It may be that the Battle of the Little Bighorn is the most written about subject in American history. For more than 120 years, people have speculated about how Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer and five companies of the 7th Cavalry were overwhelmed in southeastern Montana Territory by a combined force of Lakota and Cheyenne Indians on June 25, 1876. Yet, the controversy does not appear any closer to resolution today.
A number of reasons have been given for the defeat: Custer disobeyed orders, disregarded the warnings of his scouts, violated the principles of warfare by dividing his command, was ambushed or was the victim of a conspiracy; internal regimental jealousies caused the defeat; the regiment was too tired to fight; there were too many raw recruits or too many Indians; the Indians had better weapons; or the Army had defective guns. Most of the conjectures are moot, for they can be debated endlessly–with intellectual and emotional biases interfering with reasoned arguments. Given the nature of the evidence, however, one should be able to study the role the weapons played in the battle's outcome with a modicum of objectivity.
During the battle, the 7th Cavalry troopers were armed with the Springfield carbine Model 1873 and the Colt Single Action Army revolver Model 1873. Selection of the weapons was the result of much trial and error, plus official testing during 187173. The Ordnance Department staged field trials of 89 rifles and carbines, which included entries from Peabody, Spencer, Freeman, Elliot and Mauser. There were four primary contenders: the Ward-Burton bolt-action rifle; the Remington rolling-block; the 'trapdoor' Springfield; and the Sharps, with its vertically sliding breechblock.
Although repeating rifles such as the Spencer, Winchester and Henry had been available, particularly in the post-Civil War years, the Ordnance Department decided to use a single-shot system. It was selected instead of a repeating system because of manufacturing economy, ruggedness, reliability, efficient use of ammunition and similarity to European weapons systems. Ironically, the board of officers involved in the final selection included Major Marcus A. Reno, who would survive the 7th Cavalry's 1876 debacle on the Little Bighorn.
The guns were all tested for defective cartridges, endurance, accuracy, rapidity of fire, firing with excessive charges, and effects of dust and rust. The Springfield was the winner. The Model 1873 carried by the 7th Cavalry was a carbine that weighed 7 pounds and had an overall length of 41 inches. It used a .45-caliber copper-cased cartridge, a 405-grain bullet and a charge of 55 grains of black powder. The best effective range for this carbine was under 300 yards, but significant hits still could be scored out to 600 yards. A bullet was driven out of the muzzle at a velocity of about 1,200 feet per second, with 1,650 foot-pounds of energy. The trapdoor Springfield could hurl a slug more than 1,000 yards and, with proper training, could be fired with accuracy 12 to 15 times per minute.
The Colt Single Action Army revolver was chosen over other Colts, Remingtons and Starrs. By 1871, the percussion cap models were being converted for use with metallic cartridges. Ordnance testing in 1874 narrowed the field to two final contenders: the Colt Single Action Army and the Smith & Wesson Schofield. The Schofield won only in speed of ejecting empty cartridges. The Colt won in firing, sanding and rust trials and had fewer, simpler and stronger parts. The Model 'P' had a barrel of 7.5 inches and fired six .45-caliber metallic cartridges with 28 grains of black powder. It had a muzzle velocity of 810 feet per second, with 400 foot-pounds of energy. Its effective range dropped off rapidly over 60 yards, however. The standard U.S. issue of the period had a blue finish, case-hardened hammer and frame, and walnut grips. The Colt became ubiquitous on the frontier. To the soldier it was a 'thumb-buster,' to the lawman a 'peacemaker' or 'equalizer,' and to the civilian a 'hog leg' or 'plow-handle.' The revolver was so strong and dependable that, with minor modifications, it was still being produced by the Colt Company into the 1980s.
Overall, the soldiers were pleased with their weapons. Lieutenant James Calhoun of Company L wrote in his diary on July 1, 1874: 'The new Springfield arms and ammunition were issued to the command today. They seem to give great satisfaction.' Although most of the men drew the standard-issue weapons, it was their prerogative to purchase their own arms. George Custer carried a Remington .50-caliber sporting rifle with octagonal barrel and two revolvers that were not standard issue–possibly Webley British Bulldog, double-action, white-handled revolvers. Captain Thomas A. French of Company M carried a .50-caliber Springfield that his men called 'Long Tom.' Sergeant John Ryan, also of Company M, used a .45-caliber, 15-pound Sharps telescopic rifle, specially made for him. Private Henry A. Bailey of Company I had a preference for a Dexter Smith, breechloading, single-barreled shotgun.
It is well-known that Custer's men each brought a trapdoor Springfield and a Colt .45 to the Little Bighorn that June day in 1876. Identification of the Indian weapons is more uncertain. Participants claimed to have gone into battle with a plethora of arms–bows and arrows, ancient muzzleloaders, breechloaders and the latest repeating arms. Bows and arrows played a part in the fight. Some warriors said they lofted high-trajectory arrows to fall among the troopers while remaining hidden behind hill and vale. The dead soldiers found pincushioned with arrows, however, were undoubtedly riddled at close range after they were already dead or badly wounded. The long range at which most of the fighting occurred did not allow the bow and arrow a prominent role.
Not until archaeological investigations were conducted on the battlefield during the 1980s did the extent to which the Indians used gunpowder weapons come to light. Modern firearm identification analysis revealed that the Indians had spoken the truth about the variety and number of weapons they carried. The Cheyenne warrior Wooden Leg went into battle with what he called a'six-shooter' and later captured a Springfield carbine and 40 rounds of ammunition. The Miniconjou One Bull, Sitting Bull's nephew, owned an old muzzleloader. The Hunkpapa Iron Hawk and the Cheyenne Big Beaver had only bows and arrows. Eagle Elk, an Oglala, started the battle with a Winchester. White Cow Bull, an Oglala, also claimed to have a repeater.
