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Battle of Little Bighorn: Were the Weapons the Deciding FactorWild West | 13 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post
The soldiers’ difficulty in hitting their targets was also increased by the fact that the Indians stayed out of harm’s way for almost all of the battle. One archaeological field study located the Indian positions and discovered that nearly every location was 300 to 1,200 yards away from the troopers. Given the distances involved, the fact that soldiers tended to shoot high, the lack of marksmanship training and the conscious or subconscious posturing involved, it is not surprising that the troopers scored so few hits. Arguably, posturing has been a factor at every gunpowder battle, as it most likely was at the Little Bighorn–but how about submission? It was drummed into the common soldier that he should save the last bullet for himself. He supposedly would place his Colt to his head, pull the trigger and go to Fiddler’s Green, rather than take the chance of being captured alive. Custer had even requested that his wife, Elizabeth, who often rode with the cavalry, should be shot by an officer rather than chance being taken by the Indians. As strange as it may seem, even with this dread of being captured, surrender attempts were made at the Little Bighorn fight. Indian accounts tell of white men who, at the last second, threw their hands up in surrender and offered their guns to the onrushing warriors. The Lakotas and Cheyennes were not swayed. Given all these factors operating against the citizen-soldier, how could commanders ever go into battle expecting to win? The answer, again, lies not in the weapons the soldiers used, but in the soldiers themselves–and their officers. Dividing up a command in the near presence of an enemy may be an act to be avoided during large-scale maneuvers with army-sized units, but such is not the case during small-scale tactical cavalry maneuvers. Custer adhered to the principles for a successful engagement with a small, guerrilla-type, mobile enemy. Proven tactics called for individual initiative, mobility, maintaining the offensive, acting without delay, playing not for safety but to win, and fighting whenever the opportunity arose. It was accepted that Regular soldiers would never shirk an encounter even with a superior irregular force of enemies, and that division of force for an enveloping attack combined with a frontal assault was a preferable tactic. On a small scale, and up to a certain point, Custer did almost everything he needed to do to succeed. Problems arose, however, when tactics broke down from midlevel and small-scale, to micro-scale. According to then Brevet Major Edward S. Godfrey, fire discipline–the ability to control and direct deliberate, accurate, aimed fire–will decide every battle. No attack force, however strong, could reach a defensive line of steady soldiers putting out disciplined fire. The British army knew such was the case, as did Napoleon. Two irregular warriors could probably defeat three soldiers. However, 1,000 soldiers could probably beat 2,000 irregulars. The deciding factor was strength in unity–fire discipline. It was as Major Godfrey said: ‘Fire is everything, the rest is nothing.’ Theoretically, on the Little Bighorn, with a small-scale defense in suitable terrain with an open field of fire of a few hundred yards, several companies of cavalrymen in close proximity and under strict fire control could have easily held off two or three times their number of Indian warriors. In reality, on the Little Bighorn, several companies of cavalrymen who were not in close proximity and had little fire control, with a micro-scale defense in unsuitable, broken terrain, could not hold off two or three times their number of Indian warriors. The breakdown stems from an attitude factor. Custer exhibited an arrogance, not necessarily of a personal nature, but rather as a part of his racial makeup. Racial experience may have influenced his reactions to the immediate situation of war. It was endemic in red vs. white modes of warfare and implies nothing derogatory to either side. Historically, Indians fled from large bodies of soldiers. It was Custer’s experience that it was much harder to find and catch an Indian than to actually fight him. Naturally influenced by his successful past experiences with small-unit tactics, Custer attacked. He was on the offensive. He knew he must remain on the offensive to be successful. Even after Reno had been repulsed, Custer was maneuvering, looking for another opportunity to attack. The positions that Custer’s dead were found in did not indicate a strong defensive setup. Even after the Indians had taken away the initiative, Custer’s mind-set was still on ‘attack.’ Although a rough, boxlike perimeter was formed, it appeared more a matter of circumstance than intent. Custer probably never realized that his men’s very survival was on the line, at least not until it was too late to remedy the situation. The men were not in good defensible terrain. They were not within mutual supporting distance. They were not under the tight fire control of their officers. Custer’s troopers were in detachments too small for a successful tactical stance. When the critical point was reached, the soldiers found themselves stretched beyond the physical and psychological limits of fight or posture–they had to flee or submit. Seemingly out of supporting distance of his comrades, the individual trooper found himself desperately alone. The ‘bunkie’ was not close enough. The first sergeant was far away. The lieutenant was nowhere to be seen. The trooper responded as well as he could have been expected to. He held his ground and fought, he fired into the air like an automaton, he ran, he gave up. Some stands were made, particularly on and within a radius of a few hundred yards of the knoll that became known as Custer Hill, where almost all of the Indian casualties occurred. When it came down to one-on-one, warrior versus soldier, however, the warrior was the better fighter. George Armstrong Custer may have done almost everything as prescribed. But it was not enough to overcome the combination of particular circumstances, some of his own making, arrayed against him that day. Inadequate training in marksmanship and poor fire discipline resulting from a breakdown in command control were major factors in the battle results. Neither Custer’s weapons nor those the Indians used against him were the cause of his defeat. This article was written by Greg Michno and originally appeared in the June 1998 issue of Wild West. 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            Tags: 19th Century, American Indian Wars, Historical Conflicts, Native American History, The Wild West, Weaponry, Wild West
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13 Comments to “Battle of Little Bighorn: Were the Weapons the Deciding Factor”
One of the best analyses of Custer’s defeat I have ever read. Kudos to author Michno and Wild West magazine.
