s actual numbers. Because of that, he continued to wait for Wilson to refit before moving on Hood.

Grant’s patience was worn out by December 6. He telegraphed Thomas: ‘Attack Hood at once, and wait no longer for a remount of your cavalry. There is great danger of delay resulting in a campaign back to the Ohio River.’ Given Grant’s direct order, Thomas responded, ‘I will make the necessary dispositions and attack Hood at once … though I believe it will be hazardous with [Wilson's] small force of cavalry.’

The next day Grant and Stanton exchanged gloves-off telegrams. Stanton: ‘Thomas seems unwilling to attack because it is hazardous, as if all war was anything but hazardous. If he waits for Wilson to get ready, Gabriel will be blowing his last horn.’ Grant: ‘You probably saw my order to Thomas to attack. If he does not do it promptly, I would recommend superseding him by Schofield … .’ Thomas, meanwhile, prepared, but his definition of ‘at once’ was curious. Wood recorded that Thomas intended to attack December 10.

On December 8, Union Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox penned in his diary, ‘Freezing sleet and snow, covering the ground with ice and making movements impracticable.’ Unaware of Nashville’s weather, Grant wired Halleck, ‘If Thomas has not struck yet, he ought to be ordered to hand over his command to Schofield.’ Thomas’ career hung by the barest thread on the 9th, a day during which 3 inches of ice-encrusted snow coated Nashville. Grant again wired Halleck, ‘Please telegraph orders relieving [Thomas] at once and placing Schofield in command.’ The orders were drawn, but before transmittal, Halleck informed Grant of the storm in Tennessee. Grant recanted, ‘I … suspend the order relieving [Thomas] until it is seen whether he will do anything.’

The storm provided Thomas only a brief reprieve. On December 11, when temperatures hit 10 below zero in Nashville, Grant telegraphed Thomas, ‘Delay no longer for weather or re-enforcements.’ Thomas could only reply, ‘I will obey the order as promptly as possible, however much I may regret it, as the attack will have to be made under every disadvantage.’

On December 12, aware that Grant might sack him at any moment, Thomas ordered Wilson, who had 12,500 cavalrymen, perhaps 9,000 with mounts, to return his horsemen to the south side of the Cumberland. At a council of his subordinates, he revealed Grant’s order to move regardless of weather, stated his determination to attack only when favorable and then asked opinions. Wilson, Wood, Smith and Steedman all agreed an attack was impossible. Most accounts leave Schofield silent, or vaguely concurring. That evening Thomas wired Halleck, ‘It has taken the entire day to place my cavalry in position … I believe an attack at this time would only result in a useless sacrifice of life.’ Grant remained unsympathetic and on December 13 impulsively chose a new tact, dispatching Maj. Gen. John Logan to Nashville. If, upon Logan’s arrival there, Thomas had not attacked, Logan was to assume command.

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