There were 2,361 cartridges, cases and bullets recovered from the entire battlefield, which reportedly came from 45 different firearms types (including the Army Springfields and Colts, of course) and represented at least 371 individual guns. The evidence indicated that the Indians used Sharps, Smith & Wessons, Evans, Henrys, Winchesters, Remingtons, Ballards, Maynards, Starrs, Spencers, Enfields and Forehand & Wadworths, as well as Colts and Springfields of other calibers. There was evidence of 69 individual Army Springfields on Custer's Field (the square-mile section where Custer's five companies died), but there was also evidence of 62 Indian .44-caliber Henry repeaters and 27 Sharps .50-caliber weapons. In all, on Custer's Field there was evidence of at least 134 Indian firearms versus 81 for the soldiers. It appears that the Army was outgunned as well as outnumbered.
Survivors of the remaining seven companies of the 7th Cavalry asserted that the Indians were equipped with repeating rifles and mentioned Winchesters as often as not. Major Marcus Reno claimed: 'The Indians had Winchester rifles and the column made a large target for them and they were pumping bullets into it.' Although some white survivors claimed to be heavily outgunned, Private Charles Windolph of Company H was probably closest to the truth when he estimated that half the warriors carried bows and arrows, one-quarter of them carried a variety of old muzzleloaders and single-shot rifles, and one-quarter carried modern repeaters.
The Winchester, in fact, was almost a duplicate of the repeater developed by B. Tyler Henry, who was to become superintendent at Oliver Winchester's New Haven Arms Company. The success of Henry's rifles ensured Winchester's success, and the primary weapon carried by the Indians at the Little Bighorn was either Henry's model or the slightly altered Winchester Model 1866. Both fired a .44-caliber Henry rimfire cartridge. The Henry used a 216-grain bullet with 25 grains of powder, while the Winchester used a 200-grain bullet with 28 grains of powder. Velocity was 1,125 feet per second, with 570 foot-pounds of energy. Cartridges were inserted directly into the front of the Henry magazine, while the Winchester 1866 had a spring cover on the right side of the receiver. The carbine and the rifle had a capacity of 13 and 17 cartridges respectively.
Even though the board selected the Springfield as the top single-shot weapon, the Indians' arms fared nearly as well in subsequent tests. The Springfields recorded 100 percent accuracy at 100 yards, but so did the Winchesters, Henrys, Sharps, Spencers and various muzzleloaders. At 300 yards, the Springfield .45-55 carbine's accuracy dropped to 75 percent, while the repeaters fell to about 40 percent. Weapons such as the Springfield .50-70 rifle and the Sharps .45-70 rifle, however, still produced 100 percent accuracy at 300 yards. At 600 yards, both Springfields could still hit the mark 32 percent of the time, while the Winchesters and Henrys were almost useless at ranges over 300 yards.
In effect, all of these weapons fared equally well at short ranges. The Army's Springfields had an accuracy advantage over the Indians' repeaters at medium ranges (200500 yards), plus they were more rugged and durable. The long-range weapons the Indians had were too few (there is evidence of only one Sharps .45-70 at the battle) to make much of a difference. Their preponderance of repeaters increased the Indians' firepower, but the repeaters were only good at short ranges. And the Indian narratives tell a story of a battle that, until the last desperate moments, was fought generally from long range (more than 500 yards)–a dubious advantage to the cavalrymen, since the relatively slow muzzle velocity of their Springfields meant a high trajectory that made chances of hitting anything slim.
Overall, the pluses and minuses probably canceled each other out. It has been said that the 7th Cavalry might have won had it still used the seven-shot Spencers it carried at the Washita battle in 1868, but the Spencers were no better in range or accuracy than the Henrys or Winchesters, and they carried fewer bullets. The contention that the Springfields suffered from a significant number of extractor failures was not borne out. Only about 2 percent of the recovered specimens showed evidence of extractor problems. Custer has been criticized for not taking along a battery of Gatling guns, but General Nelson A. Miles commented on their usefulness: 'I am not surprised that poor Custer declined' taking them along, he said. 'They are worthless for Indian fighting.' Equipping the cavalry with another type of weapon probably would not have made much of a difference at the Little Bighorn.
What, then, was the reason that the soldiers made such a poor showing during the West's most famous Army-Indian battle? While Custer's immediate command of 210 men was wiped out and more than 250 troopers and scouts were killed in the fighting on June 25-26, the Indians lost only about 40 or 50 men. The explanation appears to lie in the fact that weapons are no better than the men who use them. Marksmanship training in the frontier Army prior to the 1880s was almost nil. An Army officer recalled the 1870s with nostalgia. 'Those were the good old days,' he said. 'Target practice was practically unknown.' A penurious government allowed only about 20 rounds per year for training–a situation altered only because of the Custer disaster. And the 20 rounds of ammunition often were expended in firing at passing game rather than in sharpshooting. The 7th Cavalry was not hampered by new recruits, for only about 12 percent of the force could be considered raw. What handicapped the entire regiment, however, was inadequate training in marksmanship and fire discipline.
It is a perplexing incongruity in a citizen-soldier army, but the vast majority of soldiers, when the time comes to kill, become conscientious objectors. It has been asserted that man is essentially a killer at heart, yet recent studies have found evidence quite to the contrary. Men, soldiers or not, simply have an innate resistance to killing. It is fairly well-established that when faced with danger, a man will usually respond by fight or flight. New studies, however, have argued that there are two other likely possibilities: posture or submit.
It is the posturing that has increased with the introduction of firearms to the battlefield. It is almost impossible for a man to shirk battle when at arm's length from an enemy wielding sword or pike, but it is easier to remain aloof at rifle range. One has other options besides immediate fight or flight. The Rebel yell or the Union 'hurrah,' for example, were simply means to bolster one's courage while trying to frighten the enemy. The loud crack of the rifle also served the same purpose, filling a deep-seated need to posture–i.e., to put on a good show and scare the enemy, yet still leave the shooter far away from a hand-to-hand death struggle. In reality, those good shows were often harmless, with the rifleman firing over the heads of the enemy.
Firing high has always been a problem, and it apparently does not stem solely from inadequate training. Soldiers and military historians from Ardant du Picq to Paddy Griffith and John Keegan have commented on the phenomenon. In Civil War battles, 200 to 1,000 men might stand, blasting away at the opposing lines at 30 to 50 yards distance, and only hit one or two men per minute. Commanders constantly admonished their troops to aim low and give the enemy a blizzard at his shins. Regardless, the men continued to fire high–sometimes intentionally, sometimes without consciously knowing what they were doing.