By Bob on Jun 21, 2008 at 2:03 pm
IN THE BOOK CUSTERS FALL BY DAVID HUMPHREYS MILLER. HE STATES THAT CUSTER WAS SHOT BY WHITE COW BULL AT MEDICINE TAIL COULEE.THIS WOULD GO SOME WAY TO EXPLAINING WHY INSTEAD OF CROSSING MTC THE TROOPS RETREATED BACK UP THE HILL WHEN IT SEEMED AS IF THE INDIAN VILLAGE AT THAT TIME WAS ONLY LIGHTLY DEFENDED.I WONDER WHAT VIEWS THERE ARE ON THIS
By MICHAEL O'CONNELL on Jul 7, 2008 at 1:52 pm
I love this info that is put up, I even choose this website for nhd (National
History Day
By austin pankey on Nov 17, 2008 at 5:41 pm
what kind of weapons use the Indians against the 7m Cavalry & General Custer?
By Alberto Gonzalez on Feb 24, 2009 at 1:49 pm
The original Springfield Rifle adopted by the army was not .45 caliber. It was a .50. Also the ammunition issued for the .45 jammed notoriously and was a factor in the battle. you might want to check these facts out to your satisfaction and posting improvement.
By Paul on Mar 28, 2009 at 3:40 pm
Paul,
You need to read the 1985-85 archaeolgical report at Little Bighorn. Jamming of weapons was more prevalent among the Sioux and Cheyenne weapons than it was for U.S. Army Springfields.
Crook’s 15 cavalry companies expended approximately 80,000 rounds of .45/55 ammunition aat the Rosebud on 17 June 1876 but experienced little to no documented jamming.
Custer was beat in a straight-up engagement. Bested by warriors who fought better than his immediate command. No excuses for his defeat are needed. He lost because the Sioux/Cheyenne won.
By Jeff Helmer on May 17, 2009 at 10:02 pm
Jeff: You need to look further and deeper than a archalogical report on a picked over battlefield. There are several books on the .45-70 and its overly soft copper case heads. The key word is REPORTED/DOCUMENTED jamming! Jammed springfiields were prevalent at the Battle of the Little Big Horn. Numerous busted pocket knives found of troopers trying to clear jams. Numerous indian’s reported trooper fighting with jammed trapdoors. They also reported throwing many jammed rifles into the river as they were useless. Perhaps 6 or 7 cases with blown heads. Only a small portion of what had occurred. Right after the battle Army Ordinance changed the ammunition and covered up the incident much like they did with the M16 in Vietnam!
Do not just be a reader of men’s viewpoints, be a researcher. The LBH was not a stand up fight, and the indian’s did not fight better than the soldiers. Custer broke his command into three sections, did not wait for the second half of his detachment, and went glory hunting on his own. Three small units, jamming carbines, hordes of indian’s. The results were predictable. This hardly makes great stand-up fighters of the indian’s.
There is considerable evidence to suggest the indians lost a far greater number than is accepted by dogma. In fact they may have actually lost thousands but that is politically not acceptable.
Whatever is finally said, the fact is it was the last great battle for the plains indian’s. Other than the Nez Peirce conflict the plains indian’s were destroyed. I hardly think losing only 33 indian’s would have caused that!
Yes, the early .45-70 ammunition was unreliable and cost many lives. Were it not for the Colt .45 the loses would likely have been much higher.
Custer was an incompetent and would have been courtsmartialed had he survived. DO NOT BE A READER, BE A RESEARCHER!
