Cultural Anthropology vs Physical Anthropology. It was the publishing of Richard Fox's earlier work on the LBH that refocused my attention to the Lakota-Dakota side of the story. This actually took me then to a refreshing in 101 culural anthro class.

My personal collection of LBH printed material was significant but being that I do not want to take material to my grave, and I thought my study of GG-LBH was satisfactory, it was donated to a "Friend of the Library" group 05-07? to sell throw-away what ever so they could purchase books of the library's interests.

In time memory fades. Eli Ricker wrote several books, and other magazines-periodicals, personal letters etc at and around 1900, that participated in documenting voices of that critical period in American history. To focus that LBH has finally arrived to a conclusion is wrong. Theories can not become fact until repetitive duplication of that theory occurs – outside of the creators of the theory. And I have my theory. In that mentioned collection of past, the concept that a group of soldiers were "out of the fight" I repeated recently. True – who knows. In around early 1900 this young boy, 12-14yrs in 1876 told his story (remembering migration of truth) name age has been written, and what his job was. 12-15/16yrs before passage into warrior these boys had specific duties especially when on the "move" and within honor a criteria of passage. Horses were the first daily duty, protection of the family-women and children, usually under the guidance of the elder men. These boys would by nature of their duty be between the family and the danger, close enough to family, to bring defense immediately. Not too close not too far. Many scholar historical authors negate evidence of "little" importance according to some logical consensus – as is done sometimes in physical anthropology. My telling considerations are the now available Anthro digs and the newest map rendition/interpretation that put, perhaps, Custer some distance to the north (Indian story) to turn (around?) to that soldier group in-around Last Stand. My guess at least 100 of these boys, maybe many times that many, some would have seen what this one boy spoke of while performing his duty and honor.

44-40 Empty cases. Custer owned a M73 Win rifle of 1874 purchase. So did Tom Custer. A rifle that had a feed-jamb problem of occasion. Did they take these? I would have being some subordinate would actually take care of it when not in use. Were there other 73's? How many Indians would have owned this relatively expensive new rifle? How many rounds would they have personally toted along the previous days journey? Not many of the Wagon Train immigrants of 1874 to 1895 would have owned one of these rifles -expense? The Pile? A lever action in the hands of a disciplined shooter would not have built a "pile" in one place-field of fire. Lever-actions even in a bench shooting place do not pile brass. Revolvers would tend to "condense" the spent case pile more so than a lever-action. The 44-40 was not an issue weapon. The "dig" discovered this "pile". Did an Indian before leaving the site prepare this pile for pick-up-recycle-salvage or ? My view would to a minute degree, better a revolver with the shooter prone-kneeling behind a dead horse if combat were the cause of the pile.

I also support the massive Blame or cover-up. There is little difference in Sara Winnemucca's story concerning the 1870's Paiute Indian and the corruption within the Dept of Interior-Indian Affairs. Almost identical, excluding the ability to project power in the numbers equivalent to LBH-GG The original estimate of Lakota rogue-militant Indians, off agency-reservation would have easily been handled by one cavalry unit. The numbers of agency compliant Indians that as soon as spring sprung left to join (many were just hungry) the rogue group was the sliding scale that perpetrated the outcome. Agents for hire at the "Agency" reservation did not could not Would-not properly account for Indian persons not -accounted for prior to the 7th deployment.

The God-boyish soldier, as in Godfrey, displayed earlier than LBH, but at LBH what disciplined Fire can achieve even at significant numbers disparity of soldiers vs Indians. Disciplined Fire Power and Weir Point withdrawal.

James Sturgis, Lt. was within the Custer right wing. He also wore the buck-skin jacket similar to Custer's. His head was found within the Cheyenne camp site post battle. Was he the one Indians claimed to have shot from his horse at the river?

The Grey Horse Troop. Interesting, even thought there are numerous accounts of the late-horse color change that may be an abstract by writers authors inclusion. Military horse and color was not new in 1876. Many accounts of doing such for the previous 1000 years.

I revisited the LBH and your additions unintentionally via Internet. What a pleasure vs hand digging in libraries for books etc. Your Contributions are refreshing as there has been a long attempt to distort and obfuscate the truth of Little Big Horn. Which may never be established in finding that truth. My quest, of not so nearly as long as LBH, with many similar small unit disciplinary requirements to be successful. Wild land fire suppression. The primary difference is in Wild land suppression the foe is limited to laws of physics whereas war-combat the primary factor is with a foe that can think outside of a norm. In fire the form ICs 214 incident log completed by unit leader does not include the comments of the grunts-firefighters with the dirt on them. What in 100 years if a student wishes to study that fire and reads this log – the Order of Battle is clear, but the small voice of the fire fighter is mute.

Jim

Jim

Custer based his attack on previous engagements with smaller tribes who would scatter away when he engaged them. This was a gathering of some 5 different tribes however. Even when the main column arrived the lead commander General Terry assessed the situation and elected not to engage them. By this time Reno's command had lost nearly a third of his soldiers and Custer and Keogh had been wiped out by warriors nearly 4.5 miles southeast of where Reno tried to hold a skirmish line on the flat ground near the Bighorn River confronting overwhelming warriors.