In Vietnam, it was estimated that some firefights had 50,000 bullets fired for each soldier killed. In the Battle of the Rosebud, eight days before the Little Bighorn fight, General George Crook's forces fired about 25,000 rounds and may have caused about 100 Indian casualties–about one hit for every 250 shots. One of the best showings ever made by soldiers was at Rorke's Drift in an 1879 battle between the Zulus and the British infantry. There, surrounded, barricaded soldiers delivered volley after volley into dense masses of charging natives at point-blank range where it seemed that no shot could miss. The result: one hit for every 13 shots.
Indeed, it was at times even difficult to get soldiers to fire at all. After the Battle of Gettysburg, 24,000 loaded muskets were recovered; only 12,000 of them had been loaded more than once, 6,000 had from three to 10 rounds in the barrel, and one weapon had been loaded 23 times! One conclusion is that a great number of soldiers are simply posturing and not trying to kill the enemy.
At the Little Bighorn, about 42,000 rounds were either expended or lost. At that rate, the soldiers hit one Indian for about every 840 shots. Since much of the ammunition was probably lost–Indians commented on capturing ammunition in cartridge belts and saddlebags–the hit rate must have been higher. Yet the results do not speak highly of a supposedly highly trained, 'crack' cavalry regiment.
High fire very plainly took place at the Little Bighorn, most notably on Reno's skirmish line in the valley. Troopers went into battle with 100 rounds of Springfield ammunition and 24 rounds of Colt ammunition. About 100 troopers on Reno's line may have fired half of their ammunition toward the southern edge of the Indian village. The 5,000 bullets only hit one or two Indians, but they certainly damaged the lodges. A Hunkpapa woman, Moving Robe, claimed 'the bullets shattered the tepee poles,' and another Hunkpapa woman, Pretty White Buffalo, stated that 'through the tepee poles their bullets rattled.' The relatively low muzzle velocity of the Springfield meant that the soldier would have had to aim quite a bit over the head of an Indian for any chance to hit him at long distance. If the officers called for the sights to be set for 500 yards to hit Indians issuing from the village–and did not call for a subsequent sight adjustment–by the time the Indians approached to 300 yards, the bullets would be flying 12 feet over their heads. As a comparison, the modern M-16 round, traveling at 3,250 feet per second, has an almost flat trajectory, and the bullet will hit where it is aimed with very little sight adjustment.
The soldiers' difficulty in hitting their targets was also increased by the fact that the Indians stayed out of harm's way for almost all of the battle. One archaeological field study located the Indian positions and discovered that nearly every location was 300 to 1,200 yards away from the troopers. Given the distances involved, the fact that soldiers tended to shoot high, the lack of marksmanship training and the conscious or subconscious posturing involved, it is not surprising that the troopers scored so few hits.
Arguably, posturing has been a factor at every gunpowder battle, as it most likely was at the Little Bighorn–but how about submission? It was drummed into the common soldier that he should save the last bullet for himself. He supposedly would place his Colt to his head, pull the trigger and go to Fiddler's Green, rather than take the chance of being captured alive. Custer had even requested that his wife, Elizabeth, who often rode with the cavalry, should be shot by an officer rather than chance being taken by the Indians. As strange as it may seem, even with this dread of being captured, surrender attempts were made at the Little Bighorn fight. Indian accounts tell of white men who, at the last second, threw their hands up in surrender and offered their guns to the onrushing warriors. The Lakotas and Cheyennes were not swayed.
Given all these factors operating against the citizen-soldier, how could commanders ever go into battle expecting to win? The answer, again, lies not in the weapons the soldiers used, but in the soldiers themselves–and their officers.
Dividing up a command in the near presence of an enemy may be an act to be avoided during large-scale maneuvers with army-sized units, but such is not the case during small-scale tactical cavalry maneuvers. Custer adhered to the principles for a successful engagement with a small, guerrilla-type, mobile enemy. Proven tactics called for individual initiative, mobility, maintaining the offensive, acting without delay, playing not for safety but to win, and fighting whenever the opportunity arose. It was accepted that Regular soldiers would never shirk an encounter even with a superior irregular force of enemies, and that division of force for an enveloping attack combined with a frontal assault was a preferable tactic. On a small scale, and up to a certain point, Custer did almost everything he needed to do to succeed.
Problems arose, however, when tactics broke down from midlevel and small-scale, to micro-scale. According to then Brevet Major Edward S. Godfrey, fire discipline–the ability to control and direct deliberate, accurate, aimed fire–will decide every battle. No attack force, however strong, could reach a defensive line of steady soldiers putting out disciplined fire. The British army knew such was the case, as did Napoleon. Two irregular warriors could probably defeat three soldiers. However, 1,000 soldiers could probably beat 2,000 irregulars. The deciding factor was strength in unity–fire discipline. It was as Major Godfrey said: 'Fire is everything, the rest is nothing.'
Theoretically, on the Little Bighorn, with a small-scale defense in suitable terrain with an open field of fire of a few hundred yards, several companies of cavalrymen in close proximity and under strict fire control could have easily held off two or three times their number of Indian warriors. In reality, on the Little Bighorn, several companies of cavalrymen who were not in close proximity and had little fire control, with a micro-scale defense in unsuitable, broken terrain, could not hold off two or three times their number of Indian warriors.
The breakdown stems from an attitude factor. Custer exhibited an arrogance, not necessarily of a personal nature, but rather as a part of his racial makeup. Racial experience may have influenced his reactions to the immediate situation of war. It was endemic in red vs. white modes of warfare and implies nothing derogatory to either side. Historically, Indians fled from large bodies of soldiers. It was Custer's experience that it was much harder to find and catch an Indian than to actually fight him. Naturally influenced by his successful past experiences with small-unit tactics, Custer attacked. He was on the offensive. He knew he must remain on the offensive to be successful. Even after Reno had been repulsed, Custer was maneuvering, looking for another opportunity to attack.
The positions that Custer's dead were found in did not indicate a strong defensive setup. Even after the Indians had taken away the initiative, Custer's mind-set was still on 'attack.' Although a rough, boxlike perimeter was formed, it appeared more a matter of circumstance than intent. Custer probably never realized that his men's very survival was on the line, at least not until it was too late to remedy the situation. The men were not in good defensible terrain. They were not within mutual supporting distance. They were not under the tight fire control of their officers. Custer's troopers were in detachments too small for a successful tactical stance. When the critical point was reached, the soldiers found themselves stretched beyond the physical and psychological limits of fight or posture–they had to flee or submit.
Seemingly out of supporting distance of his comrades, the individual trooper found himself desperately alone. The 'bunkie' was not close enough. The first sergeant was far away. The lieutenant was nowhere to be seen. The trooper responded as well as he could have been expected to. He held his ground and fought, he fired into the air like an automaton, he ran, he gave up. Some stands were made, particularly on and within a radius of a few hundred yards of the knoll that became known as Custer Hill, where almost all of the Indian casualties occurred. When it came down to one-on-one, warrior versus soldier, however, the warrior was the better fighter.
George Armstrong Custer may have done almost everything as prescribed. But it was not enough to overcome the combination of particular circumstances, some of his own making, arrayed against him that day. Inadequate training in marksmanship and poor fire discipline resulting from a breakdown in command control were major factors in the battle results. Neither Custer's weapons nor those the Indians used against him were the cause of his defeat.
This article was written by Greg Michno and originally appeared in the June 1998 issue of Wild West. For more great articles be sure to subscribe to Wild West magazine today!
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One of the best analyses of Custer's defeat I have ever read. Kudos to author Michno and Wild West magazine.
IN THE BOOK CUSTERS FALL BY DAVID HUMPHREYS MILLER. HE STATES THAT CUSTER WAS SHOT BY WHITE COW BULL AT MEDICINE TAIL COULEE.THIS WOULD GO SOME WAY TO EXPLAINING WHY INSTEAD OF CROSSING MTC THE TROOPS RETREATED BACK UP THE HILL WHEN IT SEEMED AS IF THE INDIAN VILLAGE AT THAT TIME WAS ONLY LIGHTLY DEFENDED.I WONDER WHAT VIEWS THERE ARE ON THIS
I understand that Custer's woulds would have been instantly fatal, according to the field autopsy. S he was not 'assisted back in the saddle' as the Indian said.
Certainly his being wounded as they tried to cross might have discouraged them from going on. More likely though, they just realised they would not be able to cross in the face of increasing fire.
I also understand that there were three other officers were wearing buckskin, so it might have been one of them who was shot. The adjutant, Major Cook, likely would have been near Custer on the probe.
I love this info that is put up, I even choose this website for nhd (National
History Day
what kind of weapons use the Indians against the 7m Cavalry & General Custer?
The original Springfield Rifle adopted by the army was not .45 caliber. It was a .50. Also the ammunition issued for the .45 jammed notoriously and was a factor in the battle. you might want to check these facts out to your satisfaction and posting improvement.
Paul,
You need to read the 1985-85 archaeolgical report at Little Bighorn. Jamming of weapons was more prevalent among the Sioux and Cheyenne weapons than it was for U.S. Army Springfields.
Crook's 15 cavalry companies expended approximately 80,000 rounds of .45/55 ammunition aat the Rosebud on 17 June 1876 but experienced little to no documented jamming.
Custer was beat in a straight-up engagement. Bested by warriors who fought better than his immediate command. No excuses for his defeat are needed. He lost because the Sioux/Cheyenne won.
Jeff: You need to look further and deeper than a archalogical report on a picked over battlefield. There are several books on the .45-70 and its overly soft copper case heads. The key word is REPORTED/DOCUMENTED jamming! Jammed springfiields were prevalent at the Battle of the Little Big Horn. Numerous busted pocket knives found of troopers trying to clear jams. Numerous indian's reported trooper fighting with jammed trapdoors. They also reported throwing many jammed rifles into the river as they were useless. Perhaps 6 or 7 cases with blown heads. Only a small portion of what had occurred. Right after the battle Army Ordinance changed the ammunition and covered up the incident much like they did with the M16 in Vietnam!
Do not just be a reader of men's viewpoints, be a researcher. The LBH was not a stand up fight, and the indian's did not fight better than the soldiers. Custer broke his command into three sections, did not wait for the second half of his detachment, and went glory hunting on his own. Three small units, jamming carbines, hordes of indian's. The results were predictable. This hardly makes great stand-up fighters of the indian's.
There is considerable evidence to suggest the indians lost a far greater number than is accepted by dogma. In fact they may have actually lost thousands but that is politically not acceptable.
Whatever is finally said, the fact is it was the last great battle for the plains indian's. Other than the Nez Peirce conflict the plains indian's were destroyed. I hardly think losing only 33 indian's would have caused that!
Yes, the early .45-70 ammunition was unreliable and cost many lives. Were it not for the Colt .45 the loses would likely have been much higher.
Custer was an incompetent and would have been courtsmartialed had he survived. DO NOT BE A READER, BE A RESEARCHER!
Custer and the 7th cavalry were demolished by Dakota fighting tactics. General Crook was also defeated at the Battle of Rosebud days prior to the Little Bighorn. The U.S Cavalry fought in skirmish lines just as they did during the Civil War. Who in their right mind fights like that?…The Dakota were masters at prairie battle tactics and used camoflage. Read the officers accounts of the Battle of the Rosebud. The U.S officers had no idea how fight against the Dakotas. They relied on Crow scouts to reveal tactics and positions.
Your image of the Dakota warrior is based on hollywood movies. The U.S never defeated the Dakota in battle.
I agree with the view that the most plausible (and imo, ONLY) explanation for the flow of the battle and command suddenly going from offense to defense after the MTC crossing is that Custer was mortally shot at that point, rather then sitting uphill and watching Yates charge the village (which totally contradicts Custer's charatcter and command expectations of the time of having the Genreal at the head of the command) or sending Yates to reconnoiter the village, which was lightly defended but yet not attacked. My only puzzle with this theory is was Surgeon Lord's body was not found by last stand hill but rather with E/F further down towards the River. It would make sense that he would have stayed close to wounded Custer unless of course Custer was dead and nothing could be done for him. Weopon jamming could explain the sudden onset of despair evident by the seeming widespread evidence of suicide pacts (frequent occurance of two paired markers) . Salute.
Mike; Rather than refer back to my books I think I will just answer off the top of my head. As I remember Custer was reported as having three wounds on his body. One through the right chest, one creasing the head and one some where else of a minor nature. I probably should do the research to renew my memory! The point I am attempting to make is should he have been shot through the chest at the river, by the time he reached LSH he could have bleed out by the time he got there. A good possibility. This of course, is only theory
At the Battle of the Rosebud Gen. Crooks account never mentions any jamming of the Springfield's during extensive ammunition expenditure that I can remember. Your own conclusions can be drawn from this. Crook was primarily saved by his own indian allies.
The paired markers is a myth caused by the fact that markers meant for the Reno-Benteen battlefield were mistakenly placed on the Custer field. When the markers were placed, the were put in locations of "depressions" and "rank" vegetation. During the earlier burials earth was scraped up on either side of a body and piled on it. Resulting in two depressions next to one another. Two markers were therefore mistakenly placed where only one should have been and others to mark where horses might have fallen.
This has been supported by subsequent excavations at paired markers where only the disarticulated remains of one individual have been found. Still at others, the markers were offset from the remains and only part of the remains were recovered for reburial leaving as much as half or more in place. This says something about the dedication of the burial details and or the Montana summer heat.
Bottom line is these myths need to stop being repeated in the face of verifiable historical and scientific fact.
Suicide pacts indeed….
I am somewhat at a loss as to what Keith means by paired markers. The only conclusion i can draw is he means a paired marker indicates two soldiers each shot themselves rather than be captured. Or two soldiers fell near each other.
If this is so, I would not be so quick to scoff at suicide pacts. This was an situation where "save the last bullet for yourself" had real meaning. These soldiers were fighting a stone age Asian society where torture was freely practiced on their enemies. Being captured alive meant being skinned or burned alive or some similar end. Some Indian biographies note that quite a few soldiers shot themselves when they ran out of ammunition or their rifles jammed (look it up!).
So scoffing at suicide pacts is not an objective evaluation of this particular situation and is a personal opinion unsupported by any evidence.
Lakota and Cheyenne warriors were generally quick killers and didn't go in for a lot of torture, though they certainly mutilated the dead afterwards. When Fanny Kelly was captured by the Lakota in 1864, they dragged her off into a teepee — and made them teach her how to read. She appears never to have been raped and when she owned a house in Washington she invited any Lakota who showed up with his wife to stay over. Perhaps the greatest myth of the American West is that Indians were "savages" who did all sorts of terrible things without the slightest provocation. This is hokum. Their most frequent initial response to white people was curiosity, sometimes followed by hospitality. Even when wars were in progress, Catholic priests and Quakers could circulate among the Plains tribes without fear because they were holy men who presented no threat. Once Episcopal Bishop Henry Whipple, visiting Lakota friends, got up on a cold night to bring his saddle into the teepee to prevent theft. "You didn't have to do that," his Lakota host told him. "You're the only white man around for 50 miles…."
It is always interesting to see the innocent try to re-write history. Modern historians and pre-occupied supporters of equality try to portray the American Indian as the gentle noble native. The truth of course, is they were asian stone-age savages. This is not a denegration, it is merely the truth. They had a penchant for war and torture. Despite all the modern nay-sayers all of the 19th century and early 20th century books on their lives and culture detail this.
Fanny Kelly's capture and captive life was brutal and savage. She details how a number of times different indians tried to murder her only to be stopped by another. Whether she was raped or not we only have her word on that. The indians regularly scalped women and small children. Skinning alive and burning at the stake was a common end for captives.
Did whites practice brutality against the indians? They certainly did. History is filled with the details. Did the whites practice ethnic cleansing? To a degree they certainly did.
Were clerics exempt? Only ocassionally, and usually based on personal relationships.
Before people yell "Hokum", read your history books, don't try to make up history as you wish it was.
I found the reading of this article and most of the comments a waste of time, although there were a couple of things that were gotten right.
[...] What, then, was the reason that the soldiers made such a poor showing during the West's most famous Army-Indian battle? While Custer's immediate command of 210 men was wiped out and more than 250 troopers and scouts were killed in the fighting on June 25-26, the Indians lost only about 40 or 50 men. The explanation appears to lie in the fact that weapons are no better than the men who use them. Marksmanship training in the frontier Army prior to the 1880s was almost nil. An Army officer recalled the 1870s with nostalgia. 'Those were the good old days,' he said. 'Target practice was practically unknown.' A penurious government allowed only about 20 rounds per year for training–a situation altered only because of the Custer disaster. http://www.historynet.com/battle-of-little-bighorn-were-the-weapons-the-deciding-factor.htm/2 [...]
Re: Norplains
Some people find reading Caesars commentaries and Shakespeare a waste of time. Norplains displays his total inability to comprehend even the basics of history! It is to bad that this site does not seem to attract any serious students of history. Much could be gained in exchanges of the educated. Should anyone really wish to discus the part the Springfield played in the defeat of Custer first they should research the M-16 in Vietnam and how many soldiers got killed with the improper ammunition issued, then they would have some background to understand the part the rifles Custer was armed with in his defeat. I invite any proper discussion on the topic.
Different weapons may not have changed the battles outcome but a different Regimental C.O would!!
Weapon wise I believe it possible that more Springfields did jam than noted, I venture that a weapon is more likely to cease on continual, sustained fire, in the last moments of the battle the troopers would have had no time to clear blockages and the guns became clubs, perhaps where the talk of troopers holding up their guns has been mentioned, was a misinterpretation of this?
Regarding accuracy, anyone who has been in rolling hill and countryside knows how difficult it is to range something? Even with effective fire discipline, it meant that the 'ranging' officer had to get it right. Were all officers effective in this way? I know the Brit Army liked to set up range markers, like in Zulu Dawn lol, to make fire more effective, obviously not something a cavalry unit would be doing!!!
I see the Little Big Horn as two separate brigade commander mindsets; Reno/Benteen's defensive 'wait for help or it to stop' process or Custer's more aggressive process. One process led to a draw at best…the other led to Custer's defeat.
Paul,
with all due respect I'd suggest you get off your high horse and accept the fact that the US army lost this battle. If it feels better to claim thousands of Indians died rather than the accepted 33 warriors (names of the dead were chanted following battles for a significant time) then by all means do so, it's a free country. But to that those of us who insist on historical accuracy are being "politically correct" is an ignorant statement.
The US army lost this one. It happened 134 years ago. get over it.
Paul et al,
ignore the previous entry. I'd assumed you were merely a strong supporter of the US military. Asian stone age savages?
You're not a military supporter. You're a garden-variety mean spirited asshole.
Sirs: In order;
Gish- The jamming of the new Springfield .45-70 copper cased cartridges is a matter of historical accuracy.It is a known technological fact despite the army attempting a cover up and changing to the harder brass case immediately after the battle.
Osori – Your sheeplike acceptance of the low numbers of indian casualties is indicative of the close minded shallow researcher.This not the place to fully discuss this. If you carefully research the amount of ammunition used and the ranges fired at coupled with the fact the plains indians were a broken force afterwards you cvannot arrive at any other conclusion than there was a massive loss of indian soldiers. Oh I don't think my horse is any higher than yours!
Osori – Again, the plain fact is the indians were indeed stone age tribes emigrated from asia. This is a fact rather than what you appear to interprept as a denegration.You sir, are attempting to play the race card with a foul mouth! SHAME ON YOU!
I'm reading "Five Years a Cavalryman" about service on the Texas frontier 1866-71. They were armed with the Spencer carbine, a reliable 7-shot repeater used with good effect in the Civil War.
It's too bad Custer's men were fighting with single-shot carbines. I don't think there's any doubt from the archeological evidence that the 7th Cavalry were outgunned at Little Bighorn. I wouldn't be surprised by a bad ammo problem in light of Ordinance's record.
Maybe a year ago I read the latest book based on digging over the Custer battlefield (sorry, can't name it). What I remember is how Custer kept subdividing his troops to hit the Indian camp from south, middle and north. Custer was fixated on the idea that the Indians would run and he needed to trap them.
When the Indians came boiling out to fight, Custer's command began to disintegrate and didn't regroup effectively.
The author suggested from the uneven evidence of heavy defensive fire (including revolvers) that a good number of the cavalrymen succumbed to panic.
Besides not arming soldiers well, the U.S. Army for a long time didn't train recruits usefully either.
I'm curious how many thousands of years a people needs to live in one place before they're natives. In fact, we're all Africans, if you want to go back far enough, right?
To the general readership: I have been disappointed with the general shallow and very narrow interest of readers replies. One guy is a indian and only interested in his race baloney, another guy pretends to be a intellectual trying to claim the hardened soldier all panicked and also plays a weak race card.
The facts are the Springfield jammed after a few shots and was often unusable. The reason for this was the new 45-70 used a soft copper case like the lower pressure, reliable 50-70. After some minimal fouling the case tended to stick in the chamber and the extractor cut through the rim leaving the fouled case in the chamber. This is not opinion! It is substantiated by the Frankfort Arsenal reports of the time.Sometimes the trooper could dig the case out with a pocket knife, sometimes and eventually he could not. He had no saber to fight with. So the 1873 Colt issued with 25 cartridges became highly significant. Smart troopers carried more cartridges and another revolver as well. Custer is quoted in the recent movie Son of the Morning Star, "The Springfield jams after a few shots and that's why the officers buy their own guns and ammunition." Numerous different revolvers and ammunition have been found at the battle site.Most of this firing was done at close range. The troopers theoretically could have fired 23,000 45-70 rounds at close charging indians, they also could have fired around 6000 revolver 45 Colt cartridges at a close range enemy. Probably much higher for the revolver cartridges and considerably lower for the rifle, more revolvers and ammunition than recorded which may even out. Nearly 30,000 possible rounds fired in this engagement. If 25% solid hits were, that would equal 7500 probable kills or serious wounds. Could any serious student of linear logic and serious researcher of history believe a fallacious number like only 33 indians were killed in this engagement. It is an impossibility! And Reno's fight is not factored in.This battle broke the back of the plains indians and all they did beyond this point was run, run, run.
The army lied about the battle because of Custer's incompetent leadership leading his underarmed and split up command to annihilation and the bad ammunition for the rifles. the indians lied because they did not want to admit the horrific losses, and history endorsed it for the clueless!
Whenever one side has a combat advantage, be it in weapons, tactics or training, we see smaller numbers repeatedly defeat larger numbers (Greeks v. Persians, Romans v. Gauls, British v. Zulus, US Cavalry v. 'Red Indians').
However, there is always a limit to how big an opposing force you can take on. Sometimes that limit is crossed and then, no matter how well the smaller force fights, it will be overrun, and numbers will decide
(Teutoberg Forest, Isandlhwana, Little Big Horn).
Thank you for these interesting comments.
I am interested in the question of malfunctions in the Springfield carbine. Some of you regard this as a myth, others not.
Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Little_Bighorn) cites Richard Fox, Archaeology, History and Custer's Last Battle, 1993, University of Oklahoma Press, pp 241-2. Fox comments on the findings after a fire exposed the area to archaeological investigation in the early 1980s. He finds that 3.4% (3 out of 88) of .45/55-caliber Springfield cartridge cases from the Custer battlefield and 2.7% (7 out of 257) cases from the Reno-Benteen field seemed to have been pried from jammed weapons.
This is obviously only a very small sample of the thousands of rounds that must have been fired. Still it may be representative. (I find it interesting that the rate of malfunction on the site of the frenetic battle of Custer’s troops before they were overwhelmed is higher than where Reno’s troops withstood attacks over a much longer period and were presumably firing at a slower overall rate.)