By Paul on Jun 9, 2009 at 12:06 pm
I agree with the view that the most plausible (and imo, ONLY) explanation for the flow of the battle and command suddenly going from offense to defense after the MTC crossing is that Custer was mortally shot at that point, rather then sitting uphill and watching Yates charge the village (which totally contradicts Custer’s charatcter and command expectations of the time of having the Genreal at the head of the command) or sending Yates to reconnoiter the village, which was lightly defended but yet not attacked. My only puzzle with this theory is was Surgeon Lord’s body was not found by last stand hill but rather with E/F further down towards the River. It would make sense that he would have stayed close to wounded Custer unless of course Custer was dead and nothing could be done for him. Weopon jamming could explain the sudden onset of despair evident by the seeming widespread evidence of suicide pacts (frequent occurance of two paired markers) . Salute.
By Mike on Jun 13, 2009 at 2:04 pm
Mike; Rather than refer back to my books I think I will just answer off the top of my head. As I remember Custer was reported as having three wounds on his body. One through the right chest, one creasing the head and one some where else of a minor nature. I probably should do the research to renew my memory! The point I am attempting to make is should he have been shot through the chest at the river, by the time he reached LSH he could have bleed out by the time he got there. A good possibility. This of course, is only theory
At the Battle of the Rosebud Gen. Crooks account never mentions any jamming of the Springfield’s during extensive ammunition expenditure that I can remember. Your own conclusions can be drawn from this. Crook was primarily saved by his own indian allies.
By Paul on Jun 22, 2009 at 1:19 am
The paired markers is a myth caused by the fact that markers meant for the Reno-Benteen battlefield were mistakenly placed on the Custer field. When the markers were placed, the were put in locations of “depressions” and “rank” vegetation. During the earlier burials earth was scraped up on either side of a body and piled on it. Resulting in two depressions next to one another. Two markers were therefore mistakenly placed where only one should have been and others to mark where horses might have fallen.
This has been supported by subsequent excavations at paired markers where only the disarticulated remains of one individual have been found. Still at others, the markers were offset from the remains and only part of the remains were recovered for reburial leaving as much as half or more in place. This says something about the dedication of the burial details and or the Montana summer heat.
Bottom line is these myths need to stop being repeated in the face of verifiable historical and scientific fact.
Suicide pacts indeed….
By Keith Patton on Sep 18, 2009 at 11:48 am
I am somewhat at a loss as to what Keith means by paired markers. The only conclusion i can draw is he means a paired marker indicates two soldiers each shot themselves rather than be captured. Or two soldiers fell near each other.
If this is so, I would not be so quick to scoff at suicide pacts. This was an situation where “save the last bullet for yourself” had real meaning. These soldiers were fighting a stone age Asian society where torture was freely practiced on their enemies. Being captured alive meant being skinned or burned alive or some similar end. Some Indian biographies note that quite a few soldiers shot themselves when they ran out of ammunition or their rifles jammed (look it up!).
So scoffing at suicide pacts is not an objective evaluation of this particular situation and is a personal opinion unsupported by any evidence.
By Paul on Sep 20, 2009 at 10:06 pm
Lakota and Cheyenne warriors were generally quick killers and didn’t go in for a lot of torture, though they certainly mutilated the dead afterwards. When Fanny Kelly was captured by the Lakota in 1864, they dragged her off into a teepee — and made them teach her how to read. She appears never to have been raped and when she owned a house in Washington she invited any Lakota who showed up with his wife to stay over. Perhaps the greatest myth of the American West is that Indians were “savages” who did all sorts of terrible things without the slightest provocation. This is hokum. Their most frequent initial response to white people was curiosity, sometimes followed by hospitality. Even when wars were in progress, Catholic priests and Quakers could circulate among the Plains tribes without fear because they were holy men who presented no threat. Once Episcopal Bishop Henry Whipple, visiting Lakota friends, got up on a cold night to bring his saddle into the teepee to prevent theft. “You didn’t have to do that,” his Lakota host told him. “You’re the only white man around for 50 miles….”
By John Koster on Oct 26, 2009 at 5:20 pm
It is always interesting to see the innocent try to re-write history. Modern historians and pre-occupied supporters of equality try to portray the American Indian as the gentle noble native. The truth of course, is they were asian stone-age savages. This is not a denegration, it is merely the truth. They had a penchant for war and torture. Despite all the modern nay-sayers all of the 19th century and early 20th century books on their lives and culture detail this.
Fanny Kelly’s capture and captive life was brutal and savage. She details how a number of times different indians tried to murder her only to be stopped by another. Whether she was raped or not we only have her word on that. The indians regularly scalped women and small children. Skinning alive and burning at the stake was a common end for captives.
Did whites practice brutality against the indians? They certainly did. History is filled with the details. Did the whites practice ethnic cleansing? To a degree they certainly did.
Were clerics exempt? Only ocassionally, and usually based on personal relationships.
Before people yell “Hokum”, read your history books, don’t try to make up history as you wish it was.
By Paul on Nov 14, 2009 at 12:12 am