Why where the Crow Indians staged nearly 14 miles away during this Custer expedition through these low lying hills? What if any did Custer's Scouts reveal about this massive encampment? If Custer had any knowledge of the size of this encampment he certainly failed to demonstrate it by leaving most of the 7th back with General Terry along with the only 2 Gatling guns in their arsenal.

Custer and Keogh were in fact surrounded by the warriors who clearly had been watching their movement for sometime as they moved through the low lying hills above the Little Bighorn River across from the flats of the valley of the great Indian encampment.

Fred, what do you mean by this sentence?

" And the Indian account in 1905 that a large (perhaps larger than was originally at the Last Stand site) group of cavalry was "out of the fight" near corralling the women and children North of the village areas, returned to the Last Stand site – to help-assist the dismounted soldiers was that Indian's claim."

Fred, never heard of this before. Tell me more, Buddy, and where can I read the details??

Thanks,
Jim

The 7th was prior to this LBH ops deployed in the South-post Civil War semi Police-occupation duties. Many of the grunt soldiers had nearly no combat preparedness training in those 14-18 months of assignment in the South and most had no combat experience. The 7th CO Gen Terry and the inevitable disciplinary action on subordinate enlisted 60 days prior to that deployment to LBH has some tell tell of small cohesive discipline deficiencies – Custer was but a piece of this disaster waiting to happen. Officers of that time were allowed to bring personal horses or The-pick of the govment horse flesh. The horse Ramrod if not politically appointed would know a horse in short order. Unusually Officers had by far better cavalry horse flesh. The U.S. Army of 1876 were the remnants of the hasty post Civil War rapid retrograde, common even today. Civil War developed the seemingly perpetual corruption in the purchasing arena of war materials. Horse flesh procurement is noted as being quality deficient – all horses did not meet cavalry requirements and the prescription was padded with horses that in some cases were little more than soap factory material. Some in the Army knew this -seeing first hand, but were out of the system to correct. Custer did recognize some of the Army deficiencies, and said so – right or wrong was properly put in place prior to the LBH. And thrown on top of the Logistics deficiencies, some number of enlisted grunt cavalrymen were drafted via the Court Alternative common at that time. This Draft so to speak were young men, usually from a large eastern city, in and out of law trouble and given a Rehab of sorts – complete the Army prescribed assignment Or go to jail. Some were recent immigrants with little-poor language assimilation.

My earlier Logistics wins wars is in part an attempt to clarify that what took place in the Civil War continues today, altered but still there. 2001 an Army combat Division, immediately post 9-11 was put on alert perpetual 18hr deployment schedule for the alert status Brigade. One subunit of this brigade Light towed airborne artillery was operating at 60% strength, and during prescription certification monthly training – live fire 6 rounds(may have been actually 12-16?), it was most common to fire one and Pretend 5. Logistics and budgets – live 105 rounds are expensive. Eventually this small artillery battery – 6 gun-howitzer but deployed with 122mm mortar tubes correctly so, came back and very soon the battery was at full strength, with more than the required Live Round training.

I think that all of these seemingly unimportant logistical shortcomings may have contributed to the battle field small unit discipline deterioration that in some part were presented by grunt enlisted comments as well as any number of Indian accounts. In some cases small unit discipline cohesiveness makes or breaks a tenacious officers battle field decisions, especially when there is not over-whelming superior force.

Horses-flesh of cavalry is more important than a repeating rifle, of that particular time. Cavalry is today's light mechanized force – rapid battle field maneuvering.The advantage of rapid maneuvering is fear-confusion-unknown. View or vision of all small units on any battle field is impossible in 1876 as well as 2012. In particular the geography and terrain of the Little Big Horn river drainage makes view nearly impossible except as the river runs north into the today's Crow Agency area-is where the 1905 Indian claim of corralling the women and children. The last minute change to Horse Color is bad business unless for the parade at 2 pm. The Springfield73 cavalry rifle can be loaded while riding at gallop, the 73 Winchester shorter pistol round can also, but the smallness of cartridge tended to make loading with a gloved or inexperienced hand more difficult. And when On Line dismounted the Springfield 45-55 had an effective engagement distance almost 3 times that of the 44-40.

I think Reno was drunk when he deployed in the valley above the village. Officers during the Civil War and 1876 were authorized sip booze from their perpetual flask carry. Peter Thompson story – all of his remaining life. And the separation of clothing regalia – Custer wanted-opted for all officers to wear buckskin for this deployment, and evidently all had the buckskin(?) and the division of loyalty showed – those supporting Custer wore those including his brothers and some others that had that clothing vs those that stayed in issue uniform. The divisional line is today evident. The pile of spent 44.40 brass at the Last Stand site two known 44.40s George and Tom Custer. Thompson's claim of seeing "Custer" at some distance across the river, alone on horse back ( was wearing the buckskin garb-regalia) could have been Tom Custer. And the Indian account in 1905 that a large (perhaps larger than was originally at the Last Stand site) group of cavalry was "out of the fight" near corralling the women and children North of the village areas, returned to the Last Stand site – to help-assist the dismounted soldiers was that Indian's claim.Keeping in tune with the then current cavalry-military procedure of common-acceptance that the right wing is the Command Wing, is separable when battlefield flow so dictates.