The Wikepedia author concludes that “these findings suggest accounts of jammed carbines were the result of misconception or a myth that grew after the defeat.” That seems to me a misinterpretation. If 3% of rounds misfired, that would mean a trooper could expect to fire 33 rounds before a malfunction. That is only two or three minutes of rapid fire with this weapon.
If as seems likely some units beat off attacks by intensive fire for some time before they were overwhelmed, the 3% figure suggests a rate of malfunction that must have been terrifying for the soldiers. There are of course no reports of this from Custer’s units, but reports from Reno’s do indicate serial malfunctions.
The report of “numerous” broken knives is interesting. I assume these were not knives intended for fighting and so broken in combat, and I cannot imagine how such a knife would break in such conditions except in a frantic effort to extract a jammed cartridge. Yet presumably the knife would break only in a minority of cases, so numerous broken knives seems to suggest many jammed cartridges.
There are no official reports of this problem in earlier or later actions. The weapon was relatively new, and I wonder if earlier actions had been as intensive as this. The copper cartridge was replaced after the Greasy Grass by a brass version, so if later actions by troops so equipped did not reveal such a problem, that tells us little.
Does it matter?
Would Custer’s disposition of his forces have led to success if the carbines had all worked as designed? It seems unlikely, given how he had divided his forces so that they could not support each other. (Can anyone tell me how long the destruction of his units took? Given the criticism of Reno and Benteen, one would have to assume a considerable period, but I suspect it happened too fast for them to intervene.)
My assumption – not well based of course – is that his experiences had convinced him that the Indians would not fight, or at least would fight only to cover the flight of their families rather than make a serious attack. And that therefore his main intent was to cut off their retreat rather than to make a concerted attack where all his forces could support each other. Had there ever in 80 years been such a fight? Red Cloud’s war had been very different. Fetterman had been a far smaller affair. It was unprecedented for a whole regiment to have its attack replied to by attack.
Moreover, Custer’s uncordinated units were met by a response that was to say the least effective and, by some accounts, brilliant. He was utterly off balance, and the reply was deadly.
And in the end, it made no difference.
Two ways of life. Epic. That is to say, tragic and brutal and splendid, on both sides. And the ordinary people ruined and bereaved.
Andy:
Point of disagreement, the Fetterman clash, I presume that you mean the encounter at Rose Bud, was not so much a smaller affair as you state. In fact when reading descriptions of it one realizes that it was a long, virtually daylong, running battle betweed Fetterman and a force led by Crazy Horse. Initial fighting began as early as 0300 hrs and continued well into the day. In fact, were it not for the assistance of turncoat indians, traditional enemies of the Lakota and Cheyenne, the Rose Bud could have been far worse that LBH. In the event the failure of Fetterman to fulfill his portion of the three pronged pincer on the Lakota/Cheyenne alliance contributed to Custer's defeat at the LBH.
I think you mean Gen. Crook
I find Andy's comments interesting. He takes the time to make some evaluation of the incident. My comments would be:
Archaeologists like Fox are evaluating a very picked over battlefield so their findings do not necessarily reflect what actually happened.
Note, 45-70 and 45-55 cases cannot be distinguished because there was no headstamping to differentiate. Both were likely present. They are not shooters nor ballistics experts, thus they really have no grasp on what they are looking at.
The 3.4% pried cases figure cannot be supported in reality. This was only the number of cases found and reported in modern times so it is a non-fact. Thus trying to extrapolate 33 shots between jams is totally incorrect. The same problem applies to the broken pocket knives found. Many had already been picked up. Battlefield pick over began with the indians looting the dead. It is a matter of record one indian said numerous Springfields were thrown into the river because they were jammed beyond
the indian's ability to repair them.
The Frankfort Arsenals reports and modern replication of Springfield rifle tests are totally conclusive. The rifle started jamming after about 5 shots and progressively got worse if not completely cleaned. To those of you who have not done any black powder shooting, that means cleaning the rifle with hot water!
One other significant point I must take issue with. The fact the brass casing replaced the copper one after this fight tells us a great deal! It tells us the copper one was inadequate and failed in service at the Little Big Horn, badly.
Of course the big question is as Andy states, would it have made any difference in the outcome had the carbines functioned properly?
The short answer is yes, but only in degree. Custer's unit could still have been completely lost due to the disparity in numbers. They also might have survived, but badly mauled. It is unlikely Custer personally would have survived as there is some indication he was badly hit down at the river before retreating up the hill.
Custer made the mistakes of:
1. Making his men leave their sabers at home.
2. Not taking Gatling guns and infantry offered.
3. Dividing his force in the face of a mammoth enemy.
4. Ignoring all advice by Reno, Benteen and his scouts.
5. Not issuing more revolver ammunition while knowing the Carbine was defective.
I believe the indians lost a massive and undetermined amount of warriors. If they did not, why did they not attack Terry's forces the next day? Where was their next big battle? There was none, because the Little Big Horn broke them. The way of life of the Plains Indian died with their enemy "Son of the Morning Star, he who attacks at dawn".
Question; Is there any info to extrapolate the rounds fired by Custer with the cartridge cases found. Unless someone picked them up Custer did not spend much time firing.
With such a picked over battlefield extrapolation is a guess work rather than facts from a uncontaminated crime scene. Cases found on the battlefield are apparently few, compared to cartridges fired. Some reports exist about large piles of copper casings at the battle site. In the 1960's cartridge case hunting by tourists and collectors was popular at the LBH. There also had been a re-enactment there in1881 with live ammunition. Dick Fox a archaeologist of small repute with others, is full of theories/extrapolations about a few casings found. He speculates Custer's battalion only fired 14% of their ammunition! Such figures are comparable to 33 indians killed in the whole battle! Custer's battalion was packing at least 21,000 rounds for the carbine not to mention the revolver
The only extrapolation to be drawn, is they threw everything they could at the indian's..
question- any info thoughts why crazy horse can ride as if on parade and not get shot, With all of the 7th firing (did it happen) was it his powerful medicine or elevation problems from lack of training, or something else.
This type of question is most difficult to answer objectively. The early plains indian's believed that "strong Medicine" could protect them from bullets. This led to some unbelievable displays of bravery or foolhardiness as one would percieve it. Crazy Horse could well have rode back and forth in front of the troops and not stopped a bullet. And also the tale maybe exaggerated as many tales are over the many retelling. This is for the reader to evaluate.
Thanks for the interesting article, better reading this than doing work (don't tell the boss). Couple of points struck me;-
As for the 'indians' being 'savages' I think we have to be mature and move away from the 'traditional' view of demonizing them but equally reject the 'PC' 'hippie' view of the some eco friendly vegetarian, spiritual, warrior(non violent warrior of course). Best comment I have read is that they were simply people with good points and faults etc.
It is only in recent times that the notion of taking prisoners (other than as slaves) has become the norm before that well it varied. If you look back to when my peope (Welsh/British) were at the same level of development –what 2-3000 years ago?— then a captive would be a slave (if she was lucky), given to a druid to sacrifice (Romans were terrffied of being caught) or I'd cut his head off and use his skull as a drinking cup of put it on a stake as a sign of my prowess.
Paul would sabres have really helped? have read several accounts and they comment that the troopers had having no close range weapons. The 24th at Rorkes Drift and Isandlwana inflicted very heavy casualties at close range because of their bayonets but they were trained and able (where they were scattered they were quickly overcome) to stand in rally squares or shoulder to shoulder. This would not have been and opotion for the 7th. also ,as you point out, the average US trooper was not trained well in his primary weapon, would they have had any idea how to use a sabre, it is not just a big knife. The officers would perhaps been competent.
Would the infantry have been able to keep up? were they mounted?
Would they have simply arrived to rescue Benteen earlier?
Wasn't he offered extra troops of horse from the 2nd (?), these may have helped but given the totality of his defeat would it have simply added extra casualties?
About the casualties from what I have read (agreed you've read more) the low numbers of Indian casualties are based on estimates so are not accurate but there does seem to be agreement in most sources that 'Indian' (sorry not sure of what is the latest PC word required to descibe these good people) casualties were very low especially considering the size of the victory. At Isandlwana the Zulu King described the 'butcher bill' for the victory as a spear thrust into his own belly. However if we accept that only 50 warriors were killed outright for each one of them there must have been 4-5 wounded. The PC brigade will then say that would shouldn't underestimate traditional medicine and that people then were much tougher than today (true that had to be or they would be dead) but sorry wounds inflicted by such guns would require modern ER so many if not most of these wounded would have died.
Hope you notice this, sorry coming late to the post.
I think I read that the paired markers were because their were markers placed at head and foot. This fact wasn't known later.
The Lakotas did not usually carry dead bodies away, except from the fight to the village. They left the dead in the teepees found in the abandoned village. Undoubtedly, many more died of wounds later and their bodies were not found along the trail.
The Indian's position in a long term conflict was untenable because they always had their families nearby. Except for occasional raids.
I don't suppose they were any more 'savage' than we were, in most circumstances. They were mostly insular though. But they were a warrior dominated society. And they raided, killed and captured other tribes. But when they stole a female, it was to acquire a wife. It's difficult to generalize about other societies. But down through history, when two different societies met, they fought. And the stronger won.
Being nomadic is a real disadvantage, because when you're gone some settler would move in and fence the best sites. They then would not be comfortable with the returning nomads. And the nomads would not be happy with their usual foraging grounds being unavailable. It would have been fatal to that nomadic lifestyle.
How could there not have been conflict?
Kevinmeath;
In regard to the mature view of the indians being not savages but instead simply" people with good points and bad".
Of course, you know that is completely misleading. The north American indian was for most definitions a "hunter gather society" but some tribes were extremely vicious and cruel and constantly engaged in tribal warfare. These are not my definitions. There is some indication that soldiers captured at the Little Big Horn were tortured well into the night. Any light study of the subject matter shows the word "Savage" regarding the Lakota, Comanche, Apache and most other indians is completely accurate although discomforting to the modern reader.
Would saber's have helped? Well, it is obvious they would have helped. It is a very good question to attempt to ascertain to what extent. You mention the British Bayonet and it's wet work in Africa.Massive casualties from a somewhat crude and simple weapon most would be surprised at. I myself have had occasion to work with a bayonet. It is an extremely deadly and under-rated weapon.
Imagine yourself on a training field surrounded by ten thousand troops all armed with bayonet fitted M-14's. The Drill Instructer in the center mounted on a twenty foot platform screams "What is the spirit of the bayonet? Ten thousand throats scream back "To Kill". Don't laugh till you have experienced the incredible chill down your back.
Hundreds of thousands of warriors have laughed in the face of death with no more than a strand of three foot of steel, iron or bronze in their hand.
Of course all kinds of extrapolations can be drawn from this. This weapon was less effective dismounted. So you could say maybe 50% of Custer's company could have killed one indian each and climb up.As you can see this is not going to change the outcome. Scale upward with all elements being lead on a sabre charge into the village indian losses would likely been horrific and probably most of the force would likely been lost. Endless but fascinating scenarios.
Custer would not accept the Gatling Guns and the infantry because he wanted to race to the indian village ahead of Terry and Crook to grasp his imagined great victory. His men were dog tired as well as his horses when they got there.
I believe the Indian losses are greatly underestimated. This was the last battle of the Plains Indian.
H. Toburen:
OK lets get a few facts straight here.
1. Not sure about the paired markers. Many of the bones were simply dumped into a mass grave with the horses. Others "buried' under sagebrush.
2. The Indian's almost always carried their dead off the field if at all possible.Often they were placed in tree's or caves. The Box Wagon Fight is well documented with a long line of ponies carrying Indian dead up the mountain. Later a Lt. followed them and reported finding hundreds of bodies placed in tree's near a clearing. One Buckskinner recorded killing hundreds of Indians as they attacked and attempted body recoveries.
3 Conflict was inevitable in settling the country.
Good subjects.
i never knew india had colonies in north america, and that they manged to aquire repeating